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ABSTRACT
Speechwriting practices have long heen associated with 
rhetorical history. American presidents..have employed,' 
the speechwriter’s assistance since the beginning of this 
nation. From the dawn of radio, presidential speechwriting 
practices have grown to the extent that most presidents 
rely heavily on the writer to prepare the bulk of their 
messages.
While many political speakers have grown to depend 
on the speechwriter to assist him in preparing the ideas 
or language of his message, rhetorical critics have largely 
ignored the writer's influence on the message and his 
impact on the preparation process. The purpose of this 
study is fourfold. First of all, this critic examines 
the speechwriter's role in the preparation process and his 
contributions to presidential discourse since the days of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. Secondly, she attempts to point 
out the strengths and weaknesses of present rhetorical 
theory and criticism in considering speechwriting practices 
Thirdly, the critic proposes her own theoretical postulates 
for extending critical methodologies, and finally, she
i
applies her postulates to two speeches in Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration.
v
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The writer discusses how speechwriters have played 
various roles in preparing presidential discourse. Some 
participants are responsible for preparing only the language 
of the address, while others assist in policy decision­
making which results in the speechwriter playing a signi­
ficant role in preparing the ideas of the speech. The 
organization of writers vary, with some presidents relying 
primarily on individual efforts and others preferring 
committee writing efforts.
Regardless of their roles and organization, the 
speechwriter's presence proposes an interactional setting, 
in which the speaker and his writer or writers participate. 
The critic must examine the speechwriting effort as an 
interactional process and therefore consider the ffect 
of the interaction between writers and the speaker on the 
drafting process and final product. This writer suggests 
guidelines whereby the critic may explore the triadic 
relationship between the speaker, the writers, and the 
ideas of the message; the triadic relationship between the 
speaker, the writers, and the language of the discourse; 
and the triadic relationship between the speaker, the 
writers, and the perception and response to a rhetorical 
situation.
The critic then examines the 196^ State of the Union 
speech and Johnson's March Jl, 1968 speech, to determine
vi
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the speechwriter's role in the drafting process and their 
effect on the final product. She describes the interaction 
between the participants in each drafting process and then 
examines each of the triadic relationships in both speeches. 
Finally, the critic evaluates the writer's contribution 
and interaction in each situation. She evaluates the 
writer's ability to assist the speaker in realizing his 
fullest potential inventionally, linguistically, and in 
response to the rhetorical situation; to assist in producing 
a superior text technically as well as artistically; and to 
assist in producing a desired response by making the speech 
a persuasive instrument.
vii
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In July of 1976, James Earl Carter stood before an
ecstatic crowd at the Democratic National Convention to
deliver his first speech as the party's nominee. The now
famous phrase, "Hello, I'm Jimmy Carter, and I'm running
for President of the United States," brought the crowd to
its feet. Amid the gaiety of balloons and confetti, few
members of the audience knew they had just heard their
candidate deliver a carefully staged introduction. In
reality, Jack Kaplan and John Barrett, two Hollywood
comedy writers, had handprinted the following words on
a yellow legal pad, complete with stage directions:
(After thank yous Jimmy turns to 
audience and says:) Hello, I'm 
Jimmy Carter, (laugh) and I'm 
running for President of the 
United States. (Applause).^
While the candidate had worked extensively on drafts which
reflected his own language and ideas, he had depended
on others to assist him in preparing and polishing his
rhetoric.
Martin Schram, Running for President: A Journal of 
the Carter Campaign (New York: Pocket Books, 1977)» P« 2^1 ,>
1
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The preceding example is truly not an atypical situa­
tion; speechwriters have been actively involved in politi­
cal speechmaking for years. In fact, in recent years, 
speechwriting has been largely a delegated responsibility. 
In this writer's view, rhetorical scholars have ignored 
an important aspect of speech preparation, for the most 
part. In addition, rhetoricians have failed to extend 
the boundaries of rhetorical criticism to determine the 
speechwriter's role and influence in the process of 
drafting a speech. Critics have been hampered by inade­
quate research methodologies and tools for examining the 
ghostwriting practices and the speeches written by 
presidential ghostwriters.
Statement of the Problem
When a public address student knows that the speaker 
is the prime source of the ideas, organization, and 
style of the speech, he can use a variety of methods to 
analyze the speaker's rhetoric. He may depend on neo- 
Aristotlean forms of criticism as well as those methods 
proposed by Burke, Black, Hillbruner, and other rhetori­
cal theorists.
However, the student may have difficulties applying 
these same methods to ghostwritten speeches. While many 
theorists acknowledge the speechwriter's presence, none
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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suggests an approach for determining the speechwriter's 
influence on the invention, disposition, or style of the 
speech. As a result, the novice critic, often limited in 
his knowledge of speechwriting practices, has no way of 
ascertaining the speechwriter's influence on the prepara­
tion of a draft.
Statement of the Purpose
The following study seeks to determine how critics 
can extend present methodologies to encompass the presi­
dential speechwriter and to discern his influence on 
speech preparation. This researcher's task is:
1. To acknowledge the signi icance 
of speechwriting practices in the 
contemporary presidency and its 
impact on rhetorical studies.
2. To establish the strengths and 
weaknesses of existing rhetorical 
theories in examining and evaluating 
ghostwriting practices.
3. To propose a methodological 
approach which would supplement 
and extend present rhetorical 
theories in examining the ghost­
written speech.
4-. To apply the proposed methodology 
to the ghostwritten speeches of a 
contemporary president.
5. To evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach in the 
chosen situation.
Through such a study, the writer seeks to explore the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
influence and implications of speechwriting on rhetorical 
criticism and to extend theoretical approaches in examining 
ghostwritten speeches.
Related Research
A growing number of studies recognize the presence 
and contributions of speechwriters in the process of speech 
preparation. Journals, magazines, and books contain arti­
cles and interviews pertaining to the speechwriting prac­
tices. (These articles are cited in the bibliography of 
the dissertation.) Among speech journals, the following
articles are exemplary of the research on speechwriting:
2James Golden's "John F. Kennedy and the ’Ghosts',"
3Craig Smith's "Contemporary Political Speechwriting,
kRobert N. Hall's "Lyndon Johnson's Speech Preparation,"
Gage William Chapel's "Speechwriting in the Ford Admini­
stration,"^ and his article, "Speechwriting in the Nixon
^ James Golden, "John F. Kennedy and the 'Ghosts'," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. 52 (December 1966), 3^8-357-
^ Craig R. Smith, "Contemporary Political Speech- 
writing," Southern Speech Communication Journal. (Fall 
1976), 52.
^ Robert N. Hall, "Lyndon Johnson's Speech Prepara­
tion," Quarterly Journal of Speech. 51 (April 1965), 168-76*
Gage William Chapel, "Speechwriting in the Ford 
Administration," Exetasis. 15 June 1976, P* 16.
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£
Administration," and Carl Kell's "The Words of a Presi-
7dent: The Carter Years,"' to mention only a few. In addi­
tion, six theses and dissertations in the field of speech 
focus on political speechwriting. These include: Douglas 
P. Starr's thesis, "Ghosts in the State House?: A Study of 
the Speechwriting Operations of Ghostwriters in Florida's
OState Capitol," Starr's dissertation, "Ghostwriting in 
Government: A lexical Analysis of Matched Pairs of 
Speeches Ghostwritten for Florida Lieutenant Governor Tom 
Adams,Michael John Broker's thesis, "The Speech 
Machine: A Descriptive Study of Speech Preparation under 
the Administration of Harry S. T r u m a n , K a t h l e e n  J. 
Turner's thesis, "Rhetorical Inconsistencies: Lyndon
£ Gage William Chapel, "Speechwriting in the Nixon 
Administration," Journal of Communication. 24 (Spring 
1976), 65-72.
 ̂Carl Kell, "The Words of A President: The Carter 
Years," Exetasis. 15 November 19771 P- 17*
O Douglas Perret Starr, "Ghosts in the State House?:
A Study of the Speechwriting Operations of Ghostwriters 
in Florida's State Capitol," Thesis Florida State 1970*
^ Douglas Perret Starr, "Ghostwriting in Government:
A Lexical Analysis of Matched Pairs of Speeches Ghost­
written for Florida Lieutenant Governor Tom Adams," Diss. 
Florida State 1972.
Michael John Broker, Jr., "The Speech Machine:
A Descriptive Study of Speech Preparation under the Admini­
stration of Harry S. Truman," Thesis Central Missouri State 
1966.
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Johnson's Use of the Speechwriter,"'*''*" and Alan Morris 
Curtis' dissertation, "Political Speechwriting ('Ghost­
writing') in the Nixon Administration, 1968-72: Implica-
12tions for Rhetorical Criticism," and this writer's 
thesis, "The Ghostwriting of Select Speeches of Lyndon B. 
Johnson's Great Society."1-̂ Each of these studies 
enlarges the critic's understanding of speechwriting 
practices.
Methodology
While considerable literature has been generated on 
speechwriting, little research has been devoted to pro­
viding a suitable methodology for analyzing the speech­
writer 's presence. Most studies on speechwriting merely 
suggest guidelines for analysis and do not develop any 
methodology for analyzing ghostwritten speeches. Of 
particular assistance are the studies of Starr, Curtis,
Kathleen J. Turner, "Rhetorical Inconsistencies: 
Lyndon Johnson's Use of the Speechwriter," Thesis Purdue 
1976.
12 Alan Morris Curtis, "Political Speechwriting 
('Ghostwriting') in the Nixon Administration, 1968-72: 
Implications for Rhetorical Criticism," Diss. University 
of Southern California 1973-
Suzanne E. Condray, "The Ghostwriting of Select 
Speeches of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society," Thesis 
Colorado State University, 1977*
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Freshley,^ Devlin, ^  and Medhurst and Driebelbis.
Each writer presents guidelines to he followed in methodo­
logical design, hut does not develop any of these guide­
lines into a framework for accomplishing the task.
In present critical methodologies, rhetoricians 
examine the speaker's relationship to the ideas and language 
of the discourse as well as his response to the rhetori­
cal situation. This writer proposes that critics supplement 
and extend their methodologies to consider the speech­
writer 's presence and influence in the speechmaking 
process. Four areas of discussion serve as the hasis of 
this author's methodological design:
1. The interaction between the 
speaker and his speechwriters and 
the impact of the relationship on 
the speech process.
2. The speaker and speechwriter's 
influence on the ideas of the 
message.
3. The speaker and speechwriter's 
influence on the language of the 
discourse.
The relationship of the speaker 
and speechwriters in response to the 
rhetoric situation.
1 ii Dwight L. Freshley, "Gubernatorial Ghostwriting," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal, 31 (Winter 19657 95>
L. Patrick Devlin, "The Influences of Ghostwriting 
on Rhetorical Criticism," Today's Speech, (Summer 197^), ?•
Martin J. Medhurst and Gary C. Dreibelbis, "The 
Ghost of McGovern," Communication Quarterly, (Winter 1978),
k z .
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The researcher describes the speechwriter's contributions 
in each of these areas and, then, evaluates their influ- 
enceon the drafting process and the final text. The 
writer proposes that critics adopt any of these applicable 
postualtes in their own particular critical methodologies.
In order to evaluate the methodological design, the 
writer applies the principles to two ghostwritten speeches 
in the Johnson administration. Speeches are examined 
which represent committee and individual speechwriting 
efforts. Hence, the researcher shows how her methodology 
is useful in understanding and assessing both individual 
efforts and committee efforts in presidential speech- 
writing.




CHAPTER II "Ghosts in the White House?" 
The Influence of Speechwriting 
in Presidential Rhetoric
CHAPTER III The Strengths and Weaknesses 
of Present Methodologies
CHAPTER IV Extending Theoretical 
Postulates to Consider 
Speechwriting




An Application of Theory: 
Lyndon Johnson's State of the 
Union Address, January 7, 196^
An Application of Theory: 
Lyndon Johnson's March 31»
1968 Speech
CHAPTER VII Conclusions
Significance of the Study
Through the design and application of a supplemental 
approach to speech preparation, the researcher hopes to 
extend the scope of rhetorical studies to include a means 
of evaluating the role of the speechwriter in a given 
speech. By proposing some theoretical alternatives for 
examining ghostwritten speeches, the writer will attempt 
to show how critics can integrate methodologies consider­
ing the speechwriter into traditional forms of criticism, 
including neo-Aristotlean approaches, Burkean analyses, 
and other critical forms.
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CHAPTER TWO 
"GHOSTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE?"
THE INFLUENCE OF SPEECHWRITING 
IN PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC
Throughout the years of rhetorical history, ghost­
writing had been associated with political oratory. 
According to W. Norwood Brigance, ghostwriting practices 
originated in the cradle of Greek civilization as early 
as 411 B. C.f when Antiphon wrote speeches for others to 
deliver.^ However, over the years rhetorical critics have 
largely ignored the influence of the speechwriter in 
political oratory.
In America's own political history, several president 
employed speechwriters. Washington, Madison, Hamilton, 
Jackson, Lincoln, and Buchanan were among those presidents 
who relied on speechwriters. However, rhetorical scholars 
paid little attention to speechwriting practices until 
the advent of radio. Once presidential candidates began 
to use the media more extensively in the 1930's and 1940's
1 W. Norwood Brigance, "Ghostwriting Before Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the Radio," Today's Speech. 4 (September 
1956), 410.
10
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speechmaking demands increased and speechwriters were more
widely utilized in the presidency. Rhetorical critics
became more sensitive to the "ghost" in the White House
during Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration and
maintained that interest throughout the following years.
In 1955» at the annual Speech Association of America
Convention, three papers were presented on political
ghostwriting by Brigance, Robert F. Ray, and Ernest G.
Bormann. Bormann set the stage for the discussion by
defining "ghostwriting" as, "the practice of using
collaboration to deceive the audience and make the speaker
2appear better than he is (or at least different)."
later in 1963> Marie H. Nichols suggested a less judgmental
definition, stating that the ghostwritten speech is one
in which an assistant or speechwriter supplies either the
form or the ideas of a given text. Finally in 1973»
Alan M. Curtis proposed in his dissertation that the
rhetorical critic substitute the word "speechwriter" for
"ghostwriter," since the latter term was no longer employed
kin most governmental circles. In less than twenty years,
p Ernest G. Bormann, "Ghostwriting Agencies," Today's 
Speech. ^ (September 1956), ^20-21.
^ Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: LSU Press, 1967)> P* ^0.
^ Alan Morris Curtis, "Political Speechwriting ('Ghost­
writing') in the Nixon Administration, 1968-72: Implications 
for Rhetorical Criticism," Diss. Univ. Southern California 
1973, P- 188.
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speechwriting had become an integral part of presidential 
rhetoric and criticism.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Although Franklin D. Roosevelt "found ghostwriters 
almost indispensable," before the 193°'s, it was during 
the 1932 presidential campaign that the first extensive 
speechwriting network was established. The "Brain Trust," 
as Roosevelt's writers were called, played a dominant role 
in the 1932 campaign and became a model for following 
speechwriting practices. Among the participants were 
Samuel Rosenman, Rexford Tugwell, Raymond Moley, Harry 
Hopkins, Robert Sherwood, Tommy Corcoran, Stanley High,
Ben Cohen, William Ballitt, and others.
Corcoran, Cohen, Moley, and High formed the initial 
presidential eloquence. For example, Corcoran suggested 
the famous phrase "rendezvous with destiny" while High 
contributed "economic royalist" in the draft for the 
Philadelphia convention speech in 1936.^ These writers 
had a significant influence on Roosevelt’s rhetoric. 
Interestingly, Corcoran's departure stemmed from accusa­
tions that he had been too influential in his role. 
According to Rosenman, political leaders were antagonized
^ Claude M. Fuess, "Ghosts in the White House," 
American Heritage, (December 1958), p. 98.
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repeatedly by Corcoran's aggressiveness and resented his 
influence on the President.^ After tempers began to 
boil, Roosevelt stepped in and suggested that Corcoran 
work for the Citizens Committee in New York City, which 
ended his participation in presidential speechwriting. 
Nevertheless, the event posed an interesting question 
in the 19^0's about a speechwriter's influence in admini­
strative matters.
Rosenman, Hopkins, and Sherwood were probably the 
most influential individuals in the Roosevelt administra­
tion. This trio worked collectively on the bulk of presi­
dential addresses. Fuess humorously notes that the three 
formed a "Society for Prevention of A d - L i b b i n g . O f  this 
trio, Rosenman had been with Roosevelt the longest, since 
the fall of 1928. Although Rosenman had no prior experi­
ence in presidential speech preparation, he became known 
as the "Chief Ghost".
Hopkins arranged for playwright Robert Sherwood to 
join the staff in the 1930's. Sherwood quickly discovered 
that playwriting and ghostwriting weie extremely different 
vocations. He humorously notes his first reflections on 
his role, in saying:
£ Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelt 
(New York: Harpers, 1952), p. 227*
 ̂Fuess, p. 99•
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I...found out what an unsubstantial 
wraith a ghost writer really is; 
when working for Franklin D.
Roosevelt, his purpose was to haunt 
the White House, day and night, 
until a speech by Rranklin D.
Roosevelt (and nobody else) had 
been produced.8
One underlying thought in Sherwood's remarks is that no
matter who contributed to the drafting of a speech, the
text belonged to Roosevelt. Regardless of the number of
sources consulted, it appears that the ghost never became
so strong as to threaten Roosevelt's own role in the
process. Indeed, Rosenman states:
When in these chapters /of my boo/7 
I say that this person or that one 
worked on a particular speech or 
message, I mean that--and that 
only. No matter how frequently the 
speech assistants were changed 
through the years, the speeches 
were always Roosevelt's. They 
all expressed the personality, 
the convictions, the spirit, the 
mood of Roosevelt. No matter who 
worked with him in the preparation, 
the finished product was always the 
same— it was Roosevelt himself.°
While Roosevelt wanted the draft to reflect his 
thoughts and policies, he often accepted his writers' 
criticism of these ideas. Both Rosenman and Sherwood 
suggest that the President encouraged them to be critical
8 Robert E. S herw ood . Roosevelt, and Hopkins: An .Inti- 
jna±a-History (New York; Harpers, 1948), p. 184.
^ Rosenman, p. 227.
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participants in the process. In fact, they noted that the 
writer’s most effective tool in the process was consensus. 
When all the writers agreed that changes should he made 
in the language or content of an address, the President 
often yielded to their suggestions.10
These remarks hy Sherwood and Rosenman and the events 
surrounding Corcoran’s departure provide valuable insights 
into contemporary speechwriting. First of all, it is 
apparent that Roosevelt encouraged his writers to take an 
active, critical role in speechwriting. At the same time, 
the President was eager to take a similar role in the 
process and serve as the final editor of the speeches 
he chose to deliver. Altogether, speechwriters formed a 
detailed network in the Roosevelt administration and were 
active participants in speech preparation.
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman, whose personality was characterized 
in his famous desk plaque, "The Buck Stops Here," had 
the same kind of philosophy about the speechwriting 
practice. In an interview with Eugene E. White and 
Clair R. Henderlider, he gave the following response to
10 Rosenman, p. 10.
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a question concerning his role in speech preparation:
Recently a prominent person in 
the government was asked why he 
stumbled in reading a particular 
speech. He replied that since 
he hadn't written the talk, he 
did not know what was in it. Can 
you imagine anyone giving a speech 
and not knowing what he was going 
to say on the next page? I have 
always taken great personal pains 
with every formal address. Each 
of my speeches goes through from 
three to ten drafts and occasionally 
more.
While Truman took a personal interest in preparing
his speeches, he, like Roosevelt, had an elaborate system
of speechwriters. Among those writers were Clark Clifford,
Charles Murphy, Charles Ross, Matt Connelly, and George
Elsey. During the campaign of 1948, Jay Franklin, pen
name for John Franklin Carter, described the eight to ten
12individuals as Truman's "composite human brain."
During the "Whistle Stop Campaign," which required a 
continual flow of speeches, Truman relied on Murphy,
Elsey, and Franklin to prepare initial drafts and 
Clifford, Ross, Connelly, Murphy, and family members to 
make revisions. There was never time for pride of 
authorship.
Eugene E. White and Clair R. Henderlider, "What 
Harry S. Truman Told Us About His Speaking," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. 40 (February 1954), 39-40.
John Franklin Carter, Power and Persuasion (New 
York: The Doell Company, i960), p. 47.
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The President developed a more systematic speechwriting 
organization in the White House than he had used in the 
"Whistle Stop Campaign." Charles Murphy's office was 
given primary responsibility for the initial steps in 
preparation. Truman made recommendations to Murphy and 
assisted him in preparing rough outlines. It was then 
Murphy's obligation to contact departmental agencies for 
data and figures related to the speech topic. Once the 
drafts were prepared, Truman assisted Murphy's office 
with revisions.
While Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" greatly influenced 
the President's language and ideas, the Truman writers 
softened the President's rhetoric. Truman's writers were 
apparently successful in doing so as a U.S. News and World 
Report article noted:
One net effect of the new speech- 
writing system is that sly, provoca­
tive digs that once found their 
way into the Truman addresses and 
made enemies for the President have 
been largely eliminated. Mr. Murphy 
keeps the speeches as nearly as 
possible to a factual basis and 
avoids., unduly antagonizing any 
group. ^
In the Truman presidency, thus, writers softened the 
President's language and played a strategic political 
role in polishing his rhetorical style as well.
^ "Truman Sets Up a Speech Factory...Charles S.Murphy Directs Assembly Line... Skilled Staff Polishes, 
Softens," U.S. News and World Report, 10 November 195°> P*51>
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Dwight D. Eisenhower
Harry S. Truman was not the only President whose 
personality was reflected in his speechwriting organiza­
tion. Dwight D. Eisenhower's character was also evident 
in the speechwriting of his own administration. Probably 
no one but the former general could have ever produced 
such a regimented staff. Eisenhower expected presidential 
aides to exhibit the same precision and skill of a military 
guard, as Sherman Adams writes:
I found out early in the game that 
Eisenhower expected anyone who 
proposed a speech to him to have 
reasons for making it thoroughly 
thought out, a draft on paper, and 
the trip phased into the calendar. 
...We had to have a finished draft 
in shape and into the President's 
hands at least two weeks before 
it was to be delivered so that 
he could put it into his desk 
drawer and brood over it at his 
leisure. The preparation usually 
meant days, sometimes weeks, of 
staff work. ^
Various critics, however, speculate that the reason 
for such regimentation was not limited strictly to 
Eisenhower's military background, but was a reflection of 
his preference for conversational remarks rather than 
prepared drafts. From this writer's reading, it appears
Patrick Anderson, The President's Men (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1968), p. 135-
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that Eisenhower was uncomfortable with highly stylized 
eloquence and insecure in preparing and presenting major 
presidential addresses. Hence, the general surrounded 
himself with an elite group of writers including Emmet 
Hughes, a senior editor of Life: Arthur Larson, .a. former 
professor of law at Cornell; Kevin McCann, President of 
Defiance College; Malcolm Moos, a political scientist; and 
Gabriel Hauge, an advisor to Governor Thomas Dewey in 19^8. 
Eisenhower took a secondary role in the drafting process, 
giving only general instructions and delegating the 
"details" to others. Anderson cites an example of the 
practice in the following manner:
Secretary of Agriculture Benson 
wanted the President to address 
the Future Farmers of America. 
Republican National Chairman Len 
Hall agreed that the speech would 
be useful politically. They wfent 
to Adams, who called in speech- 
writer Gabriel Hauge and Agricul­
ture Department experts to 
determine what the President 
might say. Hauge wrote a first 
draft, discussed it with Adams, 
and wrote a second draft. All this 
time, nothing had been said to 
Eisenhower about the proposed 
speech.
From this example, we see that Eisenhower relied on the 
speechwriter much more heavily than had his predecessors.
Anderson, p. 135*
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John F. Kennedy
What Roosevelt depended on a trio of speechwriters 
to produce, Kennedy found in working with an individual 
writer.
Kennedy became convinced that a 
large group of advisors could 
submit ideas, propose outlines 
and suggest revisions, but they 
could not produce a finished 
speech exemplifying continuity 
of thought and precision of 
style.1°
Kennedy discovered a master of stylistic oratory in 
speechwriter Theodore Sorensen and relied on Sorensen’s 
contributions in the Senate, on the campaign trail, and 
throughout the presidency. Of their relationship Kennedy 
said to Nixon:
In the end I found myself 
relying more and more on 
Sorensen, who was with me on 
the campaign tour and who 
therefore could react to and 
reflect up-to-the-minute tacti­
cal shifts in our basic policy.1?
While Kennedy maintained this close relationship with 
Sorensen, he had other equally capable writers in Richard
Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1965), p. 330.
17' Sorensen, p. 331.
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Goodwin, a Harvard law graduate; historian Arthur
Schlesinger; Myer Feldman: and Lee C. White. White House
reporter Alan Otten noted in 1961 that Goodwin had "already
mastered the Kennedy style almost as thoroughly as Ted
1 8Sorensen himself."
What made the Kennedy administration unique in the 
area of presidential speechwriting? The answer to that 
question lies not only in the writers chosen but in the 
process as well. Prior to the Kennedy administration most 
speechwriting efforts were the work of a committee, but 
Kennedy relied primarily on individual efforts. This 
practice allowed Kennedy to work more individually with 
a writer than had his predecessors. It also made it 
easier for two individuals to diminish stylistic differences 
than for four or five contributors to agree upon the 
language in which to couch those ideas. This situation 
allowed one or two individuals to exert great influence 
on the President, as Otten recognizes:
After the President himself, he 
/Sorensen7 is the White House 
official most directly concerned 
with formulating administration 
policy, particularly in the 
domestic field. He provides a 
constant cushion of advice for 
presidential actions. 'What do 
you think, Ted?' is the President's
] 8 Alan Otten, as quoted in Lester Tanzer, The 
Kennedy Circle (Washington, D. C.: Robert B. Luce, Inc.,
1961), p. 2Ur.
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most frequent question at 
staff meetings.19
During the Kennedy presidency, individual speech- 
writing efforts were emphasized. As a result, individual 
writers took a significant part in the drafting process 
and the President played a more active role as creator, 
outliner, and editor-collaborator than had many of his 
predecessors.
Lyndon B. Johnson
On November 22, 1963> Lyndon B. Johnson inherited not 
only the presidency but a complete presidential staff 
as well. Initially, Johnson decided to continue to use 
the services of Kennedy's aides and writers, but he quickly 
discovered that maintaining two staffs and coordinating 
their personnel could be a difficult task. Kennedy had 
relied on aides like Sorensen and Goodwin to produce highly 
stylized eloquence on an individual basis. It became a 
problem early in 196^, though, for these Kennedy writers 
to fit into the collaborative environment of the 
Johnson staff. During these first months of 196^, Johnson 
attempted a juggling act between individual and committee 
speechwriting efforts. At the same time, former Kennedy
^  Otten, p.
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writers tried with little success to adapt to Johnson's 
rambling, Texas drawl. By the summer of 1964, a majority 
of the Kennedy staff personnel departed and Johnson's 
aides were left to confront the presidential campaign.
Speechwriting practices in the Johnson administration 
produced some interesting characteristics, unique from 
other presidencies. For example, Robert Hardesty contends,
"Everybody on the staff, practically, did some speech-
20writing." Althougn Hardesty's statement is perhaps
an exaggeration, Johnson used three levels of participants:
contributors, who directly or indirectly assisted; the
writers, who prepared drafts; and editors who revised
drafts. Among the writers were Horace Busby, Douglass
Cater, Harry McPherson, Harry Middleton, and Hardesty.
The editors included Jack Valenti, Bill Moyers, Lee C.
White, John Roche, and George Christian.
Johnson developed a "wheel-like" organizational
structure, with these three levels of participants
21exemplifying gradations in the wheel. This particular 
system allowed Johnson to be involved in various phases 
of the organization and yet remain in control of the
20 Personal interview with Robert Hardesty, 11 
August 1976.
^  Personal interview with Bill D. Moyers, 10 July
1976.
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process. However, the "wheel" produced disadvantages as 
well. Because of the intricacies and detail in the organi 
zational structure, Johnson was unable to be intimately 
involved in speechwriting. In addition, the number of 
participants involved in speechwriting created havoc at 
times.
The increased participation produced a mixture of 
advantages and disadvantages. In all, speechwriters 
formed an intricate network in the Johnson administration 
and were responsible for the collaborative committee 
efforts, which characterized the Johnson rhetoric.
Richard M. Nixon
While presumably Johnson's "wheel-like" structure
was one of the most complex organizations in use during
the 1960's , speechwriting in the Nixon presidency was
almost as complex in another way. As Craig R. Smith notes
"Not only were there specific writers and researchers to
enhance the appearance of expertise, others were assigned
22to draft speeches into effective rhetorical display."
Nixon mastered his speechwriting as a skillful politician. 
It was the writer's task to find issues salient to public
^  Craig R. Smith, "Contemporary Political Speech- 
writing," Southern Speech Communication Journal, %2 (Fall 
1976), 54.
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interest and then determine public opinion on these issues.
In The Selling of the President. Joe McGinnis claims that 
Nixon aides even used semantic differentials to analyze 
positions taken on various issues.2^ From this information 
Nixon could determine whether to speak about the problems 
in vague terms or more specifically, depending on audience 
consensus. Nixon's speechwriters, as a result, became 
intensively involved in research and audience analysis.
Perhaps Nixon's desire to have control of the speech 
preparation process could be traced to his authoritative 
personality. He preferred extemporaneous speaking and 
never allowed the individual ghostwriter to take a major 
role in speech preparation. In his dissertation, Curtis 
suggests that Nixon expected speechwriters to contribute 
only fact sheets and lists of suggested remarks for
O hextemporaneous speeches. Nixon would then take those 
contributions and add supporting evidence as he extemporized.
Although the President maintained an authoritative role, 
he employed specialists in particular areas as speech­
writers. Within the staff, Nixon looked to William Safire 
in preparing economic addresses, John J. McLaughlin in
2^ Joe McGinnis, The Selling of the President as quoted 
in Craig R. Smith, "Contemporary Political Speechwriting,"
P. 55.
2^ Curtis, p. 188.
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structuring rational arguments, and Patrick Buchanan in 
preparing political rhetoric. Nixon also received assist­
ance from the Central Intelligence Agency and Henry 
Kissinger's Special Action Group in speeches on foreign 
affairs. The President then attempted to synthesize these 
various contributions into a workable draft, primarily 
with the assistance of a single writer.
In the Nixon presidency, speechwriters had little 
influence on the ideas and language of the speech. However, 
the writer did take an active part in research and in 
determining public opinion. This role seems to be the 
most significant contribution made by writers within the 
rather authoritative context of the Nixon administration.
Gerald Ford
Gerald Ford was the first administrator to serve 
without having been elected by the people or without 
having run previously for the Office of President. There­
fore, Ford's staff was not really prepared to make the 
transition created by Nixon's resignation, since they had 
to assume the presidency with little foreknowledge or 
preparation. In spite of these circumstances, Ford 
inherited an existing speechwriting operation which 
provided the basis for his own administration's system.
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Three major differences appeared between the speech-
writing practices in the Ford and Nixon administrations.
Smith notes that the Ford staff did not make as extensive
use of the "audience profile" system which Nixon's
researchers had developed and, secondly, they did little
2<"to develop expertise among speechwriters." J Ford relied 
primarily on his aide Bob Hartmann to coordinate the speech- 
writing staff and activities. While he often participated 
in speech preparation, Ford assumed a less authoritative 
role than Nixon.
This final distinction most readily characterized the 
speechwriter’s influence in the administration. First 
of all, Ford's writers played a significant role in -the 
inventional process, contributing to the ideas and policies 
of the administration. One example of the contributions 
is found in the campaign speeches. Former Press Secretary 
Ron Nessen suggested to this writer that the President 
sometimes only read through a draft prior to delivering 
it on the campaign trail. On other occasions writers 
simply handed drafts to Ford enroute to the podium. It 
is possible that some speeches written on the campaign
^  Craig R. Smith, "Addendum to 'Contemporary Poli­
tical Speechwriting'," Southern Speech Communication 
Journal, kZ (Winter 1976), 192.
Personal interview with Ron Nessen, July 1977*
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trail reflected the speechwriters' ideas and not necessarily 
those of the President.
While Ford would not have delivered a speech he 
deemed politically or philosophically objectionable,
Nessen's comments suggest that writers played a significant 
role in speech preparation. John Casserly, a former Ford 
writer, also felt that the writer took an influential role 
in preparing some policy speeches. Casserly relates one 
occasion in which he says that the speech mandated admini­
strative economic policy. He notes that speechwriters 
were given no guidance for a speech to the Business 
Council until after first drafts appeared. Apparently, 
Treasury Secretary Simon, economic advisor Paul McCraker, 
and Detroit industrialist Max Fisher, met with presidential 
aides to determine what policies and ideas were to be
proposed in the speech, before previous direction was
27given by Ford or Hartmann. 1
Eventhough this example may be an isolated case, it 
is interesting to note Hartmann's response to the situation. 
In a speechwriter's meeting, Hartmann later remarked:
A speechwriter may sometimes find 
himself in a role for which he was 
never intended. He may be caught 
in the midst of an unresolved
27 John J. Casserly, Tiie F^rd White House: The Diary 
of a Speechwriter (Denver: Colorado Associated University 
Press, 1975). p. 30.
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policy dispute. Therefore, what 
he writes may affect or constitutepolicy.28
If Hartmann's statement is accurate, perhaps the speech­
writer was much more influential in making policy in the 
Ford presidency than he had been in previous administra­
tions. But regardless of the statement's accuracy, it is 
apparent that speechwriters assumed more assertive roles 
in the Ford White House than they had in the Nixon White 
House and possibly in other comtemporary presidencies.
James E. Carter
When James E. (Jimmy) Carter assumed the presidency 
in 1977, he was not only a novice in the workings of the 
federal government, but he was also an amateur in the 
use of speechwriters. Carl Kell notes that during Carter's 
term as Governor of Georgia, he never had a. speechwriting 
staff, which seems an oddity in twentieth century 
p o l i t i c s . I n  fact, it was not until November 2, 1972, 
that any mention was made of hiring a writer for the 
presidential campaign. In a memo on that date, Hamilton 
Jordan suggested:
Casserly, p. 31.
Martin Schram,.Running for arter Campaign (NfeWYorkl--
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Hire a professional, first-class 
speechwriter, researcher. When 
you go out of state you need to 
have something of substance to 
say. The same thing applies when 
you address national conventions 
in Atlanta. This should be a full­time position.30
It was not until March 2k, 1976, that Carter's assistant, 
Pat Caddell, contacted Robert Schrum about writing for 
Carter. Schrum accused Carter of being deliberately fuzzy 
on issues, so it was not surprising to see Schrum1s depar­
ture after only nine days.-^ Finally, on May 11, 1976, 
Patrick Anderson joined the campaign staff as a speech­
writer. Jim Fallows was added in July of 1976. Carter, 
who insisted on contributing to his own speeches, said of
Anderson, "Pat's the only writer I've ever used who didn't
32get his feelings hurt when I changed things."
Probably no other president since the 19^0's has been 
so intent on writing his own speeches as Carter. While 
the lack of time has prevented Carter from preparing his 
own speeches, he has managed to write the bulk of a few 
major addresses. For example, he took the major writing 
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he requested contributions from former presidential 
writers, departmental agencies, and individuals whose 
expertise and interest he valued highly. Nevertheless, 
the former governor has taken a primary role in speech 
preparation even from the initial drafts of many speeches. 
Of Carter's skills, Fallows remarks:
He is supremely confident of his 
extemporaneous abilities to ex­
press. his views. Thus, his 
disinclination for conventional, 
major manuscript speeches has 
brought a change from previous 
administrations. . . . Finally, 
the President likes to prepare 
his own speeches, and, with 
adequate time, would himself 
write and revise all of his 
informal talks. His personal 
touch, born of his days as 
Governor, when he had little if 
any help, has become an ensign 
of his political existence.33
Three unique characteristics distinguish the speech- 
writing of the Carter presidency from that of other 
contemporary presidencies. First of all, Carter is 
taking a more prominent role in speechwriting than did 
many of his predecessors. Secondly, speechwriting is not 
as major a function for aides as it had been, for example, 
in the Ford administration. Finally, speechwriters have 
had to be willing to accept more criticism and changes
33 James Fallows,
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in their drafts than they did in some other administra­
tions .
Conclusions
In examining each of the presidential administrations 
from Roosevelt to Carter, one finds that "ghosts" or 
"speechwriters" have been associated with past and present 
administrations. Since the development of radio and 
television,.speechwriters have played an even more 
prevalent role in the governmental circles than t’ jy were 
required to play in the pre-radio era. The following 
observations can be made about presidential speechwriting 
since the beginning of the radio era.
First, speechwriters are presently being used to 
prepare presidential addresses. They have been used 
extensively since Roosevelt established his "Brain Trust" 
in the 1930's.
Secondly, speechwriters have served in various 
capacities in contemporary presidencies. They have served 
as researchers or contributors, writers, editors, and in 
some cases as critics. For instance, Nixon relied on 
individuals to provide research and audience analysis while 
Johnson used the contributive efforts of many individuals 
in preparing speeches. Several presidents have employed 
writers and editors in speech preparation, but only
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Roosevelt encouraged his writers to serve in critical 
roles as well.
Thirdly, speechwriters have contributed the language 
of presidential rhetoric as well as the ideas forming 
presidential policy. Truman's writers, for example, 
primarily made stylistic contributions while the Eisenhower 
and Ford writers influenced policy as well. Speechwriters 
influenced both the language and the ideas of the presi­
dent's oratory.
Fourthly, speechwriting practices followed no 
standard method or rules. Carter and Nixon used writers 
sparingly, although Eisenhower and Ford relied heavily 
on their speechwriting staffs.
Recent presidents have utilized both individual and 
committee speechwriting efforts in preparing their 
discourse. Kennedy relied on such individuals as Sorensen 
and Goodwin to prepare speech drafts. Johnson worked with 
an intricate network of contributors, writers, and editors 
on a collaborative basis.
Finally, presidents accepted varying participative 
roles in speechwriting practices. Some presidents worked 
closely with their writers, as did Roosevelt with his 
"Brain Trust" and Kennedy with Sorensen. Others largely 
removed themselves from the preparation process as did 
Eisenhower on occasion.
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From these observations, the critic may draw a number 
of conclusions. To begin with, the critic must recognize 
that the President is not solely responsible, in most cases, 
for his own speech preparation. Secondly, a critic cannot 
look at presidential oratory as being the product of one 
individual, whether he is examining the language and form 
of the ideas or the ideas themselves. Thirdly, critics 
cannot use uniform standards in making comparisons' 
between various speechwriting practices since a variety 
of methods are used in preparing presidential rhetoric.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
OF PRESENT METHODOLOGIES
The rhetorical critic has long been enamored with a 
speaker's eloquence in times of great decision making.
As Nichols suggests, "We have long turned to the individual 
in what we thought to be his great moments of decision in 
order to discover in him the marks of humanity."'*' Never­
theless, critics have been blinded from the realization 
that perhaps the individual is not solely responsible for 
the language or ideas represented in the speech.
The previous chapter recognized the speechwriter's 
presence and influence in presidential rhetoric. The 
purpose of this chapter is to focus on the role of the 
speechwriter in contemporary rhetorical theory and to 
suggest the strengths and weaknesses of present methodolo­
gies in examining ghostwritten speeches. The chapter does 
not explore individual methodologies in depth but cate­
gorizes common theoretical postulates related to speech- 
writing. Five major areas are discussed:
1 Marie Hochijiuth Nichols.* Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: LSU Pre'ss, ly6y), p . 40.
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1. The non-existent or limited 
view of the speechwriter's 
presence.
2. Speechwriting practices as 
an extended form of ideas and 
language.
3- Speechwriting as a delegative, 
interactional situation.
k. The limitations of existing 
methodological tools for 
analysis.
5. The preparation process as 
a research interest.
These areas serve as the organizational framework through 
which the methodologies are examined and their limitations 
recognized.
The Speechwriter's Presence
pDespite the fact that Nichols, Brigance, and other 
leading rhetoricians have documented the ghostwriter's 
presence as far back as ^11 B. C., critics have not yet 
discovered any ancient theorists who discussed the ghost­
writer's influence in their treatises. Even in the 
theories of Campbell, Blair, and Whately, no mention was 
made of the speechwriter's presence or influence. In 
fact, rhetoricians have not found any theorists who
2 William Norwood Brigance, "Ghostwriting Before Eranklin. £>. RpQgpyelJ„apd the Radio, Today's Speech,.
(September 1956), 410.
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discussed the speechwriter' s influence in their pedagogy- 
prior to the twentieth century.
In the twentieth century, public address students have
virtually ignored the speechwriter in their theses and
dissertations. While it is true that many orators in the
beginning of our nation's history did not rely on others
to prepare their speeches, one discovers daily that an
increasing number of individuals did have such assistance.
In 1963, Nichols brought up a somewhat controversial
question: "What happens to the approach to individual
speakers that we as rhetorical critics have superabundantly
t a k e n ? I n  an attempt to respond to this question as
well as others voiced by critics, rhetorical scholars
began in the late 1950's and early 1960's to discuss
the speechwriter's presence and influence on discourse.
k £Ernest G. Bormann and Donald K. Smithr were the 
first to exchange views on ghostwriting practices. Their 
initial interest in ghostwriting centered around an 
ethics controversy. The ethics question became much less 
of an issue in later years. Nevertheless, Bormann and
^ Nichols, p. 44.
^ Ernest G. Bormann, "Ghostwriting and the Rhetorical 
Critic," Quarterly Journal of Speech. 46 (October i960), 
284-288.
5 Donald K. Smith, "Ghostwritten Speeches," Quarterly 
Journal Speech. 47 (December 1961), 216-20.
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Smith's exchange set the stage for discussions related to 
the ghost's presence and influence in speech preparation.
Nichols' essay, "Ghostwriting: Implications for Public
£
Address," which appeared in 1963, is the most articulate 
position to date on the practice. Nichols provided histori­
cal documentation of the roots of ghostwriting. While 
she acknowledged her concern that there is "hardly...a 
redeeming feature in the matter of ghostwriting,"^ she 
insisted that public address students strive to understand 
the practice. Said Nichols:
There is no gainsaying the fact that 
for historical understanding correct 
attribution of authorship is impera­
tive. Unless the origin of thought 
is ascribed to its originator, 
accurate assessment of a speech from 
a rhetorical point of view is 
difficult, to say the least.°
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden upheld Nichols' concern 
in their revision of Speech Criticism in 1970, suggesting 
that "The speechwriter presents...the critic /with/ a 
problem he cannot ignore. These authors revitalized the
 ̂Nichols, p. 35*
 ̂Nichols, p. ^7-
® Nichols, p. ^3.
 ̂lister Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W.Braden, Speech Criticism. 2nd ed., (New York: Ronald Press,
1970), p. 333.
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Bormann and Smith controversy. They proposed that critics 
judge the morality of a speaker by determining whether or 
not the speaker is deceitful in his use of speechwriters. 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden reached the following conclu­
sion about the ghostwriter's presence in rhetorical 
criticism:
In the field of speech writing, 
the critic needs to look behind 
the derogatory label to discover 
the actual relationship between 
speech writer and speaker; he 
needs a much more precise view 
of the practice.
In the history of neo-Aristotelian rhetoric, two 
schools of thought arose. The first school ignored largely 
the speechwriter's presence. Although Brigance suggests 
that the ghost was an active participant, he described 
these early ghostwriters as:
scribes for the illiterate... 
organizers and coordinators of 
ideas for great men who had all 
kinds of talents, except for 
words, but who had not the time 
under the pressure of other work 
for the drudgery of writing.
While ancient, medieval, and renaissance rhetoricians may
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden, p. 333- 
11 Brigance, p. 10.
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have "been aware of the ghostwriter, they did not acknowledge 
his role in speech preparation in their manuscripts.
The second school of thought has evolved since the 
1950's and has accepted the role of the speechwriter in 
contemporary rhetorical circles. Even though the second 
viewpoint is more widely supported today, critics still have 
not examined speechwriting practices to any great extent 
in their rhetorical studies.
An Extended Form of Ideas and Language
In addition to having a limited view of speechwriting 
practices, rhetoricians have often disregarded the 
philosophy that these practices are an extended form of the 
speaker's ideas and language. Although contemporary 
theorists make no direct statements to the effect that the 
practices are an extension of the speaker, their philoso­
phies of language and rhetoric often indicate that their 
thinking is closely aligned to that position. Kenneth 
Burke's theories are representative of this philosophy.
Kenneth Burke, in A Grammar of Motives. introduces
two terms in his dramatistic pentad which can be applied
12indirectly to speechwriting practices. Burke describes
Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1969).
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the agent as "The person or kind of person /yiho7 performed 
13the act." y He says, however, that the categorization of 
agents might "require further subdivision, as an agent 
might have his act modified...by friends (co-agents) or 
enemies (counter-agents)."^^ Although Burke does not 
use the term "speechwriter" here, his language, by defini­
tion, does not refute the possibility that a writer serves 
as a co-agent in a rhetorical situation. Burke's pentad 
also includes the term "agency" which can categorically 
encompass the speechwriter. Strictly speaking, Burke 
defines the agency as the "means or instrument he /the 
agent/ used."1^ While any critic might reject the idea 
that a writer was an instrument through which the agent 
acted, that critic would not be guilty of misinterpreting 
Burke, this author feels, in reaching such a conclusion. 
The speechwriter is employed to assist the speaker in 
preparing his rhetoric. In this capacity, the speech­
writer allows the speaker to be more accessible to his 
audience. The writer may serve as a gatekeeper, making 
the speaker more aware of public opinion. The writer
may also help to broaden the speaker's own way of thinking
^  Burke, A Grammar of Motives, xv.
Burke, A Grammar of Motives. xix-xx.
^  Burke, A Grammar of Motives. xv.
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and his expression of those thoughts.
Whether critics readily identify the speechwriter with 
Burke's concept of "agent" or "agency" should not he the 
controversial issue. In fact, Burke, himself, suggests 
the transformational nature of his pentad in the following 
manner:
Certain formal interrelationships 
prevail among these terms, by- 
reason of their role as attributes 
of a common ground or substance. 
Their participation in a common 
ground makes for transformability. 
At every point where the field 
covered by any one of these terms 
overlaps upon the field covered 
by any other, there is an alchemic 
opportunity, whereby we can put one 
philosophy or doctrine of motiva­
tion into the alembic, make the 
appropriate passes, and take out 
another.I5
It seems apparent to this writer that one can apply 
Burke's concepts of "agent" or "agency" to the speechwriter.
This writer also believes that speechwriting can be 
examined within the context of Burke's notion of "terminis- 
tic screens." In Language as Symbolic Action. Burke 
suggests that terministic screens direct attention, by 
saying that "any nomenclature necessarily directs the 
attention into some channels rather than others."^
Burke, A Grammar of Motives. xix.
Kenneth Burke, Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley, 
California: University of California Press, 1958), p. 45.
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He provides the analogy of viewing several different 
photographs of the same object. The only difference 
between the photographs is that of color filtration.
Thus, the terministic screen directs our attention, expand­
ing our view of the phenomena, by making slight alterations 
in that attention. What this concept means is that as the 
individual views an object, his perceptions May be 
controlled by an outside source. Although the image will 
remain virtually the same, the individual's view of that 
image may be altered slightly by gradual filtration.
In terms of speechwriting, the ghost may function 
as a terministic screen, directing attention in a given 
situation. The speechwriter, for example, by enlarging 
upon the ideas of a speaker or his policies, may alter 
the audience's perceptions of the speaker without their 
being completely aware of this change. Even when the 
writer produces only the language of a speech, his 
language, in essence, may become the structure through 
which the speaker's ideas are expressed. As the audience 
listens to a speaker's language they may be unconsciously 
affected by the speechwriter's frame of reference, in 
spite of the speechwriter's intentions or choice in the 
given situation. Therefore, the writer may serve as a 
terministic screen, cognizantly or non-cognizantly 
directing the audience's attention. By merely serving as 
an assistant in the speechwriting practice, he may be the
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medium through which the speaker's ideas and language are 
filtered to a public. He is therefore a screen through 
which an audience focuses upon the image or, in this case, 
the speaker.
Perhaps the following example will indicate how the 
writer may function as a terministic screen, directing 
attention in a given situation. In an essay entitled,
"The Intellectual Gigolo Strikes Back," a former speech­
writer shares an example from his experiences as a writer 
at a Republican convention.
I felt that the candidates really 
were the expression of me. They 
were vehicles by which I expressed 
my art....Far from feeling inferior 
to the men whose ideas I assembled 
for communication to the people 
of the United States--or jealous 
of them— I regarded them as a means 
by which I might communicate as 
an individual, to the people.1'?’
In this example, the writer acts as an agent or as an 
agency through which the candidate speaks. In addition, 
the writer makes an intentional move to direct the 
attention of the audience toward his own rhetorical goals. 
The "intellectual gigolo" goes on to suggest, however, that 
the speechwriter is an employee and only an extension of 
the speaker, not his equal. In this situation, the writer
^  John M. Henry, ed., The Articulates (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1957)> P • ^3•
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may continue to function as a terministic screen only so 
long as the photographer, or in this case, the speaker 
allows him to make changes in the filtration or to continue 
to direct the audience's attention.
In applying Burkean theory to the speechwriting 
practice, critics may discover an individual or individuals 
who may act as agents or agencies creating their own 
language and ideas or extend the speaker’s language and 
ideas. Regardless of his role, the speechwriter will 
perform the intricate task of meshing ideas and expressing 
them in language representative of the speaker. Therefore, 
in the case of presidential rhetoric, a writer becomes 
the form through which the ideas and language are 
filtered, directing the attention of the mass public.
In the realm of contemporary theory, some principles 
seem to be applicable to the speechwriting situation.
In Burke's theory, rhetoricians can find a conceptual 
foundation on which to begin their study of speechwriting 
practices. In addition, they can discover patterns which 
illustrate how a speechwriter may extend the thoughts and 
language of a speaker.
A Delegative, Interactional Situation
Not only are critics broadening their views on 
speechwriting, they are beginning to recognize the inter-
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actional context in which the phenomenon takes place. An
increasing number of critics now perceive the speaker and
his speechwriters as participants in a specialized network.
Herbert Simons defines such a network as "delegative commu- 
18nication. According to Simons, delegative communication
results when "two or more sources /serve/ as communicators 
of the same message /whereby/ a message is conceived by 
one person and encoded by another."^ Simons recognizes 
this process as an interactional one in which the speech­
writer may have a reciprocal influence as well as his own 
personal persuasive goals. In this reciprocal role, the 
writer may participate in an exchange between other 
writers as well as be involved in a transactional dialogue 
with the speaker.
Simons is joined by other theorists who propose that 
speechwriting must be examined within the context of an 
interactional process. Wayne Brockreide, in an article, 
"Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric," submits that
20rhetoric may be transmitted indirectly through a channel.
Says Brockreide, "The oral interpretation act, the speaker
1 fi Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion: Understanding.
Practice, and Analysis (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1976), p. 73-
Simons, p. 72.
20 W^vne E. Brockreide, "Dimensions of the Concept of Rhetoric, in Contemporary Theories q£  Rhetoric, ed.Richard L. Johannesen tNew York: Harper and Row, 1971), P-3H-
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who reaches the newspaper reader via a reporter, the tape
recording, television, the two-step flow of communication
all illustrate the indirect channel through which the
21speaker transmits his message.". Unlike-the tape 
recorder or other strictly technical sources, the speech­
writer may well be an active participant, filtering and 
producing signals which may in turn be transmitted as 
part of the message. Brockreide's interpretation, there­
fore, parallels Simon's concept of delegative communication 
and supports the idea that speechwriting is an interactional 
communication process, in its own right.
The interactional nature of the process may also be 
identified with the basic theories of "group mind."
Nichols perceptively relates this concept to ghostwriting 
saying, "What we thought to be the most individual thing 
of all— a man's thought— is giving way to the group
p pmind." The term, group mind, refers to the participants 
in a group forming one personality or mode of behavior in 
order to function on a group level. The term implies that 
the group may take precedence over the individual.
According to McDougall, five criteria are necessary for 
group mind; at least three of these criteria seem, to this
21 Brockreide, p. 321.
22 Nichols, p. 46.
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writer, to be applicable to the speechwriting practice.^3 
First, McDougall believes that any concept of group mind 
must have continuity for existence. Within the speech- 
writing situation there must be some continuity, organiza­
tionally as well as philosophically, in order for the 
group to function effectively in its task. Secondly, 
interaction between members of the group is necessary. 
Interaction between the speechwriting staff or between 
the writers and the speaker is essential in determining 
what the speaker says and the language with which he says 
it. Finally, groups have specialized functions. For 
example, individuals may serve as contributors, researchers, 
writers, or editors in any given situation. The critic 
must view speechwriting practices, not only as a technolo­
gical extension of the speaker, but as an active indirect 
channel through which the writer transmits his message.
As speechwriters interact among themselves or with the 
speaker, a sense of group mind develops which is based 
upon that interaction, individual functions, and the 
overall continuity demanded for their existence.
When rhetorical critics fail to recognize speech- 
writing practices as an interactional process, they ignore 
a significant aspect of the rhetorical situation. Samuel
„2^,William McDougall, The Group Mind, as cited ih ^The Handbook of Social Psychology, znct ea., Gardner Lindzey and k'lliot Aronson, ed.7 (Heading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing, 1968), p. 44.
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Becker considers this problem in his essay, "Rhetorical 
Studies for the Contemporary World":
As scholars of rhetoric and public 
address, we...need to give more 
serious thought and study to the 
impact of the corporate communi­
cator or source in the communica­
tion environment.24
Becker is joined by two scholars, Martin J. Medhurst and 
Gary C. Dreibelbis, who recommend that rhetorical guide­
lines be extended, when examining speechwriting practices, 
to include elements of small group and interpersonal 
research.^ Medhurst and Dreibelbis agree that the critic 
must determine, "What the differences /are/, if any, 
between invention in political settings and invention in 
other small group situations?" The contemporary theorists, 
as well as others, propose that the bounds of rhetorical 
analysis be applied to delegative, interactional situations 
which encompass the speechwriter.
Samuel L. Becker, "Rhetorical Studies for the 
Contemporary World," The Prospect of Rhetoric. Lloyd F. 
Bitzer and Edwin Black, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971)» P- 30-
Martin J. Medhurst and Gary C. Dreibelbis, "The 
Ghost of McGovern," Communication Quarterly. (Winter 1978), 
42.
Medhurst and Dreibelbis, p. 42.
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Limitations of Existing Methodologies
In 1975» when this writer began her study of ghost­
writing, she discovered no specific methodological system 
for examining speechwriting practices. Most public address 
studies rarely even mentioned the speechwriter's presence. 
Most studies were not uniform in their methodologies. The 
following pages provide a review of the major studies on 
speechwriting and identify their limitations.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, six theses 
and dissertations in the field of speech focus on political 
speechwriting. Even though these studies focus on speech- 
writing, they present few new methodological tools for 
analyzing ghostwritten speeches and practices. Both 
Starr and Curtis gathered principal data from personal 
interviews with former speechwriters. Starr, who served 
as a speechwriter for several years in state government, 
uses an interview format similar to a questionnaire 
developed by Dwight Fre.shley for his study, "Gubernatorial 
Ghostwriting."^ Freshley's questionnaires cover the 
speechwriter's age, sex, educational level, length of 
acquaintance with the governor, academic majors and minors, 
academic courses of value, professional background,
Sp_e.ech fjnmmiihinatTnn .Tnnrnal , 31 (Winter 19657Dwight L. Eres^levj "Gubernatorial Ghostwriting,"
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methods of speech preparation, criteria for evaluating a 
speech, and factors influencing their present theory of 
speechmaking. Curtis does not attempt to make as extensive 
a biographical sketch of speechwriters as does Freshley, 
but limits his discussion to the organization of writers 
and practices associated with speechwriting. While this 
writer believes that the interview is an excellent primary 
source, its value as a research tool is hampered by 
practical barriers. Few students have the opportunity to 
interview former writers; so, the interview serves as a 
limited and partially biased source in speechwriting 
research.
In his dissertation, Starr presents another possible 
tool for the critic— the content analysis. While content 
analysis studies are growing in popularity, the study 
completed by Starr is so questionable statistically that 
one cannot make a fair assessment of its value for speech- 
writing studies. Starr's two basic flaws concern sampling 
errors. First, Starr chooses two different speechwriters, 
one who wrote for the public official when he was Secretary 
of State and the other writer who wrote for him as 
Lieutenant Governor. Merely the diversity represented by 
these two situations suggests that Starr cannot offer any 
sound conclusions from which to generalize. In addition, 
Starr takes the mean scores of lexical analysis tests,
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conducted on twenty ghostwritten speeches, and compares 
those means with the scores on a single speech, delivered
pOextemporaneously by the speaker. The reader cannot help 
but wonder how the researcher can generate nearly two 
pages of hypotheses on nine lexical measures from this kind 
of "comparative" data. While it may be that content 
analysis studies are a viable tool for studying ghostwritten 
speeches, Starr's study leaves the reader with some un­
solved questions and doubts. ■
While Curtis relies on the interview as a primary 
source, he provides critics with some concrete guidelines 
for developing a methodology. Curtis proposes four guide­
lines which he says the critic must observe in studying 
the speechwriting situation:
1. The rhetorical critic must view 
presidential speechwriting in the 
context of the totality of presiden­
tial responsibilities and workload.
2. The rhetorical critic should 
evaluate speechwriting in the 
context of the composition and 
duties of a given president's staff.
3. The rhetorical critic should 
evaluate speechwriting in the 
context of a staff's contributions 
to the different types of presi­
dential speaking.
?o Douglas Perret Starr, "Ghostwriting in Government: 
A lexical Analysis of Matched Pairs of Speeches Ghost­
written for Florida lieutenant Governor Tom Adams," Diss0 
Florida State University 1972.
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The rhetorical critic should 
evaluate speechwriting in the 
context of the presidency as an 
"institution."29
Curtis maintains that any critic must account for these 
areas of inquiry in examining ghostwritten speeches.
In her own thesis, this critic applied neo-Aristote­
lian principles to the study of speech preparation. She 
adapted the rhetorical canons— invention, disposition, 
and style— to the speechwriting situation, delineated the 
steps followed in processing the ideas, determined the 
organizational patterns used, and examined the language 
of the speech. She reached the following conclusions:
Rhetorical canons... served only 
partially as guidelines in which 
to explore the ghosting process.
I found that these canons are 
insufficient in covering staff 
involvement. So while the 
canons are useful aids in 
critiquing the final product, 
they do not offer a method for 
analyzing the entire practice.
The canons, in short, do not 
provide an efficient methodology 
to examine the organizational 
staff and processes through which 
a draft evolved.30
^ Alan Morris Curtis, "Political Speechwriting 
('Ghostwriting') in the Nixon Administration, 1968-72: 
Implications for Rhetorical Criticism," Diss. Univ. of 
Southern California 1973-
Suzanne E. Condray, "The Ghostwriting of Select 
Speeches of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society," Thesis 
Colorado State Univ. 1977*
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The critic found herself in agreement with Anthony 
Hillhruner, who feels that the rhetorical canons hamper 
"the latent creativity and diversity of approaches to 
criticism.
In summary, no critic has heen able to propose a 
methodological framework extensive enough to examine all 
the aspects of speechwriting. Interviews provide excellent 
information but are limited by barriers of accessibility. 
Content analyses may offer a great deal of information 
about a ghostwriter's influence on the speaker's language, 
but no studies to date have been statistically reliable. 
Even studies in traditional veins have not provided an 
efficient methodology for examining the entire process or 
product, This writer is convinced that new methodological 
frameworks must be developed and adapted to existing 
theories.
The Preparation Process as a Research Interest
If one considers the overall strengths and weaknesses 
of present methodologies, he will discover a crucial 
aspect of criticism which rhetoricians have failed to 
examine. Many critics virtually have ignored a factual
Anthony Hillbruner, Critical Dimensions i The, Arh 
of Public Address Criticism (New York: Random House, 1966),
p.
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premise— that a speechwriter functions within a process. 
Herein lies the real argument that speechwriting is a 
"form" which must be studied as an integral part of an 
overall process. Simons contends that speechwriting in- 
vovles "reciprocal influence through delegative channels."-^2 
The writers, acting as agents or agencies or channels, are 
participants in an interactional process whereby they may 
be seen as "bargaining negotiators" with their own personal 
performative roles and goals. Consequently, it becomes 
imperative for the critic to examine the speechwriting 
process in order to determine variables inherent in that 
process which may affect the final product.
With perhaps the exception of Curtis’ dissertation, 
no previous studies have focused on the drafting process. 
Curtis discusses the ghosting process in terms of the 
organization of writers and their participation in the 
process. Craig R. Smith, in "Contemporary Political 
Speech Writing," stresses the importance of knowing "how 
the speech writing process w o r k s . T h e  problem with 
Smith's goal is that he never develops any system for 
the critic to determine how the process works.
Simons, p. 73*
Craig R. Smith, "Contemporary Political Speech 
Writing," Southern Speech Cnmmunjcatinn Journal (Pall 1976),
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L. Patrick Devlin joins Smith in recognizing the 
importance of the process by saying:
A rhetorical critic analyzing and 
evaluating a delivered speech may 
be aided if he can uncover and 
understand the process by which 
the speech was composed. . . . The 
input of the speechwriter can be 
as important as the situation, 
speaker, or audience.3^
Although Devlin offers no detailed method for studying 
the process, he suggests three investigative areas for 
rhetorical critics. These are knowing the politician and 
his writers, knowing the circumstances under which a 
speech is composed, and knowing who worked on a speech.
In yet another article, Medhurst and Dreibelbis 
suggest that the critic consider the relevant aspects of 
political invention in much more depth. The authors propose 
that critics attempt to discover how the speechwriter 
functions in the creation of ideas, policies, and ration­
ales. Medhurst and Dreibelbis conclude:
The importance of understanding 
the genesis of ideas, both in 
terms of scholarly research and 
national well-being, can hardly 
be over-emphasized. . . .  In 
short, what we need are specific 
case studies which focus on
L.. Patrick Devlin, "The Influences of Ghostwriting on Rhetorical Criticism," Today's Speech (Summer 197^), 7.
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relevant aspects of political 
invention. By first focusing on 
the genesis of these ideas with 
reference to people, dates, and 
documents, the scholar can advance 
knowledge in the area of policy 
evolution and its public expres­sion.35
From the positions taken by Curtis, Smith, Devlin, and 
Medhurst and Dreibelbis, one senses avid support for new 
methodologies or the expansion of traditional methods. 
Although these positions are taken by contemporary figures 
in rhetorical theory, they seem to have the support of 
some traditional theorists. For example, Donald C. Bryant, 
in Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism, describes goals 
of criticism in the following manner:
Rhetorical criticism is systema­
tically getting inside transactions 
of communication to discover and 
describe their elements, their form, 
and their dynamics and to explore 
the situations, past or present, 
which generates them and in which 
they are essential constituents 
to be comprehended and judged.3°
If the critic is going to explore the speech process 
in detail, this writer feels it will be necessary for him 
or her to examine the speechwriter's role. In 1970,
Medhurst and Dreibelbis, p. 42.
Donald C . Bryant, Rhetorical Dimensions in Criticism 
(Baton Rouge, Louisiana: LSU Press, 1973)> P- 35-
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members of the Committee on the Advancement and Refinement 
of Rhetorical Criticism, at the Wingspread Conference, 
made the same kind of recommendation to rhetorical 
scholars, concerned with future studies in public address:
More than ever before, the rhetori­
cal critic must enrich his perspec­
tive and analytical approach, with 
the full range of insights, concep­
tualizations and methodologies 
being developed by his own and 
other disciplines. We also realize 
that the constituent element 
which we take to comprise the 
rhetorical transaction occur in 
more numerous behavior contexts 
than we have heretofore studied
systematically.37
Critics should be assured that the speechwriting 
process is a viable research interest which should be 
pursued. They can also be assured that any attempt to 
extend present methodologies, to consider this phenomena, 
will probably meet more acceptance today than it has 
met in past rhetorical circles.
Thomas 0. Sloan, et. al., "Report of the Committee 
on the Advancement and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism," 
The Prospect of Rhetoric, Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, 
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971)» 
p. 225.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EXTENDING THEORETICAL POSTULATES 
TO CONSIDER SPEECHWRITING
For centuries rhetoricians following in the Cicero­
nian tradition, established a strong case that a man's 
words are a reflection of his logical, emotional, and 
ethical frame of reference. These rhetoricians assumed 
virtually that the individual's speech is a product of 
his language and ideas and his interpretations and response 
to a rhetorical situation. The purpose of this chapter 
is to indicate how this assumption may be only partially 
valid in contemporary presidential speechmaking.
Since the days of Aristotle, critics have agreed 
that the primary components in the speech process are the 
speaker, his message and the audience. The speaker's 
ideas and language comprise the message. Aristotelian 
critics examined the immediate audience and the historical 
perspective as a part of the situational environment.
When a rhetorician defined the term "speech," he referred 
to a process in which an individual responded intellectually 
and linguistically to a situation. To this basic rationale, 
the critic added his own assumption that the speaker
59
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interpreted a given situation and prepared his own response 
accordingly. Hence, the critic examined the speech text 
to learn more about the speaker, his ideas, language, and 
evaluation of the situation.
Rhetoricians developed various methodologies for 
studying the speech process. They perfected their canoni­
cal system and developed other approaches which allowed 
them to examine one or more facets of the speech process.
As Lawrence Rosenfield contends, critics proposed two 
approaches to the study of a speaker-message relationship, 
a S-»M or the S«-M dyadic relationship. Both approaches 
focus on the discourse as an expression of the speaker:
One (which actually concentrates 
on the S-»M relationship) seeks 
to account for the rhetor's 
behavior as a function of the 
factors which influenced him: 
his education, the books he read, 
the persons who inspired him, and 
the like. The other variation of 
the S-M focus, SfcM is best typified 
by neo-Freudian critics who treat 
the aesthetic event as symptomatic 
of the artist's personal life and 
psychodynamics.1
Critics who practice a S-*M approach view the speech 
process initially as a biographer, undercovering circum­
stances and events in the speaker's background which might
^ Lawrence W. Rosenfield, "The Anatomy of Critical Discourse," Speech Monographs. (March 1968;, 59,
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influence his rhetoric. Of the case studies this writer 
has already seen, a majority take the S*M approach to 
criticism. Other critics prefer to examine the Sk-M 
relationship. In these cases, the critic examines the 
speaker's rhetoric and makes inferences about his psycho­
logical character manifested through his language. In 
many instances, the rhetorician develops a structural 
understanding of the speaker's message. Regardless of 
the perspective, the critic contends that the message is 
an extension of the speaker.
The second relationship is the dyadic one between 
the speaker and the rhetorical situation. According to 
Bitzer, the rhetorical situation involves the complex of 
people, events, objects, and relations presenting a 
potential exigence or modifying an existing exigence
pthrough rhetorical discourse. The speaker's relationship 
to the rhetorical situation may be on a historical- 
transcending level or on an immediate-reactionary level. 
Patton suggests that exigence may function on a causal 
or creative level. The historical or causal level may 
set the stage for the speaker's rhetoric. Says Patton:
The distinguishing feature is that 
if and when rhetorical discourse 
develops, it can be said to do so
Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Contem­porary Theories of Rhetoric. Richard L. Johannesen, ed. 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1971)* p. 381.
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in relation to some set of events 
or experiences capable of positive 
modification through the assistance 
of discourse.^
The speaker's rhetoric develops as a response to the 
situation, an S*-R relationship, and is given rhetorical 
significance by the situation. Furthermore, the relation­
ship of the speaker to the rhetorical situation, S*R, may 
be viewed on a creative basis in which the speaker reacts 
to his immediate audience. Patton addresses this duality 
as follows:
This means that while rhetors 
cannot respond without perceiving 
an exigence or constraint, their 
response, when produced, is an 
encounter with the events and 
experiences which form, part of 
their objective world.
In examining the S^R or S*R relationship, the critic 
examines the rhetorical environment and the speaker's 
response to and within that environment.
In discussing the concept of "delegative communica­
tion" Simons suggests that ghostwritten speeches evolve 
from a process through which writers and speakers
3-^John H. Patton, "Causation and Creativity in 
Rhetorical Situations: Distinctions and Implications," 
Quarterly Journal of Speech. ^5 (February 1979)*
h Patton, p. ^9.
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interact.The ghostwritten speech is not the product of 
a single individual although he alone may have written 
the drafts. Regardless of his degree of involvement in 
the process, the speaker must be viewed as an entity 
separate from the writer. Speechwriting involves a 
delegative situation and can never be seen as anything 
but an interactional exchange between the writers and the 
speaker despite their various degrees of participation 
in the process. When a President relies on an individual 
or a committee of speechwriters to prepare his rhetoric, 
he forces the critic to consider the speechwriter as 
another variable in the drafting process. Hence, the 
critic must take an interactional view of the relation­
ships .
The relationship between the speaker and his writers 
interests critics because it thrusts the study of speech 
preparation into an interactional framework. The speech­
writer has his own frame of reference, as does the speaker, 
from which he constructs his ideas and language. As each 
individual perceives the stimuli around him he cogni­
tively acts in response to those stimuli, projecting his 
ideas through language, as the following diagram illu­
strates:
5 Herbert W. Simons, Persuasion I Understand!ngr 
Practice. and Analysis (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley, 1976), p. 73.









When the speaker and speechwriter interact, they confront 
one another's ideas and language, which they may incor­
porate into their own frames of reference. Moreover, 
the speaker's ideas and language may now act as a 
stimulus to which the writer can respond and vice versa.
The exchange of ideas and language are visually represented 
in the diagram on the following page.^
Adapted from a proposed model of interpersonal 
communication discussed in Suzanne E. Condray and David M. 
Klein, "On a Theory of Language," unpublished paper, 
Louisiana State University, December 1978.













Through such an interactional process, the speaker may 
intentionally or unintentionally alter the writer's 
perceptions, ideas, and language or the writer may 
intentionally or unintentionally alter the speaker's 
perceptions, ideas, or language.
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The first inquiry a critic must make is to determine 
who is involved in the speechwriting process. The critic 
may find that a single writer was responsible in drafting 
a committee effort. If an individual writer was primarily 
responsible, then the critic would be concerned with the 
interaction between the speaker and the writer. However, 
if the speechwriting process reflects a committee effort, 
then the critic would want to examine both the interaction 
between the writers and the interaction between the writers 
and the speaker. The critic would seek essentially to 
discover what the relationship was among the writers as 
well as the relationship between the writers and the 
speaker. He would try to determine what effect these 
relationships had on the speechwriting process.
As was suggested in an earlier chapter, the committee 
effort is subject to the characteristics of small group 
communication. In examining the relationship among writers, 
the critic may discover that individuals take distinctive 
roles in preparing the draft of a speech. The critic 
would want to look at these roles and determine if the 
individuals had participative goals which differed from 
those collective goals of the group. For example, the 
critic might find that individual goals ran contrary to 
the group mind and jeopardized the group's efficiency.
Also, the product might reflect the individual writer at
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times and the committee effort on other occasions. In 
a similar manner, the critic could examine the interaction 
between the writers and the speaker to determine if the 
speaker's goals differed from those of the writers.
By examining these roles, the critic may perhaps be 
able to discern the effect of the group's interaction on 
the speechwriting process, the effect of the speaker and 
writer's interaction on the speechwriting process, and the 
overall effect of interaction on the process. In addition, 
the critic might be better prepared to discuss the organi­
zation of participants and their responsibilities in 
speech preparation.
The critic may gather information concerning the 
interaction through interviews in which participants are 
requested to describe this relationship. (As any research­
er, the critic would have to carefully guard against the 
individual's bias and attempt to verify responses.) 
Secondly, he would want to examine any biographical and 
autobiographical accounts which might be applicable. 
Probably the most reliable information would be primary 
sources which either provided a transcript of such inter­
action or correspondence refering to the situation.
Of all questions facing the critic, this one of interaction 
and relationships is probably the most difficult one to 
research without primary source material.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
The critic must acknowledge that speechwriting is a 
process and does not occur within a vacumn. Speech drafts 
often are continually revised as a result of the inter­
action between writers and the speaker. Thus, the critic 
might be able to see the direct effects of this interaction 
through the evolution of drafts.
A critic who examines a speech which is written 
solely by the speaker need not consider this interactional 
phase. However, any critic who evaluates a ghostwritten 
speech, must include the speechwriter's influence in his 
analysis. Instead of analyzing the dyadic relationships 
between the speaker and his message, the critic should 
consider a triadic relationship between the speaker, the 
speechwriter, and the message. The critic should also 
examine the speechwriter's influence in the relationship 
between the speaker and the rhetorical situation. This 
writer's purpose in the remainder of the chapter is to 
show how a critic may adapt his methodologies to the 
study of these triadic relationships.
First of all, the critic may consider the speech­
writer 's influence on the message of the speech. He may 
discover that the message is not completely a function of 
the factors which influenced the speaker, but it is the 
product of those factors plus the ones which influenced 
the speechwriter. In addition, he may find that the 
message is symptomatic of both the speaker's and
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writer's psychological character. Marie Hochmuth Nichols 
states, "The reality of the character of the speaker 
passes into the pen of the ghost writer."''7 This writer 
amends Nichols' position slightly, proposing that the 
character of the speaker passes through the pen of the 
ghost writer, in that the ghost may alter his perception, 
intentionally or unintentionally.
Through interaction, a speechwriter may influence the 
speaker's inventional process or the language he uses to 
express those ideas. Ultimately, the speechwriter may 
contribute to the ideas or language of the message. The 
critic might examine either or both triadic relationships 
formed. One includes the speaker, the speechwriter, and 
the ideas of the message, while another encompasses the 
speaker, the speechwriter, and the language of the 








^ Marie Hochmuth Nichols, Rhetoric and Criticism (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: LSU Press, 1963)* p. 45.
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In the Speaker-Speechwriter-Message (Ideas) triad, the 
critic is concerned with the inventional process of the 
speech. Since there are at least two contributors in this 
process, the critic may want to determine whose ideas are 
presented. He may not he interested in naming the partici­
pants, hut he might want to know whose ideas are chosen 
and why. Rosenman makes this argument in discussing the 
Roosevelt writers:
Nearly every major speech of a 
President is, in one way or 
another, a policy-making speech 
and those who are around when it 
is heing prepared and while it is 
going through its many drafts, 
with numerous changes and inser­
tions and deletions, are in a 
peculiarly strategic position 
to help shape that policy. Very 
often they may have prepared the 
first draft themselves...which... 
may contain an important statement 
of policy. . . . Those who have 
helped prepare it have the great 
advantage of being right at his 
/the President' s/ elbow ready- 
to argue their point of view.
In the descriptive segment of his analysis, the critic 
may want to acknowledge the speaker's intentions through­
out the drafting process. He may wish to indicate what 
revisions were made as the speech developed. The critic's 
primary task is to determine what influence the writer
O Samuel I. Rosenman, Working with Roosevelt. 2nd ed. 
(New York: De Capo Press, 1972), pp. 8-9 .
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had in the inventional process and the projection of the 
speaker's ideas in the text.
The critic may examine any remarks made in correspon­
dence which directly state the speaker’s intentions, or 
he may simply find this information discussed in secondary 
sources, like the remarks made by Rosenman. By examining 
all available drafts of the speech, the critic may be 
able to disclose if and how ideas change through the 
preparation process. Finally, the critic would want to 
compare the final written drafts with an oral transcrip­
tion to find out if any significant changes were made by 
the speaker in the presentation of the message.
In addition, the critic should examine the contri­
butions of the speaker and the speechwriter to the 
language of the message. Language has always been impor­
tant to the rhetorician because it reflects the speaker's 
personality and the way in which he structures his world.
If the language is to play such an essential part of our 
understanding of the discourse and of the speaker, then it 
must be thoroughly examined. The speechwriter and the 
speaker's styles may appear to overlap in the text of an 
address, but when they are considered in detail the critic 
may find several differences between the two styles, This 
critic does not feel that texts should be examined in order 
to point out minute differences. On the contrary, she 
believes that this would be a useless task. However,
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she thinks that any major differences in a writer's and 
speaker's language should be noted because they may reveal 
a great deal about the effectiveness of the rhetoric. For 
example, a writer whose own language is rather ornate and 
grand might lead us to believe that the speaker's natural 
language is similar, when that is not the case. Also, a 
researcher doing a content analysis of a speech might 
incorrectly use a language sample from a text to make 
observations about the speaker's linguistic behavior. In 
both cases, the critic might be guilty of attributing the 
writer's language to the speaker.
The critic would naturally be concerned with the 
writer's ability or inability to capture the natural style 
of the speaker and recreate that in the prepared discourse. 
Perhaps by comparing the speaker's oral style in extem­
poraneous and impromptu speeches with the style of pre­
pared rhetoric, the critic will be able to see some 
differences which might affect the language of the dis­
course .
Again, by looking at the drafting process, the critic 
can note any changes in the language of the speech over 
time. The critic might notice particular changes which 
he can attribute to stylistic differences between the 
writer and speaker by closely examining the speaker's own 
editing. He may also be able to see changes in language 
which reflect the speaker's personality Qr the differences
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in perceptual viewpoints.
Finally, the critic may want to compare the language 
of the last prepared draft with the speaker's language in 
the presentation of the message. The critic might not 
only find out how the speaker adapted his language to that 
particular audience, but he might also discover extempora­
neous remarks which reveal more discrepancies between the 
speaker's natural style and the prepared rhetoric.
Critics also adapt their theoretical constructs to 
include the speechwriter in their evaluation of the 
speaker's relationship to the rhetorical situation. In 
their research, the critic must consider two principles.
The writer extends the speaker's awareness of the rhetori­
cal situation and may assist the speaker in identifying the 
causal forces within the situation. In addition, the 
writer may allow the speaker to be more accessible to 
public opinion and may extend the speaker's creative 
faculties in responding to his audience. The following 
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The critic explores the speaker and speechwriter's 
relationship to the rhetorical situation to determine the 
significance of the situation. He examines the historical 
perspective in terms of the speaker's and speechwriter's 
backgrounds and ability to respond to this situation.
The critic needs to examine the writer's background and 
preparation to deal with this situation, as well as his 
ability to determine the speaker's intentions in the given 
rhetorical situation. He attempts to monitor their 
sensitivity to the environment and the factors which 
causally necessitate a response. The speechwriter's and 
speaker's knowledge of historical precedents and experiences 
in responding to similar circumstances is a valuable 
asset to the critic.
The relationship between participants and the 
immediate reaction to the situation is also of prime 
importance to the critic. He may discover that it is 
necessary to look at how the writer as well as the speaker 
creates discourse. The speechwriter may make his own 
persuasive appeals to the audience. He may create 
rhetoric which he feels is warranted by the immediate 
situation. In addition, the speechwriter may influence 
the speaker's accessibility to his audience. He may act 
as a "palace guard," insulating the President from public 
opinion, or he might work as an informer, keeping him
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oabreast on public polls and opinions, as Reedy suggests.
A speechwriter may even create discourse which responds 
to a particular audience, thereby extending the speaker's 
creative faculties. The critic examines these contributions 
and determines their value in the preparation process.
The critic's primary aim when evaluating a ghostwritten 
speech is to explain the triadic relationships which evolve 
from the writer's presence. While he may only choose to 
describe and evaluate one aspect of the speech process, 
the critic acknowledges that aspect as only one entity in 
the overall process. The critic views each relationship 
in terms of the speaker and speechwriter's influence on the 
message or rhetorical situation,
Donald C. Bryant contends that any critical perspec­
tive must go beyond the descriptive phase. Bryant proposes 
the following phases in rhetorical criticism:
1. To discovering and explicating 
the elements and form of particular 
discourses;
2. To generalizing particular 
discourses, or their informative- 
suasory dimensions, into the 
wider phenomena of the rhetorical, 
especially public address;
3 - To showing how particular 
discourses participate in families 
of didactic and suasory discourse 
to which they may be related;
9 George E. Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency 
(New York: New American Library, 1970T7 p. 92.
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4. To supporting value judgments."*"0
This writer proposes that the critic, who examines a text 
prepared by a speaker and writer, must consider each of 
these phases. His criticism should contain three steps: 
description of the speechwriting process; analysis of the 
speechwriter's influence in the effort; and an evaluation 
of the speech in terms of the triadic relationships cited 
above.
The critic describes the speech process by recognizing 
the participants, noting their roles in the speech process, 
and outlining the steps in the drafting of the speech.
Then he explains the speechwriter's influence in each 
relationship. In this step he analyzes the speechwriter1s 
contributions in the process. Finally, the critic evaluates 
the speechwriter's ability or inability to influence the 
speaker's rhetoric, according to a proposed set of 
criterion.
The writer suggests four standards for judging a 
ghostwritten speech. The purpose of each standard is to 
determine the effect of the speechwriter on the process 
and the final product. These criteria are:
Donald C. Bryant, Rhetorical Dimensions of Critipism (Baton Rouge, Louisiana*. LStJ Press, 1975)»PP. 3^-35.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
1. Did the speechwriter's presence 
enable the speaker to realize his 
fullest potentials inventionally, 
linguistically, and in response
to the rhetorical situation?
2. Did the speechwriter help to 
produce a superior text technically 
as well as artistically?
3. Did the speechwriter's presence 
and contributions contribute to 
producing the desired response?
4. Did the speech function as an 
instrument for social change?
These criteria parallel those standards proposed by 
Thonssen, Baird, and Braden in their evaluation of a 
speech.'*'̂  This writer's main concern is to extend tradi­
tional standards to account for the speechwriter's 
influence on the text and drafting process. By using 
these criteria, the writer hopes to provide the critic 
with a methodological system which may be easily applied 
to speechwriting cases.
In the first chapter, this writer acknowledged the 
fact that rhetorical critics have no methodology for 
examining a ghostwritten speech. Although a few scholars 
have proposed questions for investigative research on 
speechwriting, none have developed any systematic approach 
for that research. This writer suggests that rhetorical 
critics examine the ghostwritten speech largely within
Lester Thonssen, A. Craig Baird, and Waldo W. 
Braden, Speech Criticism. 2nd ed. (New York: Ronald Press, 
1970), pp. 539-4-2.
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the realm of traditional standards with one exception.
Rather than look at the dyadic relationships between the 
speaker and his ideas, language, or response to the 
rhetorical situation, this writer recommends that the critic 
consider a triadic relationship between the speaker and 
speechwriter and the ideas, the language, or the response 
to the rhetorical situation. By examining the discourse 
triadically, this critic hopes to account for the speech- 
writer's influence on the drafting process and the final 
text.
While this critic focuses on presidential speech- 
writing, she contends that similar standards might be . 
applied to other circumstances in which a writer partici­
pates in speech preparation and contributes to the ideas 
and language of the discourse or to the speaker's response 
to the rhetorical situation. She believes that by proposing 
such an open-ended approach, she can prevent critics from 
limiting their criticism into a restricted theoretical 
framework. The writer suggests that critics use as much 
or as little of her theoretical postulates as may apply 
to their particular critical endeavors. In addition, she 
advises critics to use her postulates simply to supplement 
and extend their existing critical methodologies. Ulti­
mately, she believes that rhetoricians can enhance their 
knowledge of speechwriting practices and the influence of
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the speechwriter on the speaker's message by applying 
this basic methodology to present theories of rhetorical 
criticism.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AN APPLICATION OF THEORY:
LYNDON JOHNSON'S STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS 
JANUARY 7, 196^
In January, 196^, Lyndon Johnson faced one of the 
first greatest challenges of his administration. Not 
only did he have to present his own legislative program 
for the coming year, he had to articulate his proposals to 
the Congress, the nation, and the world in his State of 
the Union message. One of the most significant features 
of this address is that it was prepared by members of 
both the Kennedy and Johnson staff. Critics can learn 
a great deal about speechwriting practices by examining 
the participant's role in this speech, his contributions 
to Johnson's ideas and language, his interaction with the 
President, and his ability to influence the speaker's 
response to the rhetorical situation.
The Speaker and His Writers
In order to understand the speechwriter's influence 
on the 196^ State of the Union address, one must first
80
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identify the participants and discuss the interaction 
between them. Critics can begin their inquiry by studying 
the interaction between the speaker and the speechwriter 
and by determining the affect of that interaction on the 
drafting process and the final text.
This writer discovered that two groups participated 
in the preparation of the 196^ State of the Union address—  
former Kennedy aides and the Johnson staff. The inter­
action between the two divergent groups interests critics 
because it reveals differences in the writer's backgrounds 
and experiences. The interaction between the participants 
and Johnson also provides insight about how Johnson 
assembled writers and coordinated their activities in the 
early months of his presidency.
On December 2, 1963 > President Lyndon B. Johnson 
asked several members of the late President John F. 
Kennedy's staff to continue to fulfill their responsibili­
ties on his own staff.^ Theodore Sorensen was among those 
who agreed to accept a similar role in the Johnson White
1 Draft, White House Statement to the Press, Decern-’ 
ber 2, 19^3* The White House: Papers of LBJ, Ex & Gen 
FG 11-8-l/S, Box 112. All memoranda, speech texts, infor­
mation packets, fact sheets, drafts, and letters noted 
herein are available at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 
Austin, Texas. All interviews not conducted by the author 
are deposited also in the LBJ Library.
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House. Sorensen had been a primary advisor and speech­
writer for Kennedy. His role in the Johnson administration 
was not nearly so encompassing as it had been with Kennedy. 
He was responsible primarily for preparing major addresses 
and outlining the legislative program for 1964. Sorensen's 
background and experience in this area made him a valuable 
asset to Johnson. He had worked closely with Kennedy in 
the previous three years and had experience in preparing 
such formal addresses. During December and early January, 
Sorensen served as the principal writer for the State of 
the Union address. He compiled the comments and contri­
butions of several individuals into a polished draft.
During the preparation process, Sorensen wrote at least 
seven drafts of the speech before Johnson approved the 
final text.
Other Kennedy aides participated in varying degrees. 
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, attended some of the earliest planning meetings 
for the speech. Budget Bureau Director Kermit Gordon and 
Walter Heller of the Council of Economic Advisors assisted 
Johnson in planning an economic strategy for the policies 
presented in the speech. Although they played more signi­
ficant roles in preparing the Budget Message, their 
contributions were an essential part of the State of the 
Union address.
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Johnson relied on members of the Kennedy cabinet as 
well. On December 23, 19&3> President held an "Off
Record Meeting" with several of his aides and cabinet
2members. Among the participants were Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, 
Secretary of Labor Willard W. Wirtz, Secretary of Interior 
Stewart L. Udall, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell 
Gilpatric, and Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. The 
purpose of the meeting was to go over a proposed agenda 
for the January speech and to discuss the policies to be 
included in the address.
Jack Valenti and Bill Moyers of the Johnson staff 
coordinated the drafting process and helped develop the 
legislative platform for 196^. Both men were young Texans 
and close confidants of Johnson during the early days of 
his presidency. They had worked for Johnson since his 
senatorial and vice-presidential days and knew the man, 
his style, and his ideology.
Horace Busby was "the oldest aide in tenure" and
3Johnson’s "first-ranking speechwriter," wrote Valenti.
^ The President's Appointments, December 23, 19&3- 
The White House: Daily Diary-Daily Appointments, Monday, 
December 23> 19&3-
^ Jack Valenti, A Very Human President (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1975)> P~ 7^
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Although Bushy did not take a major role in preparing the 
State of the Union in 1964, he contributed one of the 
initial drafts of the speech. Walter Jenkins, a former 
senatorial aide, along with George Reedy, attended the 
planning meetings with Busby, although they did not play 
significant roles in the writing process. Three seasoned 
campaigners, Clark Clifford, James Rowe, and Abe Fortas 
worked along with the Kennedy and Johnson men. Johnson 
valued the opinions of each of these men greatly and relied 
upon them to assist in the editing process.
Dick Nelson, an assistant to Moyers, was responsible 
for coordinating meetings between the Johnson aides and 
Eric Goldman, the Princeton historian. Goldman enlisted 
the support of about a dozen intellectuals across the 
country. The "Quiet Brain Trust" provided Johnson with 
his own council of scholars who could enhance his credibili­
ty with academicians, offer critical insight, and assist 
in polishing the President's rhetoric. Goldman contacted 
the following men and incorporated their suggestions for 
the address into a composite draft: Dean Fedele F. Fauri, 
School of Social Work, University of Michigan; Dr. Edwin H. 
land, President of the Polaroid Corporation; Dean George P. 
Schultz, School of Business Administration, University of 
Chicago; President William C. Friday, University of North 
Carolina; Professor John C. Coleman, Carnegie Institute of 
Technology; Bruce Catton, American Heritage; Professor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
Clinton Rossiter, Cornell University; Mr. C. McKim Norton, 
Executive Vice President, Regional Planning Association;
John Fischer, Editor, liar per 's Magazine ; and Professor 
David Riesman, Department of Social Relations, Harvard 
University.
The Kennedy and Johnson personnel jointly prepared the 
State of the Union address in 1964. Although some indivi­
duals had specifically delegated responsibilities, they 
were all participants in a committee effort with Johnson. 
Each contributor, in some manner, influenced the President's 
message to the nation and the world.
The initial preparation began in early December.
Johnson assured former Kennedy aides that he needed their 
assistance. Moyers recalls that these aides responded 
favorably:
They /the Kennedy men/ were well 
intentioned. They wanted to help 
him /Johnson/ in that time of 
transition and he wanted them to 
help. As a political move he 
wanted the Kennedy people to 
remain identified with Johnson 
so that all of the devoted 
Kennedy constituency in the 
country would not withdraw their 
support rapidly. And secondly, 
personally, he knew how hurt and 
wounded these people were and what 
a loss they had experienced, and 
he felt he could help them go
4 Memo, Eric Goldman to the President, December 21,
1963. The White House: Papers of LBJ, State of the Union
1964, Ex Sp 2-4, Gen Sp 2-4, Box 125.
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through this transition by 
having them stay on the White 
House staff.5
Sorensen began to meet with Johnson to discuss the speech 
and legislative policies. During the first week of 
December, they contacted one another constantly. Johnson 
gave Sorensen two directives about the speech. First of 
all, the speech was to be short and, secondly, domestic 
policies were to take priority over foreign affairs.^
Moyers had already researched the history of the State of 
the Union messages and found the percentages of time spent 
on foreign and domestic issues. Johnson was convinced that 
the draft should be less than 3,000 words and focus on 
domestic legislation.
In the following weeks before Christmas, the partici­
pants met several times. On December b, Johnson met with 
Goldman and suggested he coordinate the activities of the 
"Quiet Brain Trust." Goldman, in turn, contacted these 
individuals. He requested that each respond to two 
questions within forty-eight hours:
^ Personal interview with'Bill Moyers, July 10, 19?6o
^ Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 35*
^ Memo, Bill Moyers to the President, December b, 1963- 
The White House: President's Appointment Pile, Daily Backup, December 1963.
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What should he the general theme 
of the State of the Union message?
What specific new programs, parti­
cularly in domestic affairs, should 
it recommend?8
On Monday, December 9> the President requested'that Goldman 
Goldman meet with members of his staff to "examine and 
search out new ideas, new proposals, for the State of the 
Union message."^ On December 12, Professor Goldman met 
with Abe Fortas, Horace Busby, George Reedy, Bill Moyers, 
and Dick Nelson to discuss the speech. Goldman and the 
staff members used the opportunity to get acquainted and 
to establish some guidelines for soliciting ideas and 
drafts from the academicians. Nine days later, Goldman 
submitted a report to the President which reflected the 
ideas proposed by trust members. On December 24, he sent 
his own draft to the White House.
During the second and third weeks of December, Johnson 
received a number of drafts and comments from government 
officials and friends. For example, on December 19, 1963* 
George Meany, of the American Federation of Labor and the 
Congress of Industrial Organization (AFI/CIO), sent his
^ Memo, Jack Valenti to Abe Fortas, George Reedy,- 
Bill Moyers, et. al., December 9> 1963* The White House: 
Statements of LBJ, 1964 State of the Union Ila, Box 11a.
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suggestions to the Pr esi de n t. B ef o r e  the end of the 
year, Johnson received the remarks of Meany, Roy Wilkins 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), Walter Heller, Arthur Goldschmidt, and 
Eugene P. Foley, Administrator of the Small Business 
Association along with the suggestions from Goldman's 
proteges. Sorensen continually revised his notes and 
explored new suggestions.
On December 23, at three o'clock in the afternoon, 
the President met in the Cabinet Room with Secretaries 
Rusk, ~Pree man, Wirtz, Udall, Gilpatric and Katzenbach, as 
well as Clifford, Rowe, Fortas, Reedy, Busby, Valenti, 
Jenkins, Bundy, and Sorensen. The purpose of the meeting 
was to begin preliminary discussion on three specific 
topics for the State of the Union message. These topics 
were domestic issues, international issues, and possible 
political position. The agenda was printed as follows:
A. DOMESTIC ISSUES
1. Pending Measures*. Civil 
Rights, Tax Bill, etc.
2. New Measures: Poverty,
Housing, etc.
3. State of the National 
Economy
4*. Economy and efficiency in 
government.
Memo, George Meany to the President, December 19, 
1963. The White House: Papers of LBJ, Sp 2-k/l96b, State 
of the Union l/8/6k, Box 126.




1. Peace— East/West relations
2. Strength— National defense 
and alliance
3. Points of Danger— South 
Vietnam and Caribbean
k. Inter-American relations
5. Foreign Aid and Food for 
Peace renewals
6. Other?
C. POSSIBLE POLITICAL POSITIONS
1. Non-partisanship in foreign 
affairs
2. Challenge to Congress to 
act (reform of Congress?)
3. President for the Whole 
Nation
k. President for the Whole 
World11
The "Off Record Meeting" served as a two hour work session 
for the participants. The meeting allowed Johnson the 
opportunity to interact directly with those individuals 
who were contributing information and drafts for the 
occasion.
For the next twelve days, Johnson spent more time 
interacting with individuals on the drafts rather than 
with a group. On December 2k, the Johnson family and 
several aides went to Texas to the ranch for the holidays. 
At the ranch, the President frequently met with Valenti, 
Moyers, and Sorensen to discuss the speech. Sorensen 
prepared and revised a number of drafts while Valenti
11 Agenda, Preliminary Discussion of the State of the 
Union Message, December 23, 1963. The White House: State­
ments of LBJ, 196^ State of the Union II, Box 11a.
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and Moyers assisted in editing. On January Sorensen 
met the President in his office at the ranch to work on 
the latest draft. Altogether, Sorensen prepared at least 
seven drafts of the speech between January 1 and January 7.
By Monday, January 6, Johnson and his staff returned 
to the White House. At 10:15 that morning, Moyers and 
Valenti met with Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk, Bundy, 
Sorensen, and CIA Director John McCone in the Cabinet Room 
to discuss the international issues in more detail. That 
meeting was followed the next day by a gathering of the 
National Security Council and members of the White House 
staff. Johnson wanted to polish the foreign policy section 
of the speech and discuss any questions or remarks with 
the National Security Council staff.
On January 7> the President previewed major portions 
of the address with legislative leaders. In addition, he 
presented his plans for stricter budget control and new 
domestic programs. Johnson continued to promote his 
policies the next morning in the "Off Record Meeting" with 
the press. By noon, on Wednesday, January 8, Johnson was 
ready to announce his goals to the American public.
The preparation process gave Johnson an opportunity 
to develop personal relationships with many of the parti­
cipants. Writers also developed personal relationships 
among themselves. This critic believes that this inter­
action had an influence on the speechwriting process and
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final product. It appears to this critic that two 
variables affected these relationships— the differences 
between the Kennedy and Johnson personnel and the contrasts 
between Kennedy and Johnson.
Surely, it would have been easier for any speechwriter 
to adapt to the man he had written for than to adapt to a 
new speaker. To begin with, the Kennedy men were used 
to a more literary style of language than the short, direct 
phrases of this Texan. Sorensen had always worked indivi­
dually with Kennedy on drafts rather than collectively with 
a committee of participants. He had much more personal 
ties to the former President. Eventhough Sorensen was 
experienced in presidential speechwriting and policy-making, 
he could not adapt easily to Johnson's rhetorical or 
presidential style. No one was very surprised therefore 
to see him resign early in 196k. He submitted his resig­
nation one week after the State of the Union address. In 
his letter of resignation, Sorensen wrote:
Having largely completed my work for 
you on"the 19o4 legislative program 
and messages, and with increased 
confidence in both your dedication 
to the policies of the late President 
Kennedy and your election next Novem­
ber, I feel an obligation to devote 
next several months to writing a 
book about the late President anl my 
eleven years of service with him.12
12 Letter, Theodore Sorensen to Lyndon B. Johnson, 
January 14, 1964. The White House: Central Files, Box 452.
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While Sorensen apparently had some difficulties adapt­
ing to Johnson and his style, it does not appear from this 
letter that he admitted having any intense personal prob­
lems with Johnson. In fact, in The Vantage Point. Johnson 
wrote, "It was obvious to me that he /Sorensen/" was not 
going to remain on the White House staff indefinitely, but 
while he was there...he served with ability, working almost 
around the clock in an effort to smooth the transition and 
benefit the country.""^
Johnson also maintained a pretty good working rela­
tionship with other former Kennedy aides. Despite their 
differences in background, style, and humor, Valenti says 
that Johnson and McGeorge Bundy were well suited to each 
other. Said Valenti, "LBJ admired Bundy's thinking, always 
aiming at the essential, and uncomfortable with the trivi­
al."1^ Walter Heller and Kermit Gordon, two urbane scholars 
and unlikely Johnson staffers, worked with the President 
at the ranch that Christmas on the speech and proposed 
budget. However, both men and Johnson tried hard to main­
tain a spirit of comradery despite their academic - 
differences. In recalling those days, Johnson wrote:
^  Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 21.
Valenti, p. 80.
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Perhaps the setting, with scholars 
and government officials sitting 
around a kitchen tatle on a ranch 
far from an urban center, was not 
inappropriate for the drafting of 
a new program that would touch the 
lives of city and country dwellers 
alike.15
The President not only attempted to maintain a good 
working relationship with the Kennedy personnel, he also 
tried to improve his relationship with the academic com­
munity. Although Eric Goldman only met once with the 
President and once with the staff, he singlehandedly 
coordinated the ideas of trust members. Goldman's rela­
tionship with Johnson deteriorated in later years but 
seemingly was good in 1963 and January 196 .̂ Nelson ob­
served the meeting between Johnson and Goldman and made 
this statement to the President:
Your own eloquence and the willing­
ness and humbleness of Professor 
Goldman indicated that the final 
result of this meeting would be of 
infinite value to you, the Admini­
stration, and the Nation.16
Johnson had a very congenial relationship with members 
of his own staff. Moyers said, "Johnson had a game, an
Johnson, p. 73*
1 £) Memo, Dick Nelson to the President, December 1963* The White House: President's Appointment File, 
Daily Backup, December 1963.
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uncanny ability to make everybody who worked for him at
a time feel close to him. Also, he had a gift for bringing
17out a particular talent of a person around him." ' Valenti 
admitted that Johnson could be very brutal and demanding 
of his people, but he enjoyed his staff and treated them 
like family.
Most of the Johnson staff had worked many years with 
him. His aides, primarily Texans, came from lower-middle 
class America, unlike the Ivy League men on the Kennedy 
staff. The Johnson people were former journalists, 
business men, and one even was a former Baptist preacher. 
While they seemed individually gifted, on the whole, they 
were probably younger and less experienced than the 
Kennedy men. Johnson adopted a fatherly approach, advising, 
educating, and molding these men into politically percep­
tive young entrepreneurs. As a father, he demanded a great 
deal of discipline and perseverance from his White House 
sons and daughters.
Not only was the interaction between Johnson and the 
writers significant, the interaction between writers had 
a definite influence on the process. Although many of the 
Kennedy staff stayed on at the White House, Goldman felt 
they lived in a "sharply divided house." He said, "There
^  Moyers interview, July 10, 1976.
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were 'Kennedy men' and 'Johnson men' and in a number of
18cases they worked in awkward, wary apartness." Johnson’s
staff had been subject to heckling from the Kennedy people
after Johnson lost the Democratic nomination and went on
to accept the Vice Presidency. Potential problem areas
thus existed before the assassination. Many political
critics felt that the Kennedy people would like to have
dropped Johnson from the ticket in 1964. Goldman wrote,
"To most LBJ men, JFK and his group were a band of clever,
opportunistic sophmores who had taken on a man’s job and
19settled for a patina of style."
The animosity between members of the Johnson and
Kennedy staffs could have been relfected in the preparation
process of the speech. However, some things helped to
prevent this situation. Sorensen was given the major
writing role and Moyers assisted in a large amount of the
editing. Goldman notes that Moyers bridged the gap between
20the JFK and LBJ men. Moyers had served in a "New Fron­
tier" agency— the Peace Corps— and worn the respect of 
many more Kennedy personnel than other Johnson aides. He 
was also enamored with the "liberal intellectualism" which
^  Goldman, p. 19-
90 Goldman, p . Ill.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
characterized many of the Kennedy men. So, Moyers, unlike 
other Johnson aides had few problems with the Kennedy men 
and helped to minimize the differences between the two 
staffs.
Of all the presidential speeches, the 196*1- State of 
the Union message is significant because it incorporates 
two very opposing groups of writers with different back­
grounds and personalities. The speech also is distinctive 
in that it forced Lyndon Johnson, who was unexperienced 
in delivering presidential discourse, to interact with 
those writers on the Kennedy staff who had previously 
worked on a State of the Union message. The speech offered 
Johnson an opportunity to hear differing thoughts from the 
individuals around him, to discuss his own views and in­
tentions with participants, and to prepare a legislative 
program which would encompass the tenets of the i960 
Democratic platform and further the policies adopted by 
John Kennedy's administration. The speech also created 
a setting in which the critic can observe the interaction 
between the contributors and see what effects the differen­
ces in backgrounds and in philosophy played on the drafting 
process and the final text. By identifying the partici­
pant's role in the preparation process, the critic can 
determine how the writer influenced the speaker's ideas 
and language. By examining the interaction between
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participants, critics can discover how contributors viewed 
the situation rhetorically and how they assisted Johnson 
in creating his own response to the situation.
The Rhetorical Situation
Having examined interaction between the participants, 
the next step is to consider the speechwriter's influence 
in responding to the rhetorical situation. The critic must 
determine Johnson's and his writer's ability to recognize 
the historical significance of the situation. Then, he 
must examine the writer's assistance in creating Johnson's 
response to that situation.
Shocked by the death of Kennedy, Americans needed a 
leader who could provide reassurance and direction to the 
nation. Congress wanted a President who could continue the 
Kennedy policies as well as propose new administrative 
policies. Johnson, in turn, wanted to present his own 
agenda of legislation and lay the foundations for an 
ensuing political campaign. He recognized the occasion 
as an opportunity to gain the support of congressional 
members and former aides on Kennedy's proposed legislation. 
The State of the Union address was to be his stage as he 
prepared to win public and congressional acceptance for 
his administration and its policies in these transitional
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months and in the political year ahead.
Johnson recognized the constraints of the situation 
as well as the opportunities for his activist programs:
As a new president with no electoral 
mandate and with barely a full month 
of preparation available before it 
would be necessary to face the re­
convening Congress, I knew the effort 
to break the legislative logjam might 
be foredoomed. . . .  If any sense 
were to come of the senseless event 
which had brought me to the Office 
of the Presidency, it would come only 
from my using the experience I had 
gained as a legislator to encourage 
the legislative process to function 
as the modern era required. As I 
said...on December 3 ; 'I don’t 
anticipate a very long honeymoon—  
especially with a Presidential 
election only a few months away.'
What I wanted to do...was to try to 
unify leaders in the administration, 
the leaders in the two parties, and 
the leaders in the Congress.21
In order to succeed, Johnson had to begin by unifying 
the members of his own staff and making his intentions 
known to them.
It seems to this writer that Johnson succeeded in the 
first step. In a number of instances, Johnson verbalized 
his intentions to various staff personnel and writers.
For example, he and Goldman talked about the problem of 
unity. Goldman encouraged Johnson to appeal to active 
liberals and conservatives to minimize their differences
21 Johnson, p. 35*
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and strive together to reach common national goals. In 
Goldman's draft of the speech, he wrote:
Today, in a very real sense, we 
are all liberals, we are all 
conservatives— and we are all 
moving toward a new Americanconsensus.22
Although these exact words did not appear in the final 
text, they do indicate the participant's awareness of a 
need for unity.
While other staff personnel understood the significance 
of this occasion, only Sorensen had any experience writing 
a State of the Union address. Sorensen also was probably 
the best prepared to discuss the Kennedy legislative policy 
and incorporate it into the speech. As the critic mentioned 
previously, Sorensen's responsibilities under Kennedy were 
all encompassing. Not only did he write virtually all 
major speeches for Kennedy, he greatly influenced admini­
strative policy decision-making. Sorensen's familiarity 
with both the writing and the decision-making processes 
made him a valuable asset.
In contrast, Moyers, Valenti, and other Johnson men 
were ill prepared to draft a State of the Union message.
They had worked closely with Johnson throughout his sena­
torial and vice-presidential years and knew the Johnson
Goldman, p. 51.
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ideology. However, these men had been thrown into the 
whirlwind of the Presidency a little more than one month 
before the scheduled address. The task would have been 
great for any staff, but particularly one with little 
experience. The political implications of the transi­
tional months and the importance of this message further 
intensified the pressures on the Johnson staff.
Not only were the Johnson men novices in addressing 
this rhetorical situation, their President was a novice 
as well. Critics should not overlook the fact that despite 
his legislative background and vice-presidential experi­
ences, Johnson was delivering his first State of the Union 
speech. The prospect must have been somewhat frightening 
to Johnson, who was traditionally a "cloak-room speaker," 
avoiding major addresses. The occasion mandated a response 
from Johnson, but it did not guarantee that the speaker or 
his staff had the necessary experience to prepare his 
response.
Perhaps critics can only be assured of one thing--the 
occasion was a rhetorically significant one for the admini­
stration. The State of the Union address set the stage 
for presidential action in response to a torn and grieving 
nation. The rhetorical timing demanded that Johnson take 
decisive steps forward in order to lead the nation into a 
new phase in its history. In addition, the situation
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created an opportunity for Johnson to review the accomplish­
ments of his predecessor and to announce his own goals for 
domestic reforms. In many ways, Johnson used the occasion 
to make his debut as a' political contender as well.
Finally, the speech allowed Johnson to step forward as the 
new crusader, leading his people forward in an active 
legislative war on poverty, and helping heal the wounds 
suffered from the loss of their fallen leader,
The speech required that Johnson's staff work espe­
cially hard in accepting new responsibilities and adapt 
rapidly to these new demands. Throughout the process, 
the situation demanded that staff, Congress, political 
parties, and the American people join together for the 
sake of national unity and help make this transition as 
effortless as possible.
The Ideas of the Message
When a critic examines a speech, he usually is 
concerned with how the content of the text reflects the 
speaker's thoughts. In a ghostwritten speech, however, 
the critic must consider how the text reflects both the 
speaker's and the writer(s)'s thoughts. This section 
examines the speaker and speechwriter(s)'s influence on the 
ideas contained in the message of the speech. Particular
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attention is given to the drafting process and the parti­
cipant's role in determining what ideas are projected in 
the text.
Many aides and officials participated in the prepara­
tion of the 1964 State of the Union message. Of this 
group, some individuals contributed to the content of 
the speech as well as to its form. Collectively, the 
writers and editors played significant roles in determin­
ing the ideology of the speech.
The process of drafting the speech began in early 
December following Sorensen's acknowledgment that he 
would continue his speechwriting responsibilities. His 
first step was to secure the necessary background infor­
mation for the speech. Johnson decided that the speech 
should have two purposes. First, the speech was to publi­
cize the achievements that had been made under Kennedy 
and, secondly, the speech was to present Johnson's goals 
for his own administration which would further the i960 
campaign platform.
On December 11, 196^, presidential aide Paul Southwick 
sent Moyers a file on the i960 platform with remarks on 
"all significant progress and achievements."2^ During 
the next week, staff members reviewed the file and started
2^ Memo, Paul Southwick to Bill Moyers, December 11, 
1963. The White House: Aides File, Bill Moyers, 1^76.
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gathering additional information from government officials 
and agencies. The aides contacted all departments and 
agencies within the federal government and asked them to 
submit any reports or proposals to be considered for the 
address. A significant amount of the text was composed 
from these contributions. On some occasions* agencies even 
submitted paragraphs, prepared by their staff personnel, 
to be incorporated into the speech. On December 31* 19^3* 
Eugene P. Foley, the administrator of the Small Business 
Administration, sent the following paragraph to presiden­
tial aide Walter Jenkins:
The small business investment 
company shows great promise of 
filling this financing gap at a 
minimal cost to the taxpayers.
To date, almost half a billion 
dollars has been invested in 
nearly 10,000 small businesses 
by small business investment 
companies, and about of that?JL
money came from private sources.
Moyers forwarded this particular paragraph to Sorensen on 
January 2, 196^, for his consideration.
On other occasions, the President suggested that the 
writer send his latest draft to a departmental secretary 
or agency for review. For example, in 1963* Kermit Gordon, 
of the Bureau of the Budget, submitted a revision of
2 A Memo, Eugene P. Foley to Walter Jenkins, December 31, 1963. The White House: Statements of LBJ, State of the 
Union II, Box 11a.
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Sorensen's first draft and a proposed statement on federal 
pay for the State of the Union message. Such practices 
as these were adopted in many major addresses. They 
allowed the President and his writers to have a great deal 
of specialized assistance in preparing the content of 
a speech.
After Goldman consulted the group of intellectuals, 
he submitted their suggestions to the President. On 
December 21, 1963, Goldman wrote his report in which he 
stressed the need for action on domestic policies. Among 
the proposals were:
Recommend the establishment of a 
United State Reconstruction Agency—
to clean up trouble areas........
Encourage work being done by private 
groups in the field of unemployment 
and civil rights. . . . Establish 
a Presidential Commission on Human 
Equality . . . /and/. . . Establish 
an organization to attack poverty—  
such as a Domestic Peace Corps or 
a new kind of NYA or CCC.25
Many of these ideas found their way into the Sorensen 
drafts.
Finally, two agendas were prepared for the speech.
The first of the agendas, discussed earlier in the chapter, 
included domestic, international, and possible political
^  Memo, Eric Goldman to the President, December 21, .1963. The White House: Papers of LB'J, Ex Sp 2-4, Gen Sp 2-4,
Box 125.
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issues and positions. Another agenda was prepared later 
which dealt with budgeted and non-budgeted items. Among 
the non-budgeted items were:
1. Emergency Fund Allocation to 
support the Warren Commission.
2. Determination under Foreign 
Assistance Act to allow 
continued construction of 
Children’s Hospital in Poland.
3. Determination under Foreign 
Assistance Act to allow an 
assistance program for 
Indonesia.
Federal pay.
Although Johnson did not cite any of these individual items 
in the address, he spoke generally about hospital expansion 
and independence for new nations. In the message he em­
phasized general rather than specific issues.
Once the agendas were prepared, Johnson spent a good 
portion of time discussing the proposals. Throughout the 
Christmas holidays in 1963> Johnson met with aides and 
friends and considered his policies and goals for the up­
coming year, which were to be included in the speech. He 
reflected on those days at the ranch in his presidential 
diary saying:
I spent many long hours with them 
/Heller and Gordon/* discussing, 
planning, and evolving the outlines
p2̂ Agenda, State of the Union 196^, The White House: 
Statements of LBJ, 196^ State of the Union II, Box 11a.
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of a poverty program. Occasionally, 
staff members sat in on those sessions 
and made valuable contributions. . . . 
The challenge I presented to my 
advisers was the development of a new 
concept. I didn't want to paste 
together a lot of existing approaches. 
I wanted original, inspiring ideas.27
As a result of these conversations the theme of the 
address and administrative policies was born: "A War on 
Poverty." The theme was not a new one for Johnson. He 
had suggested similar campaigns both as a newspaper editor 
at Southwest Texas State College and as the Texas Director 
of the National Youth Administration. However, he was 
now promoting his ideas in a concerted program for the 
American people. Throughout the speech, Johnson built 
his case for a domestic equivalent of war which must be 
waged by each American.
The first drafts were reflective of this philosophy. 
Horace Busby wrote:
Our purpose is not to level our 
society but to permit all men to 
rise to the full potential within 
them, through doors of opportunity 
which open at all times to all men 
without regard to race or religionor region.28
^  Johnson, pp. 72-7^•
Draft of 196^ State of the Union Speech, by Horace Busby. The White House: Statements of LBJ, 1964 State of the Union IV, Box 11a,
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Although the language did not become a part of any other
draft, it echoed the Johnson sentiments. As the Goldman
draft, Busby's rhetoric struck a note of optimism and
idealism which was not as prominent in the Sorensen draft.
Busby spoke of Americans as being strong, responsible, and
courageous. Goldman took the same perspective saying,
"The genius of the American people has been that they
recognized when opportunity was knocking— and they threw
2 9open the door."  ̂ Neither of these drafts, submitted 
early in the preparational process, really exhibits the 
same themes and qualities of the final draft.
It seems to this writer that the individuals who 
worked on the draft at the ranch were primarily responsi­
ble for the ideas presented in the speech. As they 
worked with Johnson around the kitchen table or in his 
small office, they placed less emphasis on America's 
past strengths and more on the need for action today.
On January 1, 1964, Sorensen submitted his first 
draft of the s p e e c h . T h e  draft fulfilled Johnson's 
request in that it was a concise statement of the admini­
stration's proposed policies and it emphasized domestic
Draft of the 1964 State of the Union Speech, by 
Eric F. Goldman. The White House: Statements of LBJ, 1964 
State of the Union II, Box 11a.
Draft of the 1964 State of the Union Speech, by 
Theodore C.- Sorensen, January 1, 1964. The White House: 
Statements of LBJ, 1964 State of the Union V, Box 11a.
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legislation. Sorensen's first draft was the skeleton for 
all future drafts, with one exception. Sorensen only 
loosely outlined the President's goals for foreign policy, 
in Section V, so he had to revise a great deal in this 
particular area. Otherwise, the content of the speech 
changed very little through the drafting process.
On January 2, 196^, Section V was revised. The 
differences between the January 1 and January 2 drafts 
seemed to be more in terms of organization than content. 
Sorensen divided the last section into categories which 
fulfilled the administration's requirements for a policy 
of peace. It seems to this critic that these categories 
made the organization of Section V much stronger than 
before.
During the writing process Sorensen prepared at least 
six drafts of the speech. Johnson and his aides revised 
the content of the speech in two ways. First of all, they 
were increasingly more specific about the administrative 
policies and actions as drafts were revised. Secondly, 
they reorganized the speech into nine parts rather than the 
original five parts and developed the ideas in each of 
these divisions.
One change was made in regard to the federal budget. 
Johnson had been working with Gordon and Heller on his 
proposed budget and wanted to use this speech to announce
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his overall budgetary goals for the nation. The Budget 
Message was scheduled for January 21, 196^, and would 
provide fiscal details. On January 6, however, Johnson 
added the following comments to a draft for the State of 
the Union address:
The Budget to be submitted shortly 
is in full accord with this pledge.
It will cut our deficit in half, 
from $10 billion to $^.9 billion.
It will be, in proportion to our 
national output, the smallest 
budget since 1951*
It will call for a substantial 
reduction in Federal employment, 
a feat accomplished only once in 
the last ten years.
While maintaining the full strength 
of our defenses, it will call for 
the lowest number of civilian 
personnel in the Department of 
Defense since 1950*
It will call for total expenditures 
of $97*9 billion— compared to $98.^- 
for the current year, a reduction 
of more than $500 million.31
The only other change in the content of the speech 
was in the peroration, which was completely revised after 
the third draft. In the peroration, Johnson spoke of
^ Draft of the 196^ State of the Union Speech, "Cor­
rected Copy: Valenti, Third from Final Draft," January 6, 
196^. The White House: Statements of LBJ, 196^ State of 
the Union IV,
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Kennedy as a "builder of faith."^2 In the paragraphs 
which followed, Johnson once again attempted to identify 
himself as a President who could lead the nation in 
"expressing and fulfilling that faith" which Kennedy had 
built.
It seems apparent that Johnson wanted to be regarded 
as a man of action. "Prom the first planning meeting for 
the State of the Union message," wrote Goldman, "President 
Johnson had seized upon a n t i - p o v e r t y . T h e  mere phrase, 
"War on Poverty," suggested action. The Kennedy admini­
stration had begun to take legislative steps, but it had not 
threatened an attack on the problems as would the Johnson 
administration. Prom November 23» 1963» Walter Heller, 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, had urged 
Johnson to confront the problems of poverty. Finally, two 
staff members from the Bureau of the Budget, Bill Cannon 
and Sam Hughes, suggested in a. memo that an attack be made 
on the local level:
Basically, the ideas was this: local 
organizations would be formed in the 
neighborhoods and communities where 
the poor people themselves lived,
^ Draft of the State of the Union Speech, Final 
Draft, January 7, 196^. The White House: Statements of 
1BJ, 196^ State of the Union IV.
33 Goldman, p. ^2.
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and programs to help the poor would 
be channeled through organizations 
on the scene.3^
Throughout the drafting of the speech, Johnson was recep­
tive to contributions like this one which promoted action. 
As he interacted with participants in the speechwriting 
process, Johnson accepted those individuals who fostered 
a desire for action. In overview, the State of the Union 
in 196 ,̂ seems to have been created out of desire for 
legislative action to combat the domestic ills of a nation. 
The speech was created by a President and group of indi­
viduals who shared that desire and longed to see it 
fulfilled.
The language of the Discourse
One of the most visible influences of a writer's 
presence might be seen in the language of the discourse.
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to examine 
the writer's role, as well as the speaker's participation, 
in preparing the language of the speech. It also considers 
the impact of differences in the participant's style on 
the drafting process.
^  Johnson, p. 7^-
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While several individuals were responsible for the 
content of the speech, the language of the 1964 State of 
the Union was mainly the product of Theodore Sorensen. 
Johnson admired Sorensen's ability as a writer and even 
urged his own writers to contribute drafts as polished as 
Sorensen's drafts. Johnson was particularly self-conscious 
of his inadequacies as a speaker and thought that Sorensen's 
writing could improve his rhetoric.
Sorensen was given the primary writing responsibilities 
for the speech. Throughout the process, Sorensen's drafts 
were the ones which contained not only the ideas of the 
speech but the language as well. He wrote the first draft 
and many of the revised drafts of the address.
In the Johnson White House, senior staff members 
usually assisted in the editing process. On this parti­
cular occasion, Valenti and Moyers were chiefly involved 
with the editing because of their presence at the ranch.
They worked on the speech together with Sorensen and Johnson 
through January 4, 1964, at the ranch. Valenti and Moyers 
were valuable editors since they had assisted Johnson for 
several years and were familiar with his style. For 
instance, they knew that Johnson preferred that paragraphs 
be divided into groups of phrases rather than have lengthy
sentences. They knew too that Johnson preferred short
35sentences and short paragraphs.
35 Moyers interview, July 10, 1976.
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Valenti and Moyers also tried to look at a sentence, 
as Johnson would for political impact. The third from the 
last draft, included a statement on national defense which 
read:
We must take new steps toward the 
control and eventual abolition of 
arms. We must not stockpile arms 
beyond our needs or seek an excess 
of military power that is provoca­
tive as well as wasteful. It is in 
this spirit that we are cutting back 
our production of uranium and plu­
tonium for nuclear weapons and 
closing many non-essential installa­
tions. And it is in this spirit that 
we call on our adversaries to do 
the same. Specifically, this nation 
is ready to meet, with proper and 
adequate safeguards, any verifiable 
arms reduction made by the Soviet Union.3o
Valenti made two alterations which could have been a 
political deficit in an election year. He suggested that 
the stockpile of excess military power "could be" not "is" 
provocative. He also suggested that the final sentence 
about an arms reduction be omitted because it was poli­
tically detrimental language. ^
Moyers insists that Johnson had even more political 
insight than others in editing a speech. Says Moyers:
Draft, "Corrected Copy: Valenti," January 6, 196 .̂ 
^  Draft, "Corrected Copy: Valenti," January 6, 196^.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
He /Johnson7 always read a speech 
better than anybody for its 
political impact. He was a poli­
tician, and he knew how different 
constituencies would see— would 
interpret a word or even an idea.
He had an uncanny mastery of the 
symbolism of a speech and of how 
different groups would invest 
that speech with different symbols. 
He would say very concretely that 
you can't use that phrase...because 
of the way he saw that it would 
be perceived by somebody whom the 
speechwriter was not aware of.
None of the speechwriters were 
politicians. Johnson used to say, 
'You boys, writing these speeches, 
have never run for sheriff. You 
don't really know how really to 
write a speech, and if you'd go 
out and run for sheriff, you'd 
have more experience, and you'd 
know better how to relate this 
speech to an audience.'38
This story not only serves to show the type of language 
Johnson wanted in a speech, but it further supports a 
comment, made earlier, that Johnson understood political 
action.
Perhaps Moyers' story also sheds light on differences 
between Johnson's and Kennedy's style. Johnson's language 
was typically concise and, although choppy at times, 
carried political punch. Sorensen's language was more 
embellished, as Moyers worte, which created some problems:
Moyers interview, July 10, 1978.
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It was a more literary, allitera­
tive, form of speechwriting, geared 
so uniquely to John F. Kennedy's 
own personal literary style,...that 
it just didn't work. . . .  It was 
like trying to wed Carlyle to 
Napoleon, and it just didn't work.
Johnson was terribly uncomfortable; 
the audience was uncomfortable; the 
critics were uncomfortable.39
While the State of the Union message required a formal 
address, it is evident from Moyers.' comments that Johnson 
was not totally comfortable with the style of language for 
this formal event.
Another source of dissatisfaction, however, could have 
been related to the fact that these drafts were committee 
efforts to some extent. Although Sorensen had been the 
primary author, many participants contributed drafts, 
suggested language, and assisted with the editing of the 
speech. This critic feels that the number of participants, 
the formality of the occasion, and the "laundry list" 
effect of such a speech would have presented some potential 
stylistic problems, despite these differences in style. 
While the language of the speech was probably not truly 
reflective of his natural style, Johnson was able to 
maintain a politically safe posture and still encourage 
national action and support.,
Moyers interview, July 10, 1976.
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An Evaluation
Speechwriters worked diligently with Johnson through­
out the drafting phase for the 1964- State of the Union 
speech. They influenced the ideas and the language of the 
message as well as Johnson's response to the rhetorical 
situation. In the following pages this critic evaluates 
the speechwriter1s presence and assistance in the overall 
process.
In the previous chapter, the writer proposes that the 
participants in the process may enable a speaker to realize 
his fullest potentials inventionally, linguistically, and 
in response to the situation. It seems to this critic that 
the speechwriter's contributions to the content of the 
message may be limited by situational aspects. For example, 
in this particular speech, Johnson needed to propose legi­
slation which largely reflected the Kennedy policies and 
platform. Therefore, Johnson had to temper his own ideas 
within the context of Kennedy's previous policies. Because 
of his experiences in the previous administration,
Sorensen was able to help Johnson adapt his ideas to those 
of Kennedy.
However, Sorensen alone could not enable Johnson to 
realize his fullest potentials inventionally. Johnson 
needed to promote fresh ideas and new programs rather than
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only maintain Kennedy's programs. It seems to this critic, 
that the combination of the two staffs provided Johnson 
with an opportunity to examine the largest number of alter­
natives. The White House meetings and days at the ranch 
allowed the President to interact with individuals and 
carefully consider their ideas. As a result, this writer 
believes that Johnson's "War on Poverty" encompassed much 
more than it could have contained had it only reflected 
Johnson's ideas.
Nevertheless, the committee effort produced some 
negative results. As with most State of the Union speeches, 
the 196^ address became a "laundry list" of proposals. 
Consequently, the critic believes that the speech suffered 
stylistically. The format of the speech suppressed 
Sorensen's creative abilities as a writer. The formality 
of the address did not reflect Johnson's natural style. 
Sorensen could not elevate the rhetoric of this speech 
as he could with other formal addresses nor could he 
adapt to Johnson's natural language patterns. Linguistic­
ally, the speech did not reflect the individual. On the 
contrary, the speech reflected the committee of writers. 
However, while the speechwriters did not appropriately 
adapt to the speaker's natural language, they did adapt 
stylistically to the formality of the occasion. This 
critic finds that the language is "presidential" but not
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"lyndonese." The speechwriter enabled Johnson to adapt 
to the requirements of the occasion hut not to realize 
his fullest potential as a speaker.
Possibly the speechwriter's greatest contributions 
were in their response to the rhetorical situation. This 
critic discovered that the participants sensed the 
historical significance of the situation and assisted 
Johnson in his response. They also recognized the necessi­
ty for Johnson to create his own rhetorical platform on 
which to articulate his administrative policies. Perhaps 
the Johnson men, Valenti and Moyers assisted the President 
most in preparing his own legislative platform. They even­
tually worked as congressional liaisons articulating 
Johnson’s position.
While Goldman and members of his "Quiet Brain Trust" 
were not actively involved in the drafting process, they did 
aid Johnson in understanding the mood of the country and the 
significance of his response. In the beginning of the 
preparation process, the President relied on these in­
dividuals to evaluate major issues and propose an overall 
posture for his administration. Johnson also relied on 
such former friends as Clifford and Fortas to examine the 
political barometer and suggest a plan of action according­
ly.
The presence of former Kennedy aides reinforced the
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necessity for Johnson to use this speech as transitional 
leverage. They reminded him of the country's grief.
The aides also influenced him in taking direct action to 
lead the nation forward in the footsteps of their former 
commander.
Altogether, the participants enabled Johnson to 
realize his potential in response to the situation. 
However, these contributors only partially helped the 
President to realize his potential inventionally or lin­
guistically in the 1964 State of the Union address.
This critic believes that the speechwriters produced 
a superior text technically as well as artistically within 
the limitations of any State of the Union message.
Sorensen created a speech which artistically excelled 
Johnson's former addresses although he was unable to adapt 
to the President's natural style. Sorensen was unable 
to produce a text as artistic as some of the addresses he 
had previously prepared for Kennedy. This writer believes 
that Sorensen was unable to work as well in a committee 
effort as he previously had worked alone. Perhaps 
Sorensen's work reflected his restricted environment. 
Technically, the writers outlined a superior plan of 
action for the administration. The speech projected 
Johnson's "War on Poverty" in terms of specific legisla­
tive programs.
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Originally, Johnson wanted to use this speech as 
a means of proposing a new course of action. He also 
wanted to use the speech as transitional leverage for 
extending the Kennedy policies, gaining acceptance among 
members of the Kennedy staff, and enlisting the support of 
an intellectual clientele which his predecessor maintained. 
The speechwriter1s presence and contributions were only 
partially successful in aiding Johnson in the endeavor. 
Through the preparation process, Johnson enlisted the 
help of twelve intellectuals in a "Quiet Brain Trust"; yet, 
of those twelve, several mentioned to Goldman their lack 
of support for Johnson. They perceived Johnson's motives 
and did not wish their contributions to be read as an 
endorsement. The Kennedy men had mixed emotions about 
working for Johnson. Although they offered to assist in 
preparing the speech, Sorensen and others reminded Johnson 
that they would leave his staff early in January, which 
they later did. However, the President, with his writer's 
assistance, seemingly achieved his desired response in terms 
of a long-range continuum. This critic believes that his­
tory will show that Johnson was able to gain more 
congressional support in the beginning of his Presidency 
than any other President has gained. Part of this success 
must be traced back to this speech, its ideas and its 
response to the historical situation and circumstances.
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Johnson not only gained immediate support for proposed 
legislation, but he maintained that support for a period.
He mounted one of the most successful presidential 
campaigns in the nation's history partially based on some 
of the programs advocated in this speech. Without the 
•expertise of his speechwriters and their ability to 
enhance the President's rhetoric, perhaps Johnson would 
not have enjoyed such unlimited success.
The speechwriter's contributions helped Johnson to 
realize a great amount of his success. Moreover, their 
contributions helped the speech to function as an instru­
ment of social change. The participants effectively 
outlined a message of transition. During the preparation 
process, the participants' interaction with Johnson made 
him more aware of differing viewpoints, the mood of the 
country, and possible alternatives. The speech became 
an instrument for articulating Johnson’s "War on Poverty" 
and later his "Great Society." In the speech, Johnson 
expressed his basic philosophy and outlined his own thoughts 
for a new era of social legislation. He shared not only 
his own ideas but presented the ideas of those who had 
worked with him during his first days in the White House 
and those he conversed with at the ranch that Christmas 
in 1963.
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CHAPTER SIX 
AN APPLICATION OF THEORY:
LYNDON JOHNSON’S MARCH 31, 1968 SPEECH
On March 31» 1968, Lyndon Johnson delivered one of 
the most significant addresses of his presidency to the 
nation. In the speech, Johnson not only presented a major 
policy statement on Vietnam, but he also announced that 
he would not seek the Democratic nomination in 1968.
While many historians and critics have examined the speech 
from various perspectives, none has considered, in depth, 
the speechwriter's role and influence. This writer 
believes that such a study can extend our knowledge of 
presidential speechwriting. Moreover, by examining the 
March 31 speech, critics can discover how committee and 
individual speechwriting efforts may differ.
The Speaker and His Writers
This chapter explores the relationship between the 
speaker and his writers and the impact of that relation­
ship on the drafting process and text of the speech.
It also identifies the participants and their roles in the
122
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preparation process, discusses the writer's influence, 
and evaluates his contributions.
If one views the March 31 speech as a play he dis­
covers two scenarios with two casts of characters. The 
first cast is large, including specialists in foreign 
affairs, staff personnel, and the principal figure— Lyndon 
B. Johnson. This part of the play is largely the product 
of a committee. The cast of the second scenario is small 
and intimate. This act represents an individual speech- 
writing effort. So one finds that the speech unites two 
casts of participants.
Johnson wanted one group of participants to prepare 
his policy remraks and other individuals to draft his 
personal statement. Harry Middleton, a speechwriter in the 
White House in 1968, recalls:
Before he announced that he was not 
going to run again, he /Johnson/ made 
a major policy statement on Vietnam. 
Everything that he had to say before 
getting up to that final point would 
have itself characterized a major 
speech, had he not added this last 
business about not running. Now, the 
last five minutes of the speech, in 
which he said that he was not going 
to run again, were a totally different 
thing. There was no committee effort 
in that. . . . This was something 
that the President knew he wanted to 
do; he didn't ask a committee to help 
prepare that.l
Personal interview with Harry Middleton, December 21,19 79.
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This writer sees two possible reasons why Johnson wanted 
to use different groups of participants. He probably 
wanted to keep his announcement confidential and did not 
want to release that information to a committee of writers. 
In the past, Johnson had problems with individuals leaking 
information to the press. He wanted to avoid that situa­
tion now. Secondly, Johnson felt that perhaps a committee 
could better prepare a policy statement while an individual 
could work with him more intimately in preparing a personal 
statement. Regardless of the rationale, Johnson used both 
committee and individual speechwriting efforts in preparing 
the televised address.
A committee prepared the policy segment of the speech. 
Says Middleton:
That speech delineating new policy, 
which involved a halt to the bombing 
and other things, was really a com­
mittee effort, because it had been 
worked on for many days and by many 
people. And I mean by that legi­
timately, because this was the 
enunciation of a new policy direction 
for the war in Vietnam. So, the 
government developed a position on 
this. It was an evolving position... 
with the Defense Department and 
State Department and other people 
having their input in it.2
The committee included past and present members of govern­
mental agencies and departments as well as staff personnel.
2 Middleton interview, December 21, 1979.
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Together with Johnson, they outlined a new position on 
Vietnam.
Johnson worked closely with these men for several 
months, trying to decide what actions he should take to 
improve the situation in Vietnam. Participants discussed 
alternatives open to the administration. During these 
months, Johnson made some significant changes in personnel, 
which meant that some who had contributed ideas in the 
beginning of the process were absent in the final drafting 
stages.
The roots of the March 31 speech can be traced back 
to the last days of October 1967. Johnson knew that he 
had to revise his administration's policies on Vietnam.
In late •October he discussed his intentions with several 
Cabinet members and associates. Although the President 
had not yet scheduled an address on the Vietnam situation, 
he set the wheels in motion for a speech. He asked several 
individuals to outline their ideas for a future address.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was the first 
to contribute. On October 31* 1967» He suggested that 
Johnson propose a bombing halt in his speech. Former 
staff member, McGeorge Bundy concluded with McNamara that 
there should be no intensification of the bombing. Never­
theless, he opposed McNamara's plan for an unconditional 
bombing halt before the end of the year. While neither
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McNamara nor Bundy were a part of the drafting process 
in March, they influenced the committee's decision on 
Vietnam policy from the first stages of speech preparation. 
When the committee decided in the last days of March to 
reconsider the bombing halt, they examined McNamara's 
earlier proposals. Eventually, they decided to incorporate 
many of McNamara's and Bundy's suggestions into the final 
text.
Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy had served in the 
Kennedy administration. Johnson developed a great admira­
tion for both men. Of McNamara, Johnson wrote, "He was a 
loyal Cabinet officer and we had a close working relation­
ship that endured some of the most trying circumstances 
imaginable." Even after Bundy accepted the presidency 
of the Ford Foundation, Johnson continued to consult him 
on foreign policy issues. Despite the fact that both 
men resigned, they maintained their friendships with 
Johnson and advised him on occasion.
After McNamara's resignation on March 1, 1968, Clark 
Clifford became Secretary of Defense. He worked closely 
with Walt Rostow, Bundy's successor as the National Security 
Advisor. Together, they formed a committee with Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for East
3 -
v T,I»yndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: noit, Kinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 20.
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Asian and Pacific Affairs Bill Bundy, and White House 
assistant Harry McPherson. Clifford, Rusk, Rostow, and 
Bill Bundy drafted the major portion of the March 31 speech, 
outlining the administration's position on Vietnam.
McPherson coordinated the drafting process, serving as the 
chief speechwriter for the final text. "The President," 
said Middleton, "was the chairman of the committee, and 
his input was final, and the one that made it formal, and
Zj,the one that made it the actual enunciation of policy."
This writer has already described Johnson's close 
relationship with Clifford, in an earlier chapter. At this 
particular time in the administration, Clifford's friend­
ship and trust meant a great deal to Johnson, especially 
after McNamara's resignation, the TET offensive, and 
diminishing public support. Johnson welcomed Clifford's 
experience in foreign affairs as well. (During the Six 
Day War, Clifford acted as the Chairman of the President's 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.)
Johnson felt equally as fortunate to have a man like 
Dean Rusk on his staff. Rusk elected to remain on the 
White House staff after Kennedy's death. Johnson valued 
Rusk's experience and ability. Of their relationship, 
the President wrote:
2l Middleton interview, December 21, 1979.
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He stood by me and shared the 
President's load of responsibility 
and abuse. He never complained.
But he was no "yes man." He could 
be determined, and he was always 
the most determined when he was 
telling me I shouldn't do something 
that I felt needed to be done.5
Although there were occasions when the two men disagreed, 
Johnson appreciated Rusk's candor and continued to respect 
his views as Secretary of State.
Walt Rostow provided a balance on the committee. He 
represented the conservative view that America's presence 
in Vietnam might forestall another major war. McPherson 
contends that "Rostow*s most useful ability was in 
demonstrating grounds for optimism."^ In March of 1968, 
Johnson particularly needed to hear a note of optimism, 
so he was very receptive to Rostow's theoretical position. 
Says McPherson, "It was his ,/Rost ow's/7 memoranda to 
Johnson from the Policy Planning Staff in the State, in 
which Johnson's activities in foreign affairs were seen 
as elements in a great and beneficient design, that 
attracted the President to him and led to his appointment 
/on the National Security Council7 when Bundy left."'7
^ Johnson, The Vantage Point. p. 20.
^ Harry McPherson, A Political Education (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1972), p. 258.
 ̂McPherson, A Political Education, p. 258.
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In addition to these men, Assistant Secretary of State, 
Bill Bundy participated in the drafting process. Johnson 
and other members of the committee valued Bundy's presence 
because his "knowledge of the personalities and policies
O
of Asian leaders was encyclopedic." The President re­
spected Bundy's observations so much that he requested 
that the Assistant Secretary accompany Rostow, McPherson, 
and others on their trip to Saigon. Through his logical, 
persuasive arguments, Bundy convinced Johnson, after others 
failed, that a "graduated and continuing reprisal...was
Qthe most promising course available."
The committee included only one presidential aide—  
Harry McPherson. McPherson coordinated the drafting 
process and served as the principal speechwriter on the 
committee. Philosophically, McPherson described himself 
as "a dove." He tempered his feelings against the bombing 
of Nort Vietnam, however, so that he could continue to 
participate in policy discussions:
I felt that if I behaved like a 
dove that I would have no hope 
ever of taking part in either 
decisions or even of having 
such an effect as a speechwriter
O McPherson, A Political Education, p. 258.
g Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 127*
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can have— that I would be aced ,Q 
out of the whole Viet Nam thing.
Interestingly, Johnson apparently was never completely 
aware of McPherson's opposition. The writer disguised his 
feelings by writing about the "dove's position" and the 
"hawk's position" in somewhat vague, general terms. 
McPherson did not commit himself to any position until 
Clifford announced his support of the bombing halt. It 
seems to this writer, that Johnson thought McPherson was 
an articulate writer, capable of presenting new administra­
tive policy. Although McPherson could not agree with 
Johnson on the bombing question, this writer believes 
that he maintained a good professional relationship with 
Johnson as a speechwriter. (However, Johnson did not 
ask the writer to prepare the final paragraphs of the 
speech, in which he announced his personal intentions.)
Perhaps the following observations might be made of 
the committee's relationship to the President. In the 
early months of the conflict, Johnson was very defensive 
about his decisions on Vietnam. Because of the virtual 
stalemate in foreign affairs and the financial situation 
at home, Johnson became increasingly receptive to opposing 
views on Vietnam. He began to listen attentively to
Interview, T. H. Baker with Harry McPherson, LBJ 
Library: Oral History Project, Tape 5> March 2^, 1969.
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Clifford, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy's proposals. As 
Johnson himself admitted, he began to value the opinions 
of Rusk and others who were not the "yes men" that had 
once encompassed his administration.
The relationship between the participants is not 
discussed extensively in any historical accounts. Never­
theless, critics do know that McPherson and Clifford agreed 
philosophically about the need for a bombing halt and 
supported one another in lobbying for that action later 
in the year. Clifford, Rostow, and Rusk worked together 
on a number of speeches and were chosen for this group 
because of their experience. McPherson, Rostow, and Bill 
Bundy had traveled together on the President's trip to 
Southeast Asia and shared similar views on the situation 
there. It seems to this writer, that Johnson brought these 
men together because of their expertise on foreign affairs. 
Although their personalities and political ideologies 
differed, they each seemed dedicated to pursuing a new 
course of action in Southeast Asia.
While Clifford, Rostow, Bundy, Rusk, and McPherson 
drafted the policy section of the speech, other individuals 
were responsible for the peroration. Only a few aides 
and associates knew of Johnson's intentions, not to seek 
the Democratic nomination in 1968. Although he had 
considered his decision as early as the summer of 1967>
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Johnson shared his intentions with only a handful of 
people. Primarily four individuals contributed to the 
drafts of the announcement. These were Horace Busby, George 
Christian, Governor John Connally, and Mrs. Johnson.
While Christian, Connally, and Mrs. Johnson suggested some 
initial remarks in the fall of 1967, Busby worte the 
actual text alone with the President. This writer believes 
that of all Johnson's presidential addresses, this five- 
minute segment most closely represents an individual 
speechwriting effort.
In the spring of 1964, the President and Mrs. Johnson 
discussed their plans to leave the White House in 1969.
In The Vantage Point. Johnson recalls his wife's thoughts:
Her position had remained per­
fectly clear and consistent since 
she had first expressed it to 
me in the spring of 1964: she did 
not want me to be a candidate in 
1968.X1
In December of 196?, Busby prepared his first draft of
the statement which Johnson planned to include in the
State of the Union address. Johnson describes Lady Bird's 
reaction to the draft as follows:
I gave it to my wife to read. In 
all our conversations about declining 
to run in 1968, lady Bird had always
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 427.
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been most deferential. She never 
took the lead in these discussions 
or forced an opinion or a point 
of view on me. However, I noticed 
that she made one important change 
in Busby's draft. Above the 
phrase "have no desire to accept" 
Lady Bird penciled in the words 
we both preferred: "Will not 
accept. "-*-2
Although she did not help the President write his personal 
statement, lady Bird actively edited the remarks.
Johnson also discussed his intentions with Governor 
John Connally at the ranch in the summer of 1967* Connally 
had decided to stay on the ticket in Texas if the President 
wanted him to run again. However, Johnson suggested that 
Connally make an independent decision, informing him that 
he would not run for re-election. Valenti felt that 
regional politics alone did not draw these men together. 
"They were of a piece," he wrote, "dominating, awesomely 
energetic, shrewd, and prescient, feeling and sensing 
where others were o b l i v i o u s . I n  the fall of 1967# 
Johnson sent George Christian, from his White House staff, 
to work with Connally on a proposed draft of the statement. 
While Johnson did not use the original Christian-Connally 
draft in the final presentation, he continually sought
12 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. ^29.
Jack Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1975)* P* 23.
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Connally's advice on when to make the announcement.
George Christian, Johnson's Press Secretary, wrote 
the first draft of the statement in October of 1967-1^ 
Later, Christian combined his proposed draft with Busby's 
for the State of the Union. Throughout the process, 
Christian was one of the few members of the President's 
staff who knew about the announcement. Johnson depended 
on Christian to keep his secret and to assist in drafting 
the speech.
Johnson asked Busby to prepare the bulk of his
announcement. During Johnson's trip to Australia in
December of 19^7» Busby wrote his first draft. However,
Johnson decided to wait on the announcement until March,
at which time he again called upon Busby. Together,
Johnson and Busby worked throughout the last two or three
days of March preparing the peroration of the speech. It
is not surprising, to this critic, that Johnson worked so
closely and confidentially with Busby. Former Texas
Governor Price Daniel, who also employed Busby's services,
1^described the writer as "Johnson's favorite." J Busby 
seemed to come the closest, of all the writers, to captur­
ing the man and his style. Writes Valenti of their
14 Personal interview with George Christian, Decem­
ber 18, 1979.
ic Personal interview with Price Daniel, December 27,1979.
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relationship:
He /Johnson7 admired Busby and 
throughout his career in moments 
of great crisis, he called on 
'Buzz.' (Even in the 'final' 
crisis— his decision not to seek 
renomination— he summoned Busby 
to the White House to help him 
plot and construct the fateful 
sentences.)1°
Of all the participants in the speechwriting process, 
Johnson looked at his fellow Texans for the words that so 
personally reflected his intentions. In the March 31 speech, 
the President turned to those individuals with whom he 
shared his most private thoughts. As he sat in the Treaty 
Room with Busby the evening of the address, Johnson 
searched his own mind and concluded:
My own review of the situation, 
as honest and searching a review 
as I could make, had convinced me 
that the course I had chosen was 
the one that offered the country 
the best hope of peace and unity. '
The Rhetorical Situation
The next step in evaluating the ghostwritten text 
requires an analysis of the rhetorical situation in terms
Valenti, A Very Human President, p. 7^. 
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 18.
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of its historical significance and Johnson's creative 
response to the immediate set of circumstances. The critic 
examines the speaker and writer's interpretation and 
response to the rhetorical situation in order to determine 
if the writer extended Johnson's perceptions of the cir­
cumstances and created discourse which furthered the 
effectiveness of his rhetoric in response to the situation. 
The critic also considers the speechwriter's ability to 
understand Johnson's intentions and the political exigences 
and assist Johnson in preparing his response.
On the evening of March 31» 1968, Lyndon Johnson found 
himself responding to personal, political, and interna­
tional exigences:
While sitting at my desk in the 
White House,...I announced four 
major decisions. I would not 
accept my party's nomination as 
candidate for another term. I 
was stopping most of the bombing 
of North Vietnam in the hope that 
it would lead to peace. I had 
decided to make the expansion and 
modernization of South Vietnam's 
armed forces a goal of even 
higher priority. Finally,...I 
had decided to make a small 
increase in the size of our own 
military forces in Vietnam.18
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 365*
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Among the things this writer discusses is the impact of 
the TET offensive and the lingering war upon the necessity 
for new policies, the speechwriter's perceptions of the 
national mood and his ability to work with Johnson in 
proposing a new plan of action.
John H. Patton contends, "Two of the most urgent 
exigences were the rejections of Johnson as a communicator 
by the public at large and as an effective leader by certain 
of his advisors."'1'̂  While perhaps there is some evidence, 
as Patton states, to suggest that Johnson was unable to 
alter his image by changing his language, this writer 
believes that he suffered from more fundamental communica­
tion problems. The TET offensive angered many loyal 
supporters: some citizens no longer accepted the administra­
tion's candor on Vietnam. In short, this writer believes 
that a number of Americans felt that the President told 
one story while the media captured another scene on their 
screen at home. As they sat in their living rooms, men 
and women across the country watched General Loan, the 
National Police Chief, execute a Viet Cong in the street 
while their President called the TET offensive a
John H. Patton, "The End and a Beginning: Lyndon B. 
Johnson's Decisive Speech of March 31, 1968," Today*s 
Speech, 21 (Summer 1973). 3^.
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20"psychological victory." McPherson contends:
The terrible quality of the war 
in Viet Nam came home to people.
It appeared that these guys 
/the North Vietnamese/ didn't want 
to quit at all and were never 
going to quit; that our crowd was 
as caught as off guard as ever.21
So, first of all, this writer feels that the public had
begun to doubt the truthfulness of the President's rhetoric.
Secondly, some citizens and advisors questioned their 
President's ability to lead the nation. These perceptions
of Johnson's ineptness made it necessary for him to
re-evaluate his policies and adapt to these circumstances. 
The damage to our military forces and national pride, caused 
by the TET offensive, created further exigence for presi­
dential action.
Johnson knew that the situation demanded a response.
He sensed the nation's frustration over continued military 
action and the diplomatic stalemate between the U.S. and 
Southeast Asian leaders. Johnson had not said a great 
deal about Vietnam in his State of the Union message in 
mid-January. Many Americans interpreted the President's 
virtual silence as an inability to take decisive action.
2  ̂Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 383- 
21 McPherson interview, Tape 5> March 2k, 1969.
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Especially after the TET offensive, the public questioned 
the President's sources of information and knowledge of 
events in Vietnam. Americans not only doubted the truth­
fulness of the President's rhetoric, they began to see 
his language as empty rhetoric. Johnson later acknowledged 
his failures to verbalize the potential of confrontation:
In retrospect, I think I was too 
cautious. If I had forecast the 
possibilities, the American people 
would have been better prepared 
for what was soon to come /the TET 
offensive/ .22
The public perceived Johnson's lack of forewarning as 
a flaw in his ability act. Discontent brewed within the 
executive and legislative branches, while advisors argued 
about what new steps Johnson should take. Secretary 
McNamara proposed an unconditional bombing pause, while 
McGeorge Bundy opposed any intensification of the bombing 
in the North. Many other advisors supported a new policy 
although they opposed any unconditional bombing pause on the 
whole at that time. Congress was already dragging its feet 
on a surtax to raise more money for defense spending and 
many Congressmen reacted violently to the losses suffered 
in the TET offensive. Morale in the military even began to 
wane. Busby and McPherson heard the plights of enlisted
22 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 380.
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men and tried to urge Johnson to revise foreign policy. 
They repeated one lieutenant's.plight'to Johnson:
I've hit the same wooden bridge 
three times. I'm a damned good 
pilot. I know I've knocked it 
out every time. Big deal. It 
takes them two or three days to 
put it back. And for that I've 
flown through SAMs, flak, and 
automatic weapons fire. I've 
seen the god-damned Russian 
freighters sitting there, and 
the supplies stacked along the 
wharves. I can't hit them. It 
might start a wider war. Well, 
the war is too wide for me right 
now. And it's stupid.^3
Governmental officials, the public, and the military 
reacted similarly; they believed new actions should be 
taken immediately.
Johnson sensed national dissatisfaction with his 
policies. In an attempt to relieve these pressures, he 
appointed two groups of men to discuss what options he 
could endorse in the speech. Clark Clifford headed one 
group of governmental advisors, including Secretaries Rusk 
and McNamara, Treasury Secretary Fowler, Under Secretary of 
State Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, 
Dick Helms of the CIA., Walt Rostow, General Taylor and
2hothers. In their meeting on February 28, Clifford
^  McPherson, A Political Education, p. 426. 
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 394.
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suggested that Johnson form a similar group of nongovern­
mental advisors. These men were know as the "Wise Men" 
and included former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former 
Under Secretary of State George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, 
former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, General 
Omar Bradley, and others. Johnson asked both groups to 
assist in major policy decisions because of their percep­
tions of public opinion. It seems apparent to this writer 
that these groups understood the significance of the 
rhetorical situation in late February and the need for 
Johnson to respond to that situation.
Each group sent responses, proposals, and reports to 
the President, stating their opinions. Johnson was atten­
tive to their recommendations, although he may not have 
fully agreed with them at the time. Overall, individuals 
worked diligently to present their solutions. Throughout 
the months of February and March, they played significant 
roles in helping to form Johnson's rhetoric.
The TET offensive and mood of the country set the 
stage historically for the address. The political year 
had its own peculiar effect on the course of events. The 
public's opinion of the President's lack of leadership was 
not only detrimental to Johnson's foreign policy image, 
it jeopardized his political image as well. Johnson, 
once the national hero in the war on poverty, was now
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perceived as an ineffective leader in Vietnam.
Candidates from "both parties began their race to the 
White House. Democrats scheduled primaries across the 
nation. The circumstances demanded that Johnson make some 
quick decisions about his role in this election year. 
Earlier, he received forty-nine percent of the vote in the 
New Hampshire primary without his name officially on the 
ballot, but more primaries were to follow and Johnson 
needed to announce his intentions to party supporters. The 
Democratic party waited in limbo to hear what the President 
might say.
The stage was set domestically and internationally 
for the speech. Busby and McPherson discussed military 
unrest j Bill Bundy monitored the international atmosphere 
abroad; members of the Clifford and Wise Men groups reacted 
to Congressional and public displeasure at home. It is 
clear to this writer, that throughout the preparation 
process, participants were conscious of the significance 
of the situation and Johnson's intentions to respond to 
that situation.
Amid this mounting exigence, one question remained: 
Were these participants qualified to address themselves 
to the issues confronting the President? The nation faced 
a continued military conflict in a country far across the 
globe. The public recognized Johnson's authority on
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domestic legislation, but they questioned his credibility 
to speak on foreign affairs. Under the circumstances, it 
seems to this critic that Johnson needed to surround himself 
with a group of critical, articulate spokesmen. Rusk, 
McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy were all experienced in the 
decision-making process of the Kennedy years. They had 
served during the Dominican crisis, the Panama crisis, 
the Guantanamo incident, the Gulf of Tonkin "attack", and 
the Israeli-Arab War. Clifford had privately advised Truman 
and Kennedy before he accepted a similar role in the 
Johnson White House. Therefore, he also had an extensive 
background in foreign policy-making. McPherson was 
probably the least experienced in decision-making, even- 
though he had served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Army 
for International Affairs in 1963- Altogether, Johnson 
selected an experienced group of men to prepare his 
rhetoric. He also surrounded himself with men whose poli­
tical and military philosophies sometimes differed, but 
this difference made them all the more critical of the 
administrative's policies.
Because of the growing public dissent and the linger­
ing conflict in Vietnam, Johnson needed to present a new 
policy on Southeastern Asia. The President turned to 
qualified associates, who understood the significrnce of 
the situation, to prepare his response. In addition,
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Johnson relied on one individual, who knew him well, to 
help him declare his intentions not to run for re-election 
in 1968. All of the participants recognized the exigence 
of the unrest in foreign and political affairs. They 
assisted the President in preparing his response to the 
American people and, in turn, made their own contributions 
to minimizing this unrest.
The Ideas of the Message
The participants contributed their own ideas to the 
message in an attempt to assist Johnson in responding 
to these immediate circumstances. During the drafting 
process, the speechwriters and the speaker worked together 
on the content of the speech. In order to determine how 
the writers assisted Johnson in proposing new administra- . 
tive policies, this section examines the participants con­
tributions to the ideas.
The March 31 address was by no means a spontaneous 
response to the faltering circumstances in Vietnam.
Johnson considered announcing his political decision and 
altering the administration's policies for several months 
before the speech was ever scheduled. The President heard 
the shrill voices of those shouting anti-war rhetoric. He 
also heard the voices of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy
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supporters, mandating a change in leadership. He had 
listened to the rising opposition to his policies during 
the previous menths.
History teaches us that the President spent much time 
unsuccessfully trying to instigate a peaceful solution to 
the conflict in Vietnam. On two occasions, in February 
and April, Johnson sent letters to Ho Chi Minh offering 
an end to the escalation of the war in lieu of negotia­
tions. The rhetoric of peaceful negotiations was therefore 
not a new topic in the March 31 speech.
With the failure of his own policies to produce action, 
Johnson called on his advisors and Cabinet members to in­
troduce their own approach and ideas. Johnson wanted to 
address himself to fresh ideas, and so in preparing his 
next speech on Vietnam, he considered the advice of those 
around him. On October 31» 1967» Secretary of Defense 
McNamara proposed a new course of action saying that "he 
believed that continuation of our current course of action 
in Southeast Asia would be dangerous, costly, and unsatis­
factory to our people. On November 1, he presented
these conclusions in a lengthy memo to the President.
Johnson summarizes McNamara's recommendations briefly:
First, he suggested we announce 
that we are stabilizing our efforts
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 372.
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and would not expand our air 
operations in the North or the 
size of our combat forces beyond 
those already planned. Second, 
McNamara proposed a bombing halt 
before the end of 1967* Finally, 
he favored a new study of military 
operations in the South aimed at 
reducing U.S. casualities and 
giving the South Vietnamese greater 
responsibility for their ownsecurity.26
Johnson considered these arguments carefully and passed them 
on to some of his other advisors. McGeorge Bundy and Walt 
Rostow favored tactical bombing and increased participation 
by the South Vietnamese. Johnson's long-time associates 
Abe Fortas and Clark Clifford generally agreed with Bundy 
and Rostow and suggested that McNamara's plan might be 
interpreted as "a resigned and discouraged effort to find 
a way out of a conflict for which we had lost our will and 
dedication.
Johnson wanted to present a speech which contained 
a new policy on Vietnam, so he did not dismiss McNamara's 
contributions. He pondered the proposals for several 
weeks, as re re-evaluated his own ideas. On December 18, 
Johnson wrote his own reaction to McNamara's proposal for 
the record. Among his reactions were:
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point. p. 373* 
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 375-
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With respect to bombing North 
Vietnam, I would wish for us to:
— authorize and strike those 
remaining targets which, after 
study, we judge to have significant 
military content but which would 
not involve excessive civilian 
casualities; excessive U. S. 
losses; or substantial increased 
risk of engaging the USSR or 
Communist China in the War;
— maintain on a routine basis a 
restrike program for major targets 
through North Vietnam;
— strive to remove the drama and 
public attention given to our 
North Vietnamese bombing opera­
tions . 28
Johnson was not convinced that he should address the use 
of additional military forces at the moment, but he con­
sidered enlarging the South Vietnamese role in the con­
flict .
By March, Johnson altered his position, and McNamara's 
proposals became a part of the speech. Although the 
Secretary of Defense did not write a draft of the speech, 
his memo contained the major ideas projected in the 
President's address to the nation. While rhetorical critics 
might ignore any contributions which are not prepared with­
in the immediate drafting process, this writer believes 
that the critic is warranted in taking a more extensive 
viwe of the inventional process for the March 31 speech. 
Historical evidence indicates that participants began to
po Johnson, The Vantage Point. p. 600.
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contribute their ideas for the speech nearly six months
before the President delivered his address.
Original documents indicate that the earliest drafts
of the March 31 speech appeared during the first week in
February. On February 1, Rostow sent McPherson's first
29draft of a proposed speech to the President. 7 McPherson
prepared the initial draft after a conversation with the
President. Of that conversation, McPherson said, "Walt
Rostow and I and someone else said that the President
ought to speak, ought to be candid about the costs of the
TET offensive, about what happened at the TET offensive,
30and call for a renewed national effort." On February 5> 
Johnson forwarded copies of the draft to McNamara, Rusk, 
Clifford, and Rostow.
Johnson requested that these individuals respond to 
the draft by the following morning. McPherson revised the
Memo, Walt Rostow to the President, February 1,
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ: March 27, 1968- 
March 31» 1968, "February 5. 1968 #1 Address to the Nation 
3/31/ 68," Box 261. All memoranda, speech texts, informa­
tion packets, fact sheets, and letters noted herein are 
avaibable at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas.
McPherson interview, Tape 5» March 24, 1969*
Memo, George Christian to Secretary McNamara, et. 
al., February $, 1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, 
March 27, 1968-March 31, 1968. "February 5> 1968 #1 Address 
to the Nation 3/31/68," Box 261.
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text twice in the next weeks. On February 25, he pre­
sented a second draft. In the text, McPherson assessed 
the impact of the TET offensive:
— why the enemy struck when he did;
— what he hoped to achieve;
— where he succeeded, and where he 
failed;
— what the situation is today, and 
what is likely to happen in the 
coming months.32
He then proposed a plan of action which included calling 
up a number of reserved, requesting Congressional authority 
to extend enlistments, periods of active duty, and to 
activate ready reservists, and to increase defense expen­
ditures. Says McPherson, "Some word from the Hill was that 
unless we had a major call-up of reserves and escalated our 
committment in Viet Nam with its attendant costs, that we 
would not be able to get a tax bill through."33
McPherson wrote the final draft in this series on 
February 2?th. Several advisors met that day for lunch in 
Washington to discuss the latest draft, while Johnson was 
at the ranch. McNamara, Rostow, Califano, Rusk, Katzenbach, 
Bill Bundy, Clifford, and McPherson attended the meeting.
-̂2 Draft, -Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968, by 
Harry McPherson, February 25» 1968. The White Houser State­
ments of LBJ, "March 27-March 31, 1968," Draft 2, Box 261.
33 McPherson interview, Tape 5, March 24, 1969.
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By this point, McNamara condemned the bombing and Clifford 
mentioned the possibilities of adding a large number of 
troops, as General Earle Wheeler had suggested. Advisors 
felt that the President needed to have clear answers before 
he made any final decision on the number of troops and 
suggested that he set up a team to weigh the alternatives. 
This meeting is significant to an understanding of the 
speechwriting process. The participants played important 
roles in determining the foreign policy strategy. They 
freely discussed a number of key policy questions related 
to future administrative action. Moreover, they aired 
their differences openly.
On February 28, the Clifford group met to explore 
the available alternatives and their implications. During 
the next two weeks they discussed the administration's 
approach to negotiations. It is of particular interest 
to' this critic that the Clifford group made a distinction 
between present needs and a long-run military posture. 
Basically, they proposed many of the same actions that 
McNamara mentioned before his resignation. Although the 
participants disagreed on the bombing issue, Clifford and 
Rusk showed interest in McNamara's plan. Johnson sensed 
the committee's growing frustration and pessimism over 
military matters:
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The aspect of the Clifford group 
report that troubled me most was 
its totally negative approach to 
any possible negotiations.3^
If ever there was any major ideological change, it came 
during these meetings. Rusk, who was generally opposed 
to larger troop employments, none looked at the proposition 
as a means of establishing negotiations. He forwarded a 
memo to Johnson, prepared by a group of British intellec­
tuals, which suggested:
At some convenient point this 
Spring, America should do two 
things simultaneously, stop the 
bombing of the North and mobilize 
more men for Vietnam. It should 
announce that it will talk at any 
time, appoint negotiators, appeal 
to world opinion, remind Hanoi of 
its offers to talk and conduct a 
major peace offensive. At the 
same time, it would reinforce its 
armies in the South and continue 
the talk of 'pacification.'35
Rusk's change of heart had a powerful impact on Johnson.
The President respected Rusk immensely and knew that he 
was a cautious man who would not advise him to take such 
action if it were not completely warranted. Johnson was not 
scheduled to deliver his speech until the end of the month
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 398. 
Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 399*
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and decided to peruse Rusk's memo. In the meantime, Rusk 
appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 11 and told the senators that the administration was 
reviewing its position.
While Rusk testified in the televised hearings, ad­
visors considered the issue of troop strength for the speech. 
Johnson wanted to settle the issue and include his recom­
mendations in the March 31 address. After a meeting with 
the Clifford group on March 4, Johnson moderated his 
desires to gather selected reservists. He admitted, "My 
opinion had changed as a result of what I had heard from 
my advisors and what I saw happening on the ground in 
V i e t n a m . T h e  Clifford group completed their debates 
around March 19» and Johnson presented the administration's 
thinking on troop call-ups to Senate and House leaders. 
Although the President wanted the cost estimates refined, 
he urged his advisors to staft re-drafting the speech.
Harry McPherson coordinated the writing process.
Rusk sent background material and suggested language from 
the State Department. Clifford provided information on 
troop strength. From these proposals, McPherson prepared 
an initial draft on March 20. McPherson's draft was very 
similar to those he had submitted in February with one
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 406.
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large exception. Rusk convinced Johnson to reconsider 
the bombing halt, as is evidenced in the following para­
graphs taken from McPherson's handwritten draft:
To remove every possible barrier 
to the encouragement of talks, I 
have instructed our commanders to 
refrain from the aerial bombardment 
of Hanoi, Haiphong, and any other
targets within a range of  miles
from those cities, until they are 
instructed otherwise.^7
Other advisors joined in promoting a bombing halt. 
McNamara's first memo convinced Clifford to reconsider 
the proposal. Clifford outlined a program for deescalat- 
ing the war and ending the bombing North of the 20th 
parallel. McGeorge Bundy supported deescalation but pre­
ferred an open-ended approach. McPherson also supported 
deescalation. Although he did not participate in discus­
sions on troop strength, he was firmly committed to peace­
ful initiatives. The consensus of opinion expressed by 
these men, represented a shift in administrative policy. 
Together they voiced an opinion which influenced a new 
plan of action and the presentation of that plan in the 
March 31 speech.
The drafting process covered several weeks and can
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31» 1968, by 
Harry McPherson, March 20,,1968. .The White House: State­
ments of-LBJ, "March 20, 1968: First-DraftBox 262.
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be organized into three major phases. The initial phase 
began in February as a response to the TET offensive, as 
has been previously discussed. The second phase lasted 
from March 20 to March 27- McPherson prepared and revised 
six drafts during these seven days. The final phase began 
on March 28, and concluded on March 31> when the fifth 
draft in this series was completed. During these weeks, 
McPherson wrote a total of at least fourteen drafts of the 
speech. (These totals do not reflect, however, the final 
segment in which Johnson stated that he would not accept 
the party nomination.)
While the first phase highlighted Johnson's response 
to the TET offensive, the second phase emphasized a con­
tinued military posture in Vietnam. McPherson submitted 
the first draft in this series on March 20, the second one 
in the President's night reading that evening, a third 
draft on March 21, a fourth one on March 25 > a fifth draft 
on March 26, and the final proposed text on March 27- 
Rusk, Clifford, Rostow, Me George Bundy,. Treasury Secretary 
Henry Fowler, Bill Bundy, and the President contributed 
to the editing process during this phase. By March 26, the 
speech contained the following major revisions:
(a) Clark Clifford's redraft of 
the military section;
(b) Secretary Fowler's redraft
of the economic section— substan­
tially edited; and
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(c) Bill Bundy's redraft of the 
closing section on peace and 
Southeast Asia— substantiallyedited.38
On Wednesday, March 27, McPherson forwarded the last 
draft in this phase to the President with these remarks:
This draft represents the work 
of secretaries Rusk and Clifford, 
Bill Bundy, Walt Rostow, and 
myself. The number of pages have 
not been cut much but this is 
because the typing on this draft 
is less compact. The speech is 
now about 4000' words, a reduction 
of 800 from the last draft.39
It seems to this critic that the second phase reflected 
few changes in the content of the message. Participants 
did not make contributions which greatly altered the ideas 
presented in the speech.
McPherson made the major ideological changes in the 
third drafting phase, between March 28 and March 31• He 
designated these as "ALTERNATE DRAFTS," since they 
revealed a change in administrative policy. Two things 
influenced these alterations. On Saturday, March 23,
^ Memo, Harry McPherson to the President, March 26, 
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, March 31, 1968, 
"March 25> 1968: #7 Fourth Draft," Box 263.
39 Memo, Harry McPherson to the President, March 27> 
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, March 31, 1968, 
"March 27, 1968 #9 Sixth Draft," Box 264.
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McPherson sent a letter to Johnson outlining the steps 
for a possible negotiation. The writer said that the 
purpose of the exercise was "to show the American people 
that we are willing to do every reasonable thing to bring 
about talks. This exercise portrayed the administration 
as open and willing to make offers and counter-offers for 
peace. McPherson proposed this sequence of events:
1. NVN ^/North Viet Nam/ tells the 
Swiss they are seriously prepared to 
take part in negotiations after the 
unconditional halt of the bombing.
2. You announce that you have _ 
instructed our air forces to halt 
the bombing North of the 20th 
parallel. and you have sent repre­
sentatives to Geneva and Rangoon to 
await the NVN.
3. They say that isn't enough; we’ve 
got to stop it altogether.
We say, we cannot stop it alto­
gether so long as men and supplies 
are pouring down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
We show photographs of this and 
other evidence of the invasion over 
the past two months.
5. We say, "We'd like to stop the 
bombing altogether. If you will not 
mount an attack on our bases or on 
the cities in I Corps, or upon Saigon, 
and if you will stop the shelling of 
SVN from the DMZ and positions North
^  Memo, Harry McPherson to the President, March 23. 1968. The .White House: Statements of LBJ, March 31» 19°8, 
"March 25, 1968 #7 Fourth Draft," Box 263.
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of the DMZ, we will stop it alto­
gether during the period in which 
you refrain from such sttacks. And 
we will send our man to Geneva or 
Rangoon."
6. They say that's insulting; we 
must stop our bombing and all other 
acts of war, etc.
7. We say we regret they have 
responded in the same old way—
"You disarm, while we pistol-whip
This critic believes that there is evidence to suggest 
that McPherson's memo influenced the administration's 
policy decision and, hence, the presentation of that 
decision in the text of the speech. McPherson's ideas 
were not unique; Rusk suggested a bombing halt North of 
the 20th parallel earlier in the drafting process.
However, it seems to this critic that McFhersen's letter 
served as a catalyst, articulating the growing consensus 
of opinion among advisors. Johnson was receptive to these 
ideas, at this point, and requested copies of the memo 
for other advisors to review.
On Thursday, March 28, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford, 
McPherson, and Bill Bundy met in the Cabinet Room to dis­
cuss the proposed drafts. Clifford felt that the drafts 
did not reflect public opinion. He had maintained a close
you."
McPherson to the President, March 23,
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relationship with business leaders and legal authorities
across the nation and knew their dissention. Other
advisors attending the meeting agreed with Clifford when
he said, "The American people are fed up with more of the
same.because more of the same means no win, and only a
lf.Ocontinual long drag on American resources." McPherson 
expressed a similar concern in the meeting, as he recalls:
The war had become Lyndon Johnson's 
war and...a lot of people— very 
intelligent, basically sympathetic 
people— were beginning to feel that 
nothing could shake the President, 
that he had so much of his own 
place in history tied up in this 
war that he would continue to 
escalate it and continue to increase 
America's committment no matter 
what the facts were, no matter what 
the indications were.^3
The participants agreed that McPherson should write 
an alternate draft which might reflect some changes in 
administrative policy. McPherson complied with their 
request and submitted his first alternate draft. Later 
that day, Johnson met with the group to discuss the draft. 
At that meeting, Johnson noted that the "peace offer 
statement" included the same language Rusk had been using 
for several months. Johnson finally agreed that perhaps
lip McPherson interview, Tape 5> March Zk, 1969* 
^  McPherson interview, Tape 5» March 2^, 1969-
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he should alter his position, hut he did so with relief 
and caution:
It was what I had decided needed to 
he done, but I felt I still should 
not say so flatly for fear of 
another damaging press leak...I began 
to feel the pressure lifting. It 
had been quite a month, but now 
the wheels were turning; decisions 
had been made. Only the announcement 
of those decisions remained.^
The announcement came in the next few days. In the mean­
time, advisors revised the content and language of the 
speech, articulating the administration's new policy on 
Vietnam.
McPherson prepared a peroration for the sixth draft 
during the second drafting phase. However, Johnson rejected 
McPherson's conclusion and considered one of his own 
instead. In the closing days of the preparation process, 
Johnson decided to announce his decision not to seek or 
accept the Democratic nomination. He wanted to make this 
announcement at the end of the March 31 speech. Rather 
than rely on a committee to prepare his remarks, Johnson 
asked former aides and close associates to assist him 
in the speechwriting effort.
As suggested earlier in this chapter, Johnson spent 
many months contemplating his decision. In August of 1967»
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 4-20-421.
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he discussed his intentions with Governor Connally at 
the ranch and encouraged the governor not to make personal 
decisions on the basis of his intentions. The President 
then suggested to his Press Secretary, George Christian, 
that he consult Connally in preparing the speech. Christian 
recalls the event which followed in October:
President Johnson called me and 
reiterated what he told me privately 
a time or two. He used some thoughts 
that Governor Connally had given him 
on how to frame a statement. I took 
the statement on a yellow tablet.
He told me to go to Austin (the press 
was in San Antonio) and talk to 
Governor Connally and get his thoughts 
collected on how we should frame the 
statement. I went to see Governor 
Connally in late October or early 
November. . . . Connally and I sat 
in the Governor's mansion and 
talked about how to go about getting 
nouncement made and what to
Christian accepted the responsibility for drafting the 
speech. Johnson wanted the announcement to remain confi­
dential. He thought he might make the announcement at a 
political dinner in December, so Christian prepared the 
draft for that occasion. However, after the President 
and Mrs. Johnson went over the text, they decided that 
this was not the logical time to make such an announcement„
^  Recorded Conversation, Dorothy T-errito and George 
Christian, March 19, 1969. The White House: Appointment 
File-Diary Backup, "March 31, 1968 I," Box 96.
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In the meantime, Johnson discussed his intentions with
his presidential aide Tom Johnson and former aide Horace
Busby. The President worked with Busby on a draft during
his international trip in December. At that time, the
President thought of including the statement in his State
of the Union speech, but was undecided because, wrote
Christian, "He did not want to cripple the legislation he
46proposed by an ill-timed statement." Busby continued 
to work on the text while Johnson considered the possibili­
ties. "On January 15. Busby submitted a draft," says
Christian, "which the President had me incorporate into 
47my draft." ' Christian revised the text and presented it
to Johnson as an addendum to the speech.
During the early part of January, Johnson weighed 
the advice of several individuals as he tried to decide 
whether or not to go ahead with his announcement. Connally 
felt the decision should be presented in the State of the 
Union address. Christian outlined Connally's reasoning 
in a memo to the President four hours before the scheduled 
message:
Memo, George Christian to Drew Pearson, May 15, 
1968. The White House: Appointment File-Diary Backup,
"March 31, 1968 I," Box 96.
^  Memo, George Christian to Drew Pearson, May 15. 
1968, Box 96.
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1 . This would be as non-political 
a setting as we could ever achieve 
— much different from a news con­
ference or any other speech.
2. The setting and the reasoning 
gives credibility to the decision.
3. The audience is huge, and the 
reaction from the public will be 
much in the President's favor.
4-. The poll will start back 
down after Congress gets in full 
swing.
5. If the decision has been made, 
the longer you wait the more dif­
ficult it becomes; there will be 
turmoil in any event, but he thinks 
delay in announcement helps Bobby 
/Kennedy? who is already free to 
operate while others are not. ^
Busby had already offer his comments saying that "the
kgforum and occasion are the very best." ' However, Busby 
was convinced that the President could best judge the 
situation and he encouraged him to make an independent 
decision, saying:
...on a decision like this, I 
earnestly believe every man—  
including presidents— must step 
to his own drum. If you do what
JNO Memo, George Christian to Lyndon B. Johnson,
January 17, 1968. The White House: Appointments Pile- 
Diary Backup, "March 31> 1968 I," Box 96.
^  Memo, Horace Busby to Lyndon B. Johnson, January 15, 
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, March 31» 1968, 
"Reaction to M&rch 31> 1968'," Box 266.
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is right for your own self, it 
will be right in the history 
books.50
History records several different versions of the 
events on January 17, 1968. Some reports suggest that 
Johnson left this portion of the draft at the White House. 
Others propose that Johnson never really intended to make 
his announcement at that time. This writer contends that 
Johnson was not ready to make such a statement. In The 
Vantage Point. Johnson writes:
Although the State of the Union 
occasion would have provided an 
excellent forum for my announce­
ment, I sensed that the timing 
was not the best. I was asking 
the Congress that night for a 
heavy and demanding program. To 
couple such a request with a 
statement that I was not going 
to run for President might suggest 
to various people that I was not 
willing to fight for what I was 
asking. -51
Perhaps Busby's remarks are accurate, no one but Johnson 
could make that decision.
The announcement was a topic of discussion once again 
in March. Busby sent a draft to Johnson on Saturday,
^ Memo, Horace Busby to Lyndon B. Johnson, January 15» 1968, Box 266.
^  Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. ^30.
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March 29 > accompanied by a letter. In this letter Busby
COpraised the draft's simplicity and forthrightness. He 
also indicated that the timing was right for the President 
and the country.
On Sunday afternoon, March 31> Busby and Johnson met 
in the Treaty Room to prepare the President's remarks.
(Busby had arrived at the White House at 9=35 that morning 
and had been writing for several h o u r s . D u r i n g  the 
afternoon, Johnson and Busby worked extensively on three 
drafts of the speech. When the secretary, Marie Fehmer, 
went into the room at two o'clock that afternoon, she 
found Johnson reading the first draft and editing it with 
a felt tip pen. Johnson read the handwritten draft aloud, 
doing minor editing as he went along. After Miss Fehmer 
typed a copy of the draft, Johnson shared it with his 
luncheon guests— Mrs. Johnson, Pat and Luci Nugent, and 
Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Krim.
In the meantime, Busby prepared a second handwritten 
draft and showed it to the President at 6:30 in the evening, 
at which time he explained his revisions.to Johnson. In
Memo, Horace Busby to Lyndon B. Johnson, March 29, 
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, "Speech Archives 
March 1968," Box 266.
53 Notes, March 31. 1968. The White House: Daily 
Diary, "March 16-31» 1968," Box 3^-
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the editing process, Johnson decided to revise nearly 
an entire page of this draft, inserting a paragraph on 
partisanship problems in a political year. He wrote the 
following language on a shorthand tablet:
I prefer to apply my time to 
supporting the men and t£je cause 
we have committed. The strength 
and endurance of all of us has 
its limits and I do /not/ wish 
to divide and dilute my energies 
by devoting a day or a week to 
advancing my political campaign.5^
Busby proposed an alternate passage, which he dictated to 
Johnson. After the President copied these paragraphs in 
his own hand, he sent the draft to his secretary to be 
typed. Once the draft was typed, Johnson made a few 
changes in the language of the speech with Busby. Then, 
he returned it to the secretary saying, "put it on the 
teleprompter!
During the drafting process of this part of the 
speech, Johnson worked confidentially with a few individ­
uals.- In fact, only a couple of his closest White House 
aides and secretaries knew of his announcement including:
i
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31» 1968, by 
Horace Busby, March 31» 1968. The White House: Statements 
of IB J, "Original Drafts," Draft 2, Box 266.
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968, by Horace Busby, March 31» 1968. The White House: Statements 
of LBJ, "Original Drafts," Draft 3» Box 266.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
Christian, Marvin Watson, Tom Johnson, Marie Fehmer, and 
Juanita Roberts. Those participants who prepared the first 
portion of the speech never saw the President's closing 
statement. The last segment was almost completely a joint 
effort between Busby and Johnson, although Christian, 
Connally, and Mrs. Johnson were consulted along the way.
Both a committee of writers and a select group of 
individuals contributed to the ideas of the message. While 
some participants made their contributions long before 
the first drafts appeared, they were equally as influential 
in providing the content of the speech. Johnson encouraged 
the support of his advisors and staff members in the 
preparation process and welcomed their contributions.
The language of the Discourse
Speechwriters not only contributed to the ideas of 
the speech, they prepared the language of the discourse 
as well. This section examines the relationship between 
the speaker, his writers, and the language of the speech.
It analyzes the speechwriter1s influence on the speaker's 
language, in an attempt to show how speechwriters helped 
Johnson articulate his new policies and political inten­
tions. The section also indicates how the participants 
made the President's language more concrete throughout 
the drafting process.
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In the initial drafting stages, the contributors 
wanted to project new administrative policy as clearly as 
possible. McPherson also wanted to avoid any unwarranted, 
exuberant language which might prove detrimental to the 
President:
What I've tried to do since I've 
had the speechwriting operation 
is to simplify speeches substantially 
and to reduce their rhetoric, not 
to make such extravagant claims.
One thing I've tried to do since 
1966 is to very much scale down and 
moderate our language on Vietnam.56
The participants tried to avoid any rhetoric which might 
dapen Johnson's political image. They also eliminated 
ambiguous statements which did not accurately represent 
the administration's policies.
Several examples characterize this type of editing 
in the third drafting phase. On the evening of March 28, 
1968, after an extensive meeting which, altered'the thrust 
of the message, the rhetoric changed from confrontation 
to consultation. In one of his first alternate drafts, 
McPherson began, "My fellow Americans: tonight I want to 
speak to you about the prospects for peace in Vietnam and
Interview, T.H. Baker with Harry McPherson, LBJ 
Library: Oral History Project, Tape 4, January 16, 1969.
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Southeast Asia."-^ A week before the draft began with 
"a challenge." Clifford proposed a similar revision in the 
third alternate draft on March 29 =
Tonight, I should like to suggest 
to Hanoi that we pursue a different 
and alternate course to peace; a 
course that would involve a mutual 
reduction in the present level of 
hostilities.58
Each of these stylistic changes reflected revisions being 
made in the content of the speech. The language invoked 
resolution rather than aggression.
In addition, contributors suggested that the President 
adapt the tenor of his language to this new thrust in 
administrative policy. The participants wanted Johnson 
to maintain his resolute posture and vetoed any language 
which altered from that course. In a memo to the President, 
McPherson argued against the aggressive language of a 
proposed peroration. McPherson and Clifford both felt 
that Johnson must avoid language which might misinterpret 
the administration's posture.
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968, by 
Harry McPherson, March 28, 1968. The White House: State­
ments of LBJ, "March 28, 1968 #10 Alternate Draft #1,"
Box 26k.
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968, by Harry McPherson, March 28, 1968. The White House: State­
ments of LBJ, "March 28, 1968 #11 Alternate Draft #2,"
Box 265.
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He ^Clifford/ argues that if you 
come on with a strong 'we must 
resist aggression' line at the end 
of a peaceful initiative speech, 
people will say 'ah...now here 
comes the real Johnson, Old Blood 
and Thunder,' and that the purpose 
of the speech will he lost. I 
agree with him. I believe you 
should acknowledge...the misgivings 
the war has aroused. Because that 
it is so true, it will generate a 
greater acceptance, and I believe 
some merited empathy among your 
listeners. -59
The participants also revised the language of the 
speech which dealt with the bombing halt and troop levels. 
Once the administration decided what its position on the 
bombing halt and troop level would be, participants worked 
diligently to clarify that position. As a result, the 
language of the final draft was more concrete than it had 
been earlier in the speechwriting process. For example, 
in the February 25 draft, McPherson wrote:
We have no desire to continue 
bombing North Vietnam, and we will 
stop that bombing, as I said six 
months ago in San Antonio,
— when stopping it will lead to 
prompt and productive talks,
— and when it is clear that North 
Vietnam will not take advantage 
of our restraint to launch
Memo, Harry McPherson to Lyndon B. Johnson, March 30* 
1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, "March 31* 1968 
#±k Alternate Draft #5»" Box 266.
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precisely the kind of accelerated 
attacks he has now begun in theSouth.60
On March 29, as the committee reached decisions on the 
bombing halt, the language changed:
Beginning tonight, and without 
waiting for any signal from Hanoi, 
we will order our aircraft to make 
no bombing attacks, until further 
notice, north of the 20th parallel 
in North Vietnam. The 20th parallel 
is about 75 miles south of the 
cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Our 
attacks will be limited to the 
southern-most area of North Vietnam 
— the area through which weapons, 
supplies and reinforcements are 
moving directly toward South 
Vietnam.61
The bombing halt issue produced one particularly - 
interesting circumstance. Apparently, Johnson and his 
committee debated setting the limits on the bombing halt 
up until the last moments, because they did not wish to 
use specific language to refer to those limits. The day 
before the speech was to be delivered Johnson met with his 
advisors for six hours to go over every word and detail in 
the text. McPherson recalls that Katzenbach did not want
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968 . The. 
White House: Statements of LBJ, "February 25, 1968 Draft 
#2," Box 261.
^  Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31» 1968. The 
White House: Statements of LBJ, "March 29, 1968 #12 Alternate 
Draft #2," Box 265.
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to use the twentieth parallel as a limit. Katzenbach 
argued, "We should say that we would limit the bombing 
to that area North of the DMZ in which the enemy might be
zT o
gathering his forces to strike our people." Consequently, 
while the debate continued, no one took the initiative to 
restrict the bombing missions scheduled on April 1. 
Ironically, U. S. planes bombed a truck distribution point 
near the twentieth parallel the day following the speech 
and, of course, Congressmen attacked Johnson for his gross 
oversight. It seems to this critic that perhaps the situa­
tion could have been prevented had the debate over the 
language been resolved sooner.
In each of these instances, the committee played a 
prominent role in designing the language of the speech and 
Johnson usually accepted their recommendations. However, 
in the final analysis, contributors failed to show the 
same degree of political perception in editing the text 
as did Johnson. McPherson contends, "Most of the time 
Lyndon Johnson's skill and sagacity and long-range capacity 
to anticipate exceeded that of anybody else in the room.
And he would ultimately be proved to be r i g h t . S e v e r a l  
examples of Johnson's sagacity can be.seen in the speech.
£ P McPherson interview, Tape 5> March 2k, 1969•
^  McPherson interview, Tape 5» March 2k, 1969*
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On the afternoon before he spoke, the President videotaped
his speech on the small Sony unit in his office. He
wanted to practice using the teleprompter and to time
his speech without the final statement. During this
practice period, Johnson made nearly twenty changes in the
language of the speech. Many of these revisions revealed
Johnson's astute understanding of politics. For example,
he changed "I've told the American people" to "I've assured
the American people." He spoke of "prudent measures"
Ah,instead of "restraints." Johnson also suggested alter­
nate phrasing for grammatically incorrect passages. By 
the end of the tape, Johnson had a polished draft which 
eliminated some of the politically detrimental language.
The only changes not reflected in the practice tape 
were those involving Johnson's personal statement. He 
did not want anyone to leak his announcement to the press, 
so he refrained from practicing this part of the speech. 
Although the language of the January and March drafts 
differed little, Johnson spent a great deal of time editing 
a segment concerning the partisanship question. He and 
Busby added several references to national unity. In the 
final edited version, Johnson wrote:
^  Videotape, Practice Tape, Address to the Nation, 
March 31, 1968. LBJ Library, Audio-Visual Archives.
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I would ask all Americans—  
whatever their personal interest 
or concerns— to guard against 
divisiveness and all its con­
sequence . 65
In summary, this critic found that speechwriters 
contributed to the language of the, .text. 'Throughout the 
writing process, they not only assisted in editing the 
content of the speech but they also revised the language 
which expressed those ideas. In the initial phase, 
McPherson edited drafts as other advisors proposed their 
changes. In the peroration, Busby made similar revisions 
alone with the President. Ultimately, the participants 
significantly affected the language of the speech through 
their contributions in the editing process.
An Evaluation
One question remains: How effective were the parti­
cipants in contributing to the ideas and language of the 
text as well as assisting Johnson in responding to the 
rhetorical situation? In order to answer this question 
the critic evaluates the writer's contribution to the 
ideas and language of the speech. She also examines the
^  Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31 > 1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, "Original Drafts,’1 Draft 3, 
Box 266.
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writer's ability to interpret the significance of the 
situation and to adapt Johnson's rhetoric to that situation.
While Johnson wanted to propose a new Southeast Asian 
policy in his March 31 speech, he had not chosen a definite 
course of action when speech preparation began. McNamara, 
Clifford, Rusk, McPherson and others assisted Johnson in 
developing the policy. Through their assistance Johnson 
prepared and projected a new administrative policy in the 
speech. The participants presented controversial proposals 
which forced the President and his advisors to re-evaluate 
their own particular viewpoints and administration poli­
cies. While Johnson may have considered these arguments 
on his own, the speechwriter's presence enabled him to 
look more in depth at these positions and to defend his 
own ideas orally as he interacted with his writers.
Through this interaction, the critic believes that 
Johnson and his advisors were able to weigh the alterna­
tives of the proposed plans of action and suggest a policy 
which largely reflected a consensus of group opinion.
Thus, the critic contends that the speechwriter's presence 
enabled Johnson to consider more alternatives and present 
more comprehensive policies than he would have if he had 
presented only his own ideas in the speech.
The writer believes that the effectiveness of 
Johnson's language may have been limited by the
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speechwriter' s presence. While it appears that the 
President edited the practice tape thoroughly, it does not 
seem to this critic that the language of the discourse 
truly reflected Johnson's natural style. Despite the fact 
that the speech was written for a rather formal presenta­
tion, the language of the committee effort seems lifeless 
to this critic. For example, in speaking of South Vietnam, 
Johnson said:
We and our allies can only help 
to provide a shield--behind which 
the people of South Vietnam can 
survive and develop. On their 
efforts— on their determination 
and resourcefulness--the outcome 
will ultimately depend. That 
small, beleaguered nation has 
suffered terrible punishment for 
more than two decades. I pay 
tribute once again to the great 
courage and endurance of its 
people.66
Further in the speech, he spoke of President Thieu's 
actions in Vietnam:
On Wednesday of last week, President 
Thieu ordered the mobilization of 
135»0°0 additional South Vietnamese 
troops, for service in the armed 
forces. He plans to reach— as soon 
as possible— a level of some 800,000 
men in the regular and territorial
^  Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968. The White House: Statements of LBJ, "March 29* lyoo #12 Alter­
nate Draft #3*" Box 265.
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forces..........Last month, 10,000
men volunteered for military service 
— two and a half times the number 
of volunteers during the same month 
last year. Since the middle of 
January, more than ^8,000 South 
Vietnamese have joined the armed 
forces— nearly half of them 
volunteers.
Both of these passages reflect the formal and stilted 
language of the discourse. As the critic viewed the 
practice tape, she discovered that Johnson rambled through 
these passages with a sense of boredom. Even in the tele­
vised address, the President read from the teleprompter 
the lifeless statistics of the men, weapons, and casualties 
of war. He was unable to make those figures come alive 
as he once had on the campaign trail when the words were 
his own. While the language was precise and adapted to the 
formality of the occasion, it did not truly capture 
Johnson's natural style and speaking ability.
Busby seems to have captured the words of Johnson in 
the last five minutes of the speech. He projected the 
President struggling to lead the nation, willing to nego- 
tiatie with an enemy he so opposed, and able to divorce 
himself from four years in the White House in order to 
dedicate his working hours to ending the conflict abroad.
^  Draft. Address to the Nation,. March 31, 1968,"March 29, 19d8 #12 Alternate Draft #3, Box 265.
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Busby wrote the words which conveyed Johnson's personal 
convictions about national freedom and unity. He portrayed 
Johnson amid the trials of his office:
Fifty-two months and ten days ago, 
in a moment of tragedy and trauma, 
the duties of this office fell upon 
me. I asked then for 'your help 
and God's' that we might continue 
America on its course, binding 
up our wounds, healing our 
history, moving forward in new 
unity to clear the American agenda 
and to keep the American commitment for all our p e o p l e .
These words suggested Johnson's commitment much more 
personally than the language prepared by the committee.
It seems to this critic that two reasons may explain why 
Busby captured Johnson's natural style better than 
McPherson and the other participants. He had the benefit 
of working virtually alone with Johnson on the peroration. 
Throughout the preparation process the President actively 
edited the text and discussed the possible revisions with 
Busby. In addition, Busby, unlike McPherson, knew 
Johnson's style because he had worked with the President 
for years and had been called upon in many instances to 
write speeches for him. Many White House staff members 
agreed that Busby knew the essence of Johnson's rhetoric.
Draft, Address to the Nation, March 31, 1968, by 
Horace Busby. The White House: Statements of LBJ, "Ori­
ginal Drafts," Draft 3, Box 266.
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Although the committee did not enable the President 
to realize his fullest potential linguistically, this 
writer believes that there were aware of the significance 
of the situation and helped Johnson respond accordingly.
The advisors acted as gatekeepers regulating the flow of 
public opinion to Johnson. In this instance, the members 
of the committee projected the views of the American 
public and suggested ways in which he might effectively 
respond to those views. McNamara, Clifford, and McPherson 
seemed particularly capable of recognizing the significance 
of the situation and the need for Johnson to take some 
action. They knew the divisiveness of public opinion and 
America's sense of failure after the TET offensive. These 
participants had the foresight and ability to help Johnson 
re-evaluate the administration's policies and adapt them 
to the immediate circumstances surrounding the conflict 
abroad. This writer believes that the speechwriters not 
only were able to extend Johnson's understanding and re­
sponse to the situation but achieved their goals quite 
effectively.
The writers may not have been able to help the 
President present his ideas in his own natural style, but 
they did assist him in outlining the administration's 
policies precisely with one exception. This critic believes 
that the committee's inability to reach a consensus about
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troop levels and the bombing limits led to some ambiguity. 
For example, the President had to juggle any decision he 
might make at the moment about troop levels with the 
ultimate decision he might announce in the speech. He 
could not justify sending a small number of men early in 
the year and ask for a surtax to cover the expense without 
considering how many men he might send.after the first of 
April and how much these additional troops would cost.
The continued ambiguity on bombing limits eventually ' 
resulted in an embarrassing situation for the administra­
tion. Had the committee and Johnson agreed on these 
issues earlier and articulated their position, they could 
have eliminated some difficulties. This writer believes 
that while the committee assisted Johnson in proposing a 
new policy they did not succeed in presenting a superior 
and flawless technical statement of this change in admini­
strative policy.
Lyndon Johnson clearly had two goals in the March 31 
speech. First, he wanted to propose a new course of action 
in Southeast Asia. Secondly, he wanted to announce that 
he would not seek or accept his party's nomination for 
the Presidency. This writer believes that Johnson used 
both of these goals to try to show the public, Congress, 
the military forces, and the world that he was dedicated 
to the pursuit of peace and would take any means within
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his reach to resolve the crisis in Vietnam.
The public had heard Johnson speak of negotiations 
before. They listened to the opinions of editorialists, 
critics, and advisors. The American people had grown 
tired of empty rhetoric. The writer believes that Johnson's 
personal statement indicated to some degree his dedication 
to a new policy in Vietnam. Perhaps if anything were to 
encourage the public at this stage in the conflict, it 
was Johnson's decision to dedicate all his time to the 
problems at home and abroad. This critic contends that if 
anything was to grasp the public's attention at this point 
it was the statement from an ardent politician not to 
seek further political goals at the moment. Yet, many 
Americans saw Johnson's action as a statement of utter 
frustration and the futility of his policies.
Nevertheless, the speechwriter's influence in the 
speech may have helped to solidify the administration* s 
policy. The writers presented a policy which articulated 
public opinion better than had previous speeches. If 
these contentions are true, then perhaps the speechwriterrs 
presence contributed to producing a desired response.
Busby's ability to capture the President's natural style 
may have increased the effectiveness of this part of the 
speech. By announcing his intentions not to seek re- 
election, Johnson portrayed himself as a leader dedicated
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to negotiations rather than his own political gain.
Busby's contributions helped to portray Johnson as a 
dedicated leader, which was the President's goal. Hence, 
the speechwriter assisted Johnson in gaining his desired 
response.
The March 31 speech is significant not because it led 
to social change, but because the speech announced a 
change in American policies toward Southeast Asia. The 
speech also set a precedent for future presidencies. 
Johnson's decision not to run for office created a situa­
tion whereby he could largely divorce the Office of the 
President from the political event during a campaign year. 
While he may have created a "lame-duck" position for him­
self, Johnson eliminated all speculation that his actions 
in foreign affairs were linked to his own political gains. 
The speech served as an instrument for acknowledging his 
desires and announcing an altered course in foreign policy. 
The speechwriter assisted Johnson in clarifying his 
position and articulating his decisions to the American 
public.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The writer undertook this study with three "basic goals 
in mind:
To extend the rhetorical critic's 
awareness of the speechwriter's 
presence and influence on the 
drafting process and the final 
text.
To offer a systematic approach to 
the study of a ghostwritten speech 
in order to extend present metho­
dologies in rhetorical criticism.
To apply the proposed criteria to 
committee and individual speech- 
writing efforts in the Johnson 
administration.
The writer discusses the speechwriter's role and influence 
in the preparation process in order to determine how the 
speechwriter's presence contributed to the effectiveness 
of the speech. She also summarizes information on the 
presence and influence of the speechwriter in rhetorical 
criticism, reviews her theoretical postualtes, and shows 
how her methodology extends critical insight in studying 
a ghostwritten speech.
182
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Speechwriting and Rhetorical Criticism
Although critics have largely ignored speechwriters 
in their rhetorical criticism, this critic discovered that 
the speechwriter has long been associated with rhetorical 
history. In fact, speechwriting practices evolved in the 
cradle of Greek civilization where speakers in judicial 
courts required the speechwriter's assistance. Throughout 
history, speakers have enlisted the ghost's services in 
preparing political rhetoric. In contemporary politics, 
the American president is one of the most important 
international officials employing the services of speech­
writers. Especially since the advent of radio, these 
participants have been an integral part of the presidential 
staff. In the last forty years, most presidents have 
prepared few major addresses without their speechwriter1s 
assistance.
Franklin D. Roosevelt relied on a "Brain Trust" to 
prepare his presidential messages and encouraged them to 
takn an active, critical role in the process. Harry 
Truman's writers polished his style as they edited, his 
speeches. The speechwriters of the Eisenhower administra­
tion formed a regimented staff and prepared addresses with 
the precision and skill of a military organization. During 
the early 1960's, John F. Kennedy relied on individual
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speechwriters, like Theodore Sorens.en, rather than a com­
mittee of writers. Lyndon Johnson's speechwriters, however, 
formed a "wheel-like" structure with Johnson at the center. 
Richard Nixon’s staff took an active role in research and 
audience analysis. The writers of Gerald Ford's admini­
stration played significant roles in the inventional pro­
cess, contributing to the ideas and policies of the 
administration. While Roosevelt encouraged his writers 
to be critical in the process, James E. (Jimmy) Carter 
insisted that his speechwriters be willing to accept his 
criticism and revisions in their drafts. This critic 
concludes that although speechwriters played various roles 
in the drafting process, contemporary presidents have re­
lied heavily on their services.
The critic has located a few major trends in presi­
dential speechwriting practices. In some situations the 
speechwriter participated only in the editing process or 
contributed the ideas or form of those ideas in drafting 
a speech. In other presidencies, speechwriters worked 
individually with the speaker or collectively in a group 
as a committee in preparing the speaker's rhetoric. 
Regardless of their degree of involvement, in all instances, 
the speechwriter1s presence influenced the speechwriting 
process and final text.
Despite the influx of ghosts in the contemporary 
presidency, the writer found that few rhetorical critics
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considered their impact on the preparation process and 
the final discourse. In fact, throughout rhetorical 
history, very few theorists have so much as mentioned 
the speechwriter in critical methodologies. Only 
W. Norwood Brigance, Ernest G. Bormann, Marie Hochmuth 
Nichols, Herbert Simons, and a few others have discussed 
the significance of the speechwriter in rhetorical criticism. 
In the past ten years a handful of students in rhetorical 
studies have focused on the speechwriter in theses and 
dissertations. However, no theorists has proposed a 
specific methodology for extending present critical forms 
to take into account the influence of the speechwriter.
Extending Rhetorical Methodologies
After examining contemporary presidential speech- 
writing practices and the role of speechwriting in rhetori­
cal criticism, this critic concluded that present critical 
methodologies are inadequate in examining a ghostwritten 
speech. While critics may examine the speech text and 
assume that it is the product of an individual speaker or 
the work of a committee, they have no way of determining 
what impact the speechwriter's presence has on the drafting 
process or the subsequent product. This writer believes 
that by describing the speechwriter's role, his interaction
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with the speaker, his contributions to the ideas and 
language of the discourse and the speaker's response to 
the rhetorical situation, as well as evaluating his con­
tributions, the critic can enlarge his understanding of the 
speechmaking process.
By studying the speechwriter's role and influence 
in the preparation process, critics can better evaluate 
the speaker's message. The interaction between the 
participants can be a key to the critic's knowledge of the 
speaker's intentions. It may also reflect the speaker's 
awareness of public opinion, opposing arguments, the 
possible alternatives open to his consideration. By 
examining the interaction between a president and his 
writers, the critic may discern how the speaker's purpose 
was articulated to his writers. The critic may also dis­
cover how aware the speaker was of public opinion. In the 
interaction process, one might find out what possible 
alternatives the speaker considered and how he came to 
adopt a particular course of action. Finally, by examining 
the interaction process, the critic could evaluate the 
writer's ability to extend the President's understanding 
of the situation, public opinion, and alternative courses 
of action. The critic might also discover how the speaker 
came to adopt a viewpoint articulated in his speech.
When a critic examines a speaker's rhetoric he is 
concerned with the speaker's ability to analyze his audience
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and respond to that audience. The speechwriter is a very 
important part of the analysis and response process. For 
example, in Johnson's March 31. 1968 speech, the partici­
pants made Johnson more aware of the public's dissatis­
faction with his policies. The speechwriters also shared 
with Johnson the discontent they heard from individuals 
in the military forces. Consequently, the writers helped 
Johnson analyze the situation and urged him to respond by 
revising his Southeast Asian policy. If Johnson had not 
had access to the participant's observations and analysis, 
then he may have continued to endorse existing administra­
tive policy. As a result, he would have limited his 
perception of public opinion and possible alternatives 
available to him. The participant's contributions in 
outlining a new policy, enabled Johnson to extend his own 
ideas. In addition, the speech offered Johnson an oppor­
tunity to re-evaluate existing policies and endorse a new 
course of action.
If a critic is aware of the speechwriter's role and 
influence, he will be better able to evaluate the ideas 
expressed in the speech. He will be in a position to 
determine if the ideas expressed in the speech reflect 
the speaker's background or if those ideas were born out 
of an exchange between the speaker and his writers. Then 
the critic can determine if the writer's participation
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extends the proposed ideas or limits the content of the .. 
message. The critic explains the writer's contributions 
in extending or limiting the speaker's ideas. For example, 
critics examining the State of the Union address in 196 ,̂ 
might find that because Moyers, Valenti, and other Johnson 
aides confronted poverty and the problems of unequality 
in their own backgrounds, they were better able to assist 
the President in expressing ideas related to those prob­
lems of unequality in their own backgrounds, they were 
better able to assist the President in expressing ideas 
related to those problems in the "War on Poverty" legisla­
tive programs, than were the Kennedy men. On the contrary, 
the former Kennedy aides who had no referent to the ideas 
expressed in the speech might limit Johnson's rhetorical 
effectiveness in presenting those ideas.
The critic's knowledge of the speechwriter and his 
influence assists him in evaluating the language of the 
discourse. A critic who knew that the speechwriter pre­
pared the language of a speech might be better able to 
understand why the rhetoric succeeded or failed. If, for 
instance, a critic discerns the ambiguity in a speaker's 
rhetoric and knows that a speechwriter prepared this 
language, he might concur that the speaker intentionally 
or unintentionally failed to articulate his ideas to the 
writer. Hence, his language might be perceived as
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ambiguous by the writer and articulated in the same manner. 
The writer's experience in preparing the language of a 
speech might be another factor of interest to a critic 
evaluating the discourse. For example, Sorensen's experi­
ence in preparing formal presidential addresses may have 
produced a more artistic product than if Johnson had pre­
pared the language of his speech alone. However, if the 
speechwriter were unfamiliar with the speaker's natural 
language, as was Sorensen in 196^, then he may not have 
captured the speaker's style in the discourse. Thus, the 
language of the speech did not truly reflect the speaker's 
style and may have produced an awkward circumstance for a 
speaker delivering his text.
This writer contends that when a critic examines a 
speech prepared by someone other than the speaker, he must 
extend his theoretical postulates for evaluating the text.
In addition to describing the preparation process and 
evaluating the speaker's effectiveness, the critic should 
judge the speechwriter's influence on the final text. The 
critic must examine how the speechwriter and speaker's 
interaction affects the language and ideas of the discourse. 
The critic might also consider the speechwriter’s assistance 
in responding to the rhetorical situation. Once the critic 
examines and explains the writer's role, he must analyze 
his contributions to the speechmaking process. He may
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evaluate those contributions in four ways:
1. Did the speechwriter1s presence 
enable the speaker to realize his 
fullest potential inventionally, 
linguistically, and in response to 
the rhetorical situation?
2. Did the speechwriter help to 
produce a superior text technically 
as well as artistically?
3. Did the speechwriter's presence 
and contributions contribute to 
producing the desired response?
Did the speech function as an 
instrument for social change?
By simply supplementing present critical methods in these 
areas, the critic can extend rhetorical theories of 
criticism to encompass the speechwriter's presence and 
influence in speech preparation.
While this writer believes that her criteria are 
applicable in examining a ghostwritten speech, she is 
not so bold to suggest that the methodology is flawless. 
This system, like other methods of rhetorical criticism, 
leaves room for adaptability. The rhetorician may find 
that he does not have sufficient information to examine 
each area as extensively as he would like to examine it. 
He may also find that any evaluative judgments he could 
make might be limited as well. However, this writer 
believes that by proposing such open-ended system for 
criticism she allows the critic to adapt the theoretical
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postulates to his own particular needs.
Finallyi the critic contends that her criteria are by 
no means a necessarily sufficient method for criticizing 
a speech. Her intentions from the beginning have been to 
propose a supplemental form which might be applicable to 
speechwriting practices. She suggests that her criteria 
be adapted to any method of rhetorical criticism which 
the critic may already understand. The proposed criteria 
are meant to supplement such critical forms as a canonical 
approach to criticism, a Burkean analysis, Hillbruner's 
intrinsic and extrinsic methods, or any other applicable 
systems of criticism. The writer encourages critics to 
discover new ways to adapt and extend these proposed cri­
teria to existing forms of rhetorical criticism in order 
to perfect our methods of analysis and understanding of 
the speechmaking process.
By examining the speechwriter's role in preparing 
presidential rhetoric, this critic discovered several 
characteristics of speechwriting which should interest 
other critics and open the door to research in this area.
She proposes that future critics extend speechwriting 
studies to expand their knowledge in these aspects of 
communication: the effects of the speechwriter on other 
public speaking environments, the influence of speechwriting 
practices on the theorist's understanding of small group
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
192
communication, and the effects of the media on speech- 
writing practices.
While a critic might enhance his knowledge of presi­
dential rhetoric by further comparing the speechwriting 
practices of several administrations, this writer believes 
that critics have much insight to gain from comparing 
presidential practices with those used by other political 
figures, business leaders, and academicians. Among the 
studies which might be very profitable are: a comparative 
study between a speaker's ghostwritten and non-ghostwritten 
speeches, a comprehensive study of the use of speechwriters 
in major corporations, or the use of ghosts in the rhetoric 
of social, political, economic, or educational movements. 
These endeavors could add to the critic's knowledge of 
speechwriting practices in other environments. They could 
also enhance our understanding of the impact of the ghost's 
presence in contemporary speechmaking. By comparing presi­
dential practices with the practices of business leaders, 
for example, critics might observe strengths and weaknesses 
which might improve his rhetoric by adopting particular 
practices.
Critical studies of speechwriting may also enlarge the 
theorist's knowledge of small group communication. Speech- 
writing practices offer theorists an environment for 
testing many of their hypotheses of group interaction, par­
ticipative roles, and goals, the effectiveness of a group
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product versus an individual effort, and the function of 
groups in political as well as business settings. Studies 
could be pursued in any of these areas and in applying 
principles of small group research to usually individual 
speechmaking efforts, to determine the effect of interac­
tion on the speaker and his discourse. Critics might also 
compare group decision-making processes to a speaker's 
decision-making process in determining the ideas developed 
in speechwriting efforts.
Finally, since speechwriting practices have grown 
along with technology of the media, critics might extend 
their studies of speechwriting in regard to the media.
For example, critics might compare campaign speechwriting 
before and after the development of television to evaluate 
the media's impact on the speechwriting practices. Re­
searchers might also study the speechwriter's perceptions 
of the media's ability to create*exigence, to influence 
public opinion, and to alter the effectiveness of the 
speaker's discourse as well as the speechwriter's ability 
to create rhetoric which might alter the media's portrayal 
of a speaker. Through their studies, critics would hope­
fully be better able to explain the effects of the media 
on contemporary speaking.
By extending studies of speechwriting practices and 
their influence on other areas of communication, critics 
.can develop a greater awareness of contemporary speaking
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variables. They may also develop a greater appreciation 
of the speechwriter1s contributions to public speaking.
In addition, they may extend the application of rhetorical 
theories to new communication environments.
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